The sectarian regime is the cause of sectarianism among the opposition – 2014

Much of the criticism of the Syrian resistance to the Assad regime is of the fact that Sunni sectarianism has become an important element within it, in particular sectarianism against the Alawites, ie, the sect to which Assad belongs. This criticism is justified, especially with reference to the extreme jihadist elements, but is also greatly exaggerated and generalised to unjustly cover all the resistance, which is also anti-sectarian in large part.

Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that there has been a gradual drift further towards sectarian discourse even among non-jihadist parts of the resistance. Often this is merely verbal, on the part of such groups, and (unlike the jihadist-sectarians) does not correspond to any propensity to engage in armed sectarian attacks. But this very fact, of groups that seemingly have no history of or ideological dedication to sectarianism adopting sectarian language, raises the question of what is driving the sectarian dynamic of the struggle – a struggle that began in 2011 as an anti-sectarian democratic struggle to overthrow a tyranny.

One of the answers most commonly given is that it has been driven by the sponsorship of parts of the resistance by Saudi Arabia, Qatar and other Gulf states, who are supposedly driven to divert the democratic struggle into a sectarian Sunni-Shia conflict in order that the democratic spirit of the Arab Spring does not reach their own tyrannical regimes. This is certainly a factor, but a hard look at the reality forces me to say that this factor has been greatly exaggerated and misunderstood (including in some pieces I have written, eg, https://mkaradjis.wordpress.com/2013/09/24/the-geopolitics-of-the-syrian-uprisinginsurgency).

One factor that has received not nearly enough discussion has been the role of the regime itself as the chief cause of sectarianism. As Gilbert Achcar wrote in a recent piece:

“Let us take Syria for example. It is obvious that the transformation of the armed forces by Hafez el-Assad into a Praetorian guard of the regime, based on minority religious sectarianism, was likely to feed sectarian rancours within the majority. Let us imagine that the Egyptian president were Coptic Christian, that his family dominated the economy of the country, that three-quarters of the officers of the Egyptian army were also Coptic and that the elite corps of the Egyptian army were close to one hundred per cent Coptic. Would one be astonished to see “Muslim extremism” thriving in Egypt? Yet the proportion of Alawites in Syria is comparable with that of Copts in Egypt, that is to say approximately one tenth of the population” (http://internationalviewpoint.org/spip.php?article3279).

Recently, in some discussion, Assad apologists have tried to tell me that the sectarian nature of the regime has been exaggerated, or is merely a reference to the religion of Assad himself. They point to the fact that there are a number of top positions occupied by Sunni (eg, Vice-President, Foreign Minister). For anyone in doubt, you ought to take a look at this map of the regime:

http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Maps/Syria-Regime-Chart-20130826_2

All the dark green are positions held by Alawites, light green Sunni, and yellow “Others.” First, don’t be confused by most of the yellow – nearly all of this is only yellow because it refers to businesses connected to the regime and so is only “other” in the sense that they are not individuals, and therefore cannot be given a sect. The only regime individuals I can see which are “other” (presumably Christian, Druze or Shia?) are four positions.

For the same reason, we can for the moment omit several dark green and light green squares which refer to regime-connected Alawite or Sunni businessmen, but who are not in the regime as such.

Counting just the regime individuals, we find there are 23 Alawites, 5 Sunni and 4 Others. That is, Alawites, some 10-15 percent of the population, occupy some 72 percent of the regime. Sunni, some 75-80 percent of the population, occupy under 16 percent of the regime. The “others”, with 4 positions, about 12 percent, would be slightly, but not enormously, over-represented (though given the regime discourse that it is the protector of “minorities,” we could thus say that “minorities” make up 20-25 percent of the population but 84 percent of the regime, and the vast Sunni majority only 16 percent of the regime).

Then we need to look at other aspects.

First, a large part of the Alawite regime people are connected to Assad by family, so the regime is both sectarian and family-run.

Second, Alawite elements are absolutely dominant within the military and security elements of the regime – including head of the Republican Guard, chief of staff of the Armed Forces, head of Military Intelligence, head of Air Force Intelligence, director of National Security Bureau, head of Presidential Security etc. What this means is that the appointment of a few loyal Sunnis to the officially top positions – Defence Minister and Interior Minister – takes on the nature of being largely cosmetic, ceremonial.

Third, looking now at all the yellow-coloured regime-connected businesses. These are of course the Syrian bourgeoisie – the big bourgeoisie, who absolutely dominate the economy. They are connected via two main branches. First, all the top right of the chart shows large companies (eg oil, banking, telecom etc) connected via Alawite, and Assad-family-connected, members of the regime. This includes Assad’s cousins, the Makhlouf family, who reportedly control some 40-60 percent of the Syrian economy.

But of course, if the regime is absolutely Alawite-dominated, where it can claim to be a little more “multi-cultural” in relation to the capitalist class – you wouldn’t want to exclude traditionally dominant big Sunni capital. So the whole bottom-right of the chart shows big businesses connected via the “Sunni business elite” who are in turn connected by marriage to Maher al-Assad, the president’s brother and head of the Republican Guard (wow, talk about the state as the “bodies of armed men” defending the capitalist class – hard to get it more open that that).

So to the extent that the regime isn’t entirely Alawite, it is the Sunni mega-capitalist class that is its chief non-Alawite support base.

So now let’s further summarise, the regime is:

1. Alawite sectarian
2. Assad family-run
3. The executive committee par-excellence of the Syrian mega-capitalist class.

So when an Alawite-sectarian regime that has ruled for decades launches unlimited war against its population who rise up for democratic rights, and the majority of the rising population (though by no means all of it) just happen to be Sunni, then Achcar is right that this “was likely to feed sectarian rancours within the majority.”
And it works the other way as well. As Thomas Pierret explains:

“The kin-based/sectarian nature of the military is what allows the regime to be not merely “repressive”, but to be able to wage a full-fledged war against its own population. Not against a neighboring state, an occupied people or a separatist minority, but against the majority of the population, including the inhabitants of the metropolitan area (i.e. Damascus and its suburbs). There are very few of such cases in modern history … No military that is reasonably representative of the population could do what the Syrian army did over the last two years, i.e. destroying most of the country’s major cities, including large parts of the capital. You need a sectarian or ethnic divide that separates the core of the military from the target population. Algeria went through a nasty civil war in the 1990s, and Algerian generals are ruthless people, but I do not think that the Algerian military ever used heavy artillery against one of the country’s large cities” (http://angryarab.blogspot.com.au/2013/04/angry-arab-interviews-thomas-pierret-on.html).

But it is not only the presence of a totally sectarian regime waging war against its people that promotes a sectarian dynamic. It is also the fact that the regime early on set up sectarian Alawite militias (the Shabiha) to terrorise specifically Sunni populations, including through mass murder of hundreds of people at a time (the list is well-known: Houla, Tremseh, Bayda and Banyas etc), and ethnic cleansing, not to mention the wholesale destruction of districts and cities where Sunni live. To again quote Pierret:

“The problem is that many people do not even recognize the sectarian character of these atrocities, claiming that repression targets opponents from all sects, including Alawites. In fact ordinary repression does target opponents from all sects, but collective punishments (large-scale massacres, destruction of entire cities) are reserved for Sunnis, just like they were reserved for Iraqi Shiites and Kurds under Saddam Hussein.”

A sectarian, anti-Alawite response is thus to be expected as much as we find anti-Jewish responses among many Palestinians (and check Hamas’ virulently anti-Jewish founding charter if you don’t believe me, largely based on the Protocols). I believe Hamas has moved on a great deal since its founding charter, and I don’t think this characterises its politics today. However, such discourse understandably remains a factor among many Palestinians, and the address for those responsible for this is in Tel Aviv.

That of course does not make it alright. But the point of this contribution is not to justify real sectarian politics among some sections of the opposition, but to analyse its cause. A number of points can be made.

First, the fact that sectarian views have been rising among sections of the opposition, and that this had led to a number of actual sectarian attacks and crimes, and even at least one large-scale sectarian crime – the monstrous ISIS-led attack on Alawite villages in Lattakia in August 2013, when nearly 200 were massacred (http://www.hrw.org/reports/2013/10/11/you-can-still-see-their-blood) – is evidence that the regime’s crimes are the major factor making life insecure for the Alawite masses, in the same way as the crimes of the Zionist regime occupying Palestine are the main factor making life insecure for the Jewish masses.

Second, the massacre just referred to is the only one on that scale, ie, on a similar scale to the kinds of massacres of Sunni that regime militias regularly carry out. That does not mean that smaller scale ones are OK. What it means is that, by and large, most sectarian attacks on Alawites by opposition forces have been opportunist attacks by undisciplined elements, not part of a strategy of any of the leading groups other than ISIS, and cannot be compared to the massacres organised by the regime.

It is also important to be aware of fake “sectarian massacre” stories spread by the regime, such as the alleged massacre of Shia villagers in Hatla in June 2013 (see http://blog.you-ng.it/2013/06/17/hatla-fabrication-of-a-massacre), the more recent faked “Adra massacre” (see http://www.interpretermag.com/the-massacre-in-syria-that-wasnt/ and especially http://lopforum.tumblr.com/post/70411153632/alleged-adra-massacre-collated-media), the alleged large scale massacre of Kurds by jihadists last August (where the jihadists did carry out crimes in their war against the Kurds, but not of this nature or scale, seehttp://claysbeach.blogspot.com.au/2013/08/breaking-news-assad-iran-you-lie-on.html), among others.

As for Lattakia itself, ISIS is of course widely reviled by the rest of the opposition, who see it as either a front for the regime or a dictatorship which must also be fought, and since early January 2014 all the other resistance forces have been engaged in a frontal war on ISIS.

Third, therefore, it is wrong to call the entire war a sectarian conflict or to call the entire anti-Assad uprising a sectarian uprising. In such a wide-ranging revolt against the murderous regime, there is a huge spectrum of opinions on everything. The task of supporters of the Syrian revolution is to do our best to support the best, anti-sectarian elements. To take one example, the contrast between the ISIS-led massacre of Alawites last August, and this appeal by the local FSA Battalions and Committees of the Sahel (Coast) in solidarity with Alawites in Lattakia who were waging their own struggle against the regime (http://darthnader.net/2012/10/13/and-then-there-was-hope/), speaks volumes about the differences between elements of the opposition. This is also the case with many Islamist groups outside the jihadist-sectarian fringe; for example, Liwa al-Tawhid, the large moderate-Islamist militia that dominates Aleppo, makes a point of protecting Christians (http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2013/Sep-21/232025-christian-hostel-in-aleppo-has-own-view-of-jihadist-rebels.ashx#axzz2gfb4z1J2). Indeed there are Alawite, Christian and Druze units of the FSA; here is an important article about anti-Assad Alawites: http://freehalab.wordpress.com/2013/06/04/the-free-alawite-front/.

Fourth, however, the fact of this sectarian aspect, even if only from part of the resistance, makes it all the more difficult for the Alawite masses – which, if we take out the those in the ruling elite, are, like most Sunnis, often poor rural folk – to break with the regime and join the ranks of the revolution. Even many of those who despise the regime. Of course this is a Catch-22 however – because to the extent that Alawites are seen to be blocking with a sectarian regime that it slaughtering the majority, anti-Alawite sectarianism will increase, whereas if a powerful anti-Assad group of Alawites did emerge, it would nullify such a trend. Which adds weight to the view that a purely “military situation” is impossible, and that if some kind of ceasefire could be forced out of the regime, which allowed for the civil struggle to resume, it could be a good thing for the revolution if such space were used right.

Finally, however, the fact that this sectarianism has been created, driven, perpetuated by the regime, also means that purely “diplomatic solutions,” that aim to save the regime with some cosmetic changes, will also not work – the chief cause of the cancer cannot be the “shield” against it, as some imagine. Both diplomacy and military struggle, like civil struggle, are tactics, parts of an overall “revolutionary solution,” which removes the regime. Even to get to a ceasefire that aids the struggle – ie, the opposite of one that merely allows the regime to go on killing behind a façade after the revolutionary forces have demobilised – will require not nice talk to a regime that has waged all-out, unlimited war for three years, but real military pressure on it via the opposition being able to get real arms in relevant quantities.

And if we have to accept that at this stage, part of the resistance has become sectarian due to the regime’s sectarianism, and that little can be done about it until the regime is removed, by the same token all the non-sectarian parts of the resistance need to wage a relentless struggle against the influence of this destructive, reactionary sectarianism within its ranks – the war currently being launched against ISIS scum by the rest of the resistance being a very positive step in that direction.

Israel and the Syrian War 2014

By Michael Karadjis

This is not an article, but a collection of links. Among those leftists defending the Assad dictatorship and its brutal war on its people, many claim the opposition does not consist only of proxies of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, other Gulf states and Turkey, but also proxies of Israel. This is odd, given Israel’s well-documented preference for a victory of a weakened Assad over any of the available alternatives. Assad, after all, has not only maintained total peace – without even symbolic moves – on the border of the Israeli-annexed Syrian Golan Heights for 40 years, a policy which Israel quite rightly does not trust any of the Syrian opposition to continue, but has also led countless attacks on Palestinians, their refugee camps, their organisations and their militants, including major aggression in 1976, 1983 and 1985-86 – and now, in countless criminal bombings and starvation sieges of Palestinian camps in Syria. See my article on this sordid history here: https://mkaradjis.wordpress.com/2013/09/24/syria-and-the-palestinians-almost-no-other-arab-state-has-as-much-palestinian-blood-on-its-hands

Yet the occasional Israeli leader holds a dissident view. Israel, after all, is a “democracy,” as long as you are White and Jewish. So when retired Israeli ambassador to the US, Michael Oren, recently asserted that Israel’s interest was in a victory of the bad guys not connected to Iran (ie, the Syrian rebels) over the bad guys connected to Iran (ie, the Assad regime), the pro-Assad left spread it round their websites like wildfire – finally they had found the unique voice of an Israeli leader that validated their assertions. Alas, the reason for this wildfire was precisely that it was so unique. How do the views of one retired ambassador compare in weight to the mass of views expressed in this resource below by so many top Israeli political leaders, IDF leaders, Mossad and other intelligence officials, top strategists and academics?

1. “The Israeli Position toward the Events in Syria” looks at varying views among different sections of the Zionist ruling class and weighs them up, rather than assuming there is “an Israeli view.” This article covered the view above – regarding Syria as the link between Iran and Hezbollah – but also other concerns, particularly that the Assad dynasty has maintained its border with the Israel-occupied Golan Heights meticulously quiet for 40 years, which may not be the case if it is overthrown – and came to the conclusion that, overall, for the Zionist rulers, the dangers of the overthrow of Assad outweigh the possible benefits, despite differing views. In particular, given this paper was written in May 2011, just a few months into the uprising and long before it descended into armed conflict, the author’s conclusions are fascinating:

i. Israel would prefer that the Syrian regime not be peacefully overthrown;
ii. Israel would prefer not to respond to the Syrian people’s demand for freedom and democracy
iii. Israel hopes that the Syrian regime will resort to repressive and bloody responses to the intifada instead of entering into negotiations with the various shades of opposition, and reaching political solutions that ensure real and comprehensive reforms
iv. Israel prefers the continuation of a Syrian regime founded on tyranny and corruption in its mode of governance, as evidenced by various Israeli statements to this effect
v. Israel would prefer that Syria descends into a state of sectarian conflict that would continue as long as possible, rather than a Syrian transformation from situation of struggle to one of freedom and democracy

Clearly, Assad played the Israeli card perfectly (http://english.dohainstitute.org/release/284e36f8-7bd1-4d84-89a6-a1e9ee1b835a).

2. Israel’s intelligence chief, Major General Aviv Kochavi, “warned that “radical Islam” was gaining ground in Syria, saying the country was undergoing a process of “Iraqisation”, with militant and tribal factions controlling different sectors of the country”, and claiming there was “an ongoing flow of Al-Qaeda and global jihad activists into Syria”. Making clear that his fears were about Assad losing, he said that with the Assad regime weakening, “the Golan Heights could become an arena of activity against Israel, similar to the situation in Sinai, as a result of growing jihad movement in Syria” (http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2012/Jul-17/180917-assad-moving-troops-from-golan-to-damascus-israel.ashx#axzz20t8QAeyJ).

3. In a similar vein, Yoav Zitun, writing for Israeli newsagency Ynet, reported that, “The IDF is preparing for the possibility that global Jihad terrorists will launch attacks from Syria in case President Bashar Assad’s regime will fall … Army officials are not ruling a situation whereby terrorists will take advantage of the chaos that may follow a regime change in Damascus to seize control of the border region, as was the case in the Sinai Peninsula after Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak was overthrown.” The army was “gearing for a number of possible scenarios, including a cross-border attack by global jihad, which is operating in Syria against Assad’s regime”. Brigadier-General Tamir Haiman warned of possible attacks “launched without prior warning from army intelligence – as was the case in the attack in Ein Netafim a year ago, which originated in Sinai” (http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4248954,00.html).

4. According to Khaled Amayreh in Al-Ahram, Israel was “dismayed” by the election victory of Muslim Brotherhood chief Mursi in Egypt. He claimed a major “pillar” of Israeli policy “was courting and neutralising Arab dictators who proved highly effective in pacifying their own masses” but now Israel “is beginning to lose” this pillar. He quotes Ron Ben-Yishai, editor-in-chief of the Israeli website Ynet, not only warning of the “danger posed by the ascendancy of the Muslim Brotherhood to the helm of power in the most important and populous Arab country”, but also that “Egypt’s Islamicisation constitutes a very negative harbinger for secular regimes that rely on the army, not only in Lebanon and Syria, but also in Jordan and the Palestinian Authority”. Israel’s defence minister Ehud Barak stated “The moment Assad starts to fall we will conduct intelligence monitoring and will liaise with other agencies” regarding such intervention (http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2012/1104/eg7.htm).

5. Straight after the bombing of military facilities near Damascus on May 5, Israel sought to persuade Assad that the air strikes “did not aim to weaken him in the face of a more than two-year-old rebellion… Officials say Israel is reluctant to take sides in Syria’s civil war for fear its actions would boost Islamists who are even more hostile to Israel than the Assad family, which has maintained a stable stand off with the Jewish state for decades”. According to veteran Israeli politician Tzachi Hanegbi, a confidant of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the government “aimed to avoid an increase in tension with Syria by making clear that if there is activity, it is only against Hezbollah, not against the Syrian regime” (http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/05/06/18079587-israel-to-syrias-assad-airstrikes-not-aimed-at-helping-rebels?lite).

6. As Yuval Steinitz, Israeli Minister of Intelligence and Strategic Affairs, explained, the “only scenario” for Israeli military action in Syria would be to “prevent the delivering of arms, chemical weapons and other kinds of weapons into the hands of terrorists” and noted that Netanyahu had made clear that “if there will be no threat to Israel, we won’t interfere.” Steinitz emphasized that Israel was not urging the U.S. to take any military action “whatsoever” in Syria at this stage” (http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505263_162-57582025/syrian-rebels-to-get-1st-direct-u.s-support-as-$8m-in-medical-supplies-rations-set-for-delivery/).

7. In a meeting with British prime minster Cameron, Netanyahu, who was visiting London for Thatcher’s funeral, again warned of the danger of western arms reaching Jihadists rebels that could be used later against Israel and western targets. (http://www.haaretz.com/misc/article-print-page/britain-less-eager-to-arm-syrian-rebels-following-intel-on-al-qaida-links.premium-1.518235).

8. In an interview with BBC TV, Netanyahu called the Syrian rebel groups among “the worst Islamist radicals in the world … So obviously we are concerned that weapons that are ground-breaking, that can change the balance of power in the Middle East, would fall into the hands of these terrorists,” he said (http://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-wary-quiet-on-syrian-front-may-soon-end).

9. Israel also “worries that whoever comes out on top in the civil war will be a much more dangerous adversary” than Assad has ever been, specifically in relation to the Golan Heights. “The military predicts all that (the 40-year peaceful border) will soon change as it prepares for the worst.” The region near the occupied Golan has become “a huge ungoverned area and inside an ungoverned area many, many players want to be inside and want to play their own role and to work for their own interests,” said Gal Hirsch, a reserve Israeli brigadier general, claiming Syria has now become “a big threat to Israel” over the last two years. The military’s deployment on the Golan is its most robust since 1973, “and its most obvious manifestation is the brand new border fence, 6 meters (20 feet) tall, topped with barbed wire and bristling with sophisticated anti-infiltration devices” (http://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-wary-quiet-on-syrian-front-may-soon-end).

10. “Israel could launch a pre-emptive strike to stop Syria’s chemical weapons from reaching Lebanon’s Hezbollah or al-Qaida inspired groups … Israel has long expressed concerns that Syrian President Bashar Assad, clinging to power during a 22-month civil war, could lose control over his chemical weapons”
(http://news.yahoo.com/israel-warns-attack-syrian-chemical-weapons-181427470.html).

11. The Syrian government has withdrawn large numbers of troops from the Golan Heights … Rebel groups have moved into the vacuum, the report said, and Israel fears that jihadists will use the area as a staging ground for attacks on Israeli territory” (http://world.einnews.com/article/145179407/uEIDkYaz8DaA9cYH?afid=777&utm_source=MailingList&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Breaking+News%3A+world348-monday).

12. “Israel’s military chief of staff has warned that some of the rebel forces trying to topple Syrian President Bashar al-Assad may soon turn their attention southward and attack Israeli settlements in the Golan Heights.” ”We see terror organisations that are increasingly gaining footholds in the territory and they are fighting against Assad,”
Lieutenant-General Benny Gantz said at a conference in Herzliya, north of Tel Aviv. “Guess what? We’ll be next in line” (http://www.smh.com.au/world/syria-rebels-a-threat-to-golan-20130312-2fylt.html?skin=text-only).

13. “Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu on Sunday said Israel would erect a new security fence along its armistice line with Syria in order to protect the Jewish state from “infiltration and terrorism. “We know that on the other side of our border with Syria today, the Syrian army has moved away, and global jihad forces have moved in,” he said. “We must therefore protect this border from infiltrations and terror, as we have successfully been doing along the Sinai border” (http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/163906).

14. “Despite Netanyahu’s weekly warnings on Iran, Syria is more imminent danger. The IDF views Iran as a problem for the ‘international community,’ but worries that the Syrian Golan could became a new version of the Gaza Strip. The main danger is brewing in Syria, where the 40 years of quiet that began in the wake of the Yom Kippur War have come to an end. Bashar Assad is still in his palace, but the post-Assad era has already started. The worrisome scenario in the north is that after Assad is gone Israel will be attacked, and the Syrian Golan will turn into a new version of the Gaza Strip, with southern Lebanon serving as a base for launching rockets and missiles. This is what is concerning the IDF’s top brass. Assad’s control of the Golan is disintegrating as his forces are being drawn into the decisive battles around Damascus and the fight for the city’s international airport (http://www.haaretz.com/misc/article-print-page/despite-netanyahu-s-weekly-warnings-on-iran-syria-is-more-imminent-danger.premium-1.515547).

15. Defence ministry strategist Amos Gilad stressed that while “Israel has long made clear it is prepared to resort to force to prevent advanced Syrian weapons reaching Hezbollah or jihadi rebels”, Israel was not interested in attacking Syria’s chemical weapons because “the good news is that this is under full control (of the
Syrian government)” (http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/04/us-syria-crisis-chemical-israel-idUSBRE94309720130504).

16. According to Aaron Klein and Karl Vick writing in Time in February, “Hizballah is not Israel’s only concern – or perhaps even the most worrying. Details of the Israeli strikes make clear the risk posed by fundamentalist militants sprinkled among the variegated rebel forces fighting to depose Assad … jihadist groups are less vulnerable to the same levers that have proved effective against Syria and other states – such as threats to its territory — or even the frank interests of an organization like Hizballah, which as a political party plays a major role in Lebanon’s government” (http://world.time.com/2013/02/01/the-fallout-from-the-air-raid-on-syria-why-israel-is-concerned).

17. “Israel prefers the regime of President Bashar Assad in Syria to continue than see a takeover of the country by rebel Islamist militants,” The Times of London reported in May 2013, quoting an Israeli intelligence official. “Better the devil we know than the demons we can only imagine if Syria falls into chaos, and the extremists from across the Arab world gain a foothold there,” the official said, according to the report. According to the Times, the senior intelligence officer in the north of Israel said a weakened but stable Syria under Assad is not only better for Israel but for the region as a whole (http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/israeli-official-assad-preferable-to-extremist-rebels-the-times-of-london-reports-1.524605).

18. ‘Israel’s Man in Damascus – Why Jerusalem Doesn’t Want the Assad Regime to Fall’ – heading in Foreign Affairs (May 10, 2013), article by Efraim Halevy, who served as chief of the Mossad from 1998 to 2002:

“Israel’s most significant strategic goal with respect to Syria has always been a stable peace, and that is not something that the current civil war has changed. Israel will intervene in Syria when it deems it necessary; last week’s attacks testify to that resolve. But it is no accident that those strikes were focused solely on the destruction of weapons depots, and that Israel has given no indication of wanting to intervene any further. Jerusalem, ultimately, has little interest in actively hastening the fall of Bashar al-Assad.

“Israel knows one important thing about the Assads: for the past 40 years, they have managed to preserve some form of calm along the border. Technically, the two countries have always been at war — Syria has yet to officially recognize Israel — but Israel has been able to count on the governments of Hafez and Bashar Assad to enforce the Separation of Forces Agreement from 1974, in which both sides agreed to a cease-fire in the Golan Heights, the disputed vantage point along their shared border. Indeed, even when Israeli and Syrian forces were briefly locked in fierce fighting in 1982 during Lebanon’s civil war, the border remained quiet. Israel does not feel as confident, though, about the parties to the current conflict, and with good reason.

“Last week’s attacks were a case in point. Israel did not hesitate to order air strikes when it had intelligence that arms were going to be funneled from Syria to Hezbollah. Although Israel took care not to assume official responsibility for the specific attack, Minister of Defense Moshe Yaalon publicly stated that Israel’s policy was to prevent the passage of strategic weaponry from Syria to Lebanon. But parallel with that messaging, Israel also made overt and covert efforts to communicate to Assad that Jerusalem was determined to remain neutral in Syria’s civil war (http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139373/efraim-halevy/israels-man-in-damascus).

19. “Israel would prefer that Bashar Assad hold onto the presidency in Syria, rather than leave a power vacuum that could be filled by Islamic radicals, according to former IDF chief of staff Dan Halutz.
“The regime in Syria kills its citizens every day, but we must acknowledge that the opposition in Syria is composed of Muslim extremists like al-Qaeda,” he said at a fundraising event for Israel’s Tel Hashomer hospital in Moscow on Monday, according to the daily Maariv. “The question ‘what is better for Israel?’ is an important question because we must ask ourselves if we want to trade the bad regime we know for the very bad regime that we don’t know, and this is something that requires serious consideration.”

“At the moment it looks like even in the rest of the world, they understand that they cannot replace the Assad regime as long as they don’t know who will take its place,” he added. “Right now it looks like the alternative is forces that will endanger the stability of the region.

Meanwhile, many feared that anarchy would ensue if Assad were to fall, and Muslim extremist groups such as al-Qaeda would be free to flourish and even rule the country, which would have left them in control of Syria’s considerable chemical weapons stockpile (http://www.timesofisrael.com/ex-idf-chief-israel-prefers-that-assad-stay-in-power/).

20. Israel and the Syrian War: An Interview With Professor Eyal Zisser (December 6, 2013), of Tel Aviv University, one of Israel’s best-known academic experts on Syria and Lebanon and the former director of the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies.

Q. Could you describe the evolution of Israeli policy on Syria since 2011?
A. At first, Israel wanted Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to stay in power, thinking it was “the devil we know” and fearing the spread of chaos along the border. Then Israeli leaders came to the conclusion that Assad is finished. But then they became aware of the presence of al-Qaeda elements in Syria, like the rebel Nusra Front. So now the real position-not the official one-is that we wish both sides good luck and that it is in the interest of Israel that they continue fighting. Essentially, we want Assad to stay in power. We want him to be strong enough to keep the border quiet but weak enough so he will not present any real threat to Israel.

Q. What is the chance of Israel being dragged into war in Lebanon or with Syria?
A. Very low. Only if Israel is attacked by Assad-but why should he do such a stupid thing? However, Israel could find itself engaged in some local conflicts with Islamic extremists along the border or in a limited conflict with Assad if he decides to retaliate the next time Israel attacks targets in Syria. But clearly, everyone in Israel understands that Israel must not get involved in the war in Syria (http://carnegie-mec.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=53831)

21. Interview with Seymour Hersch, December 9, 2013, Democracy Now:

AMY GOODMAN: That’s David Shedd, the deputy director of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, the DIA, speaking in July. The significance of what Shedd said, and what he also couldn’t say, Seymour Hersh?

SEYMOUR HERSH: I don’t know what he could or could not say. I’m not in—I can’t get into his mindset. I just know that by then he had received one major report, and also the ops order was being conducted. And Shedd, by—Shedd’s been around a long time. He was in the CIA. And I haven’t talked to him, and I didn’t discuss this with him. But he’s a fine intelligence officer. And I—he’s reflecting on what—look, by the time he’s talking, inside the community, for the last year, it’s been known that the only game in town, whether you like it or don’t like it, was Bashar, because otherwise the—what we call the secular anti—the opposition to Bashar, the legitimate, non-radical, if you will, dissenters, people from within the army, people—civilians who didn’t like the lack of more social progress, etc., etc., they were overrun, even by—we know that beginning in early in the year. We knew they were being overrun by jihadists. And so, the only solution, it seemed to me, for—it seems for the government at the time, the people I know—and I’ve talked to people about this for years; it’s been more than a year of talk—is, the only solution for stability was Bashar. You have to just like it or don’t like it.

Israel, which—don’t forget, Damascus is, what, 40 miles, 45 miles from the Golan Heights and 130 miles south of—north of—northeast of Tel Aviv, easily within range of any missiles. The Israelis are not going to tolerate a jihadist government inside Syria, or even any area that the jihadists will claim as an area of sharia law. They’ll hit it. The only potential for stability was to keep Bashar there, or at least to get him in a position where maybe he’d be willing to negotiate some sort of collaborative government, which seems to be the only sensible theme right now (http://www.democracynow.org/2013/12/9/seymour_hersh_obama_cherry_picked_intelligence).

22. Netanyahu and Putin agree that Assad and Sisi are better than alternatives (20 December 2013)
Putin, believes Netanyahu, has an interest in Middle East stability and the confrontation of the threats posed by ‘extremist Islam’. It has been reported that Israel’s prime minister and Russia’s President Putin agree that having Bashar Al-Assad in Syria and Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi in Egypt is better than the current alternatives of “extremists” and the Muslim Brotherhood. Maariv newspaper added that Benjamin Netanyahu has also been promised by Putin that he will block any conference proposed to discuss nuclear disarmament in the Middle East (https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/middle-east/8908-netanyahu-and-putin-agree-that-assad-and-sisi-are-better-than-alternatives).

23. Jihadist tsunami on Israel’s borders: IDF barely ready for 2014

In the national security area, alongside “old” and known challenges, the security forces will be dealing with some new challenges in the coming year. The IDF and intelligence community must prepare an intelligence and operational infrastructure and develop fighting methods which will allow them to deal with a “jihadist tsunami” piling up on Israel’s borders, mainly in Syria.

We are talking about fanatic Salafi Sunnis operating as part of al-Qaeda or inspired by al-Qaeda, who are succeeding in laying their hands on huge amounts of modern weapons from the depositories of the Syrian army which Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic fronts have taken control of, and on Libyan weapons which keep flowing into the hands of Salafi groups operating in Sinai and Gaza.

The Israeli intelligence community is mainly concerned about Jabhat al-Nusra, which is active in Syria and includes some 10,000 motivated and experienced fighters, including about 1,000 foreigners from Europe and Asia. This is the biggest fighting system directly affiliated with al-Qaeda. If and when its people take over Syria, for example, they will direct their full fanatic passion and the weapons they have accumulated against us, in a way which will make us long for Hezbollah. The Americans, and mainly the Europeans, are also concerned about the al-Qaeda base which has taken its place on their doorstep (http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4472027,00.html).

……………………………………………….

And finally, though this is not specifically about Syria, this article shows that the claims about a great US-Israeli rift over the US rapproachment with Iran are exaggerated at best; indeed, Syria is one area of broad agreement:

24. The great US-Israel rift that isn’t
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/commentary/la-oe-1223-saban-u-s–israel-ties-20131224,0,2594785.story#axzz2p0kkGydX
Commentators point to discord on the Iran deal, but the two nations have an identical goal, by Haim Saban, December 24, 2013

In recent weeks, the media have had a field day reporting on a so-called rift in the U.S.-Israel relationship over the nuclear negotiations with Iran. The story makes for great headlines, but it’s poor analysis. Despite the heated rhetoric, the pillars that have anchored America’s most important alliance in the Middle East for more than six decades are just as firmly rooted today as they have ever been.

These fears come from a focus on form over substance. In statement after statement, President Obama and Netanyahu continue to articulate an identical goal: Iran must not have nuclear weapons.
For example, Israel recently hosted U.S. forces for “Blue Flag,” a major joint military exercise involving dozens of fighter jets. This is a perfect example of how Israel and the United States can put aside their differences on one issue and continue to work closely together to advance their shared interests: fighting terrorism, ending the war in Syria, promoting global development and stabilizing the Middle East.

Senior national security officials of both countries say that the U.S. and Israel have never enjoyed closer military and intelligence cooperation, with both countries, and countless others, safer as a result. With U.S. support, Israel has developed a cutting-edge missile defense system that one day may be used to guard America, just as Israeli technology protects the vehicles that U.S. soldiers drive in Afghanistan.

Haim Saban is a private equity investor, the chairman of the Spanish-language media company Univision and founder of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/commentary/la-oe-1223-saban-u-s–israel-ties-20131224,0,2594785.story#ixzz2p0lUiA77

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15 thoughts on “Israel and the Syrian War”

  1. Joseph Maizlish

January 5, 2014 at 3:54 pm Edit

Something additional about Haim Saban: As a child with his parents he left Egypt for Israel shortly following the “Lavon Affair,” the uncovering of an Israeli government plot which used some Egyptian Jews as participants in bombings at British properties in Egypt, apparently in hopes of alienating the British/U.S./etc. from the newly installed Egyptian government headed by Gamal Nasser. Among the results of the uncovering of the plot (some of whose bombings were carried out) was pressure against the Jewish communities in Egypt and the exit of many Jews from Egypt.

So we have the tragedy and irony of someone who both suffered from the counter-reaction against the violent overreaching of the Israeli government and found refuge from that counter-reaction in that government’s territory being now and having been for many years an adherent and advocate for that very government while it continues its violent overreaching.

Not a unique turn in human affairs, but a tragic one nonetheless, and in many ways.

Iran discussion 2013: Imperialist, sub-imperialist, anti-imperialist, capitalist even, revolutionary?

The following comment and reply was related to my article ‘The US, Iran, Russia-Syria and the geopolitical shift (December 2013): Anything for the region’s oppressed?’ when I first published that article on my Syrian Revolution: Commentary and Analysis blog. Tim Dobson posted a comment on Facebook criticising my article, but the substance of his criticism was about Iran, rather than about Syria as such. I put it up as a comment on my blog article and then replied there. However, with this new site, I am putting it up here as a stand-alone, because I believe there was much valuable discussion on the issue of Iran itself:

……………………………………………………………….

Tim Dobson posted the following comment on Facebook. As I see little point in getting into big discussions on a single person’s facebook account, I ahve taken the liberty to post his comment here so that I can reply. This is Tim’s comment:

Tim Dobson’s comment:

I disagree with Michael Karadjis on Syria but since this article is just as much about Iran (which know more about), I’ll just comment on that and how it has led some people astray on Syria (referring to Iranian imperialism, their ‘sectarian’ politics etc etc)

Mike writes ‘The US overtures to Iran and positive Iranian response have to be understood as part of a long-term process of bringing the relatively powerful Iranian bourgeoisie back into the fold – militarily, diplomatically and economically where it always belonged. While it may have been useful in the post Cold War era for the US and Israel to use Iran, as part of using “Islamic fundamentalism” (whether Shiite or Sunni or both) as a scarecrow to replace “communism” in order to maintain a permanent war threat in the region, sell lots of weapons, feed the masses with bullshit etc, the fact remains that there hasn’t been anything fundamentally antagonistic towards imperialism about the Iranian bourgeoisie for decades since its very bloody suppression of the revolution there in the 1980s.’

I think there are a number of things wrong here. Firstly, what powerful Iranian bourgeoise exists inside Iran? There isn’t one. The most powerful Iranian bourgeiouse live in Los Angeles and aren’t welcome back in Tehran. Why? Because the most powerful force during the 1979 revolution was the petty bourgeiouse (the Bazaari people) and that remains the case today. This may be peculiar but nonetheless true. This explains why politically they broke with imperialism but haven’t been able to break the back of imperialist domination economically (hence why the sanctions were so damaging). Its why the bazaari people and Sepah play such a big role politically and economically. Therefore, this process that Mike describing isn’t actually occurring. There has been little to no internal shifts within Iran economically during the last period (which surely such a process would bring about)

This idea of an Iranian bourgiousie being reintegrated also leads Mike to the strange conclusion that there hasn’t been anything ‘fundamentally antagonistic’ between Iran and imperialism. This may seem strange to people and that’s because it is. Firstly, Iran has never been that heavily demonised for its fundamentalism by imperialists, (mostly this has only be done by liberals), it has always been demonised for its antagonism towards imperilaist interests, however. Whether it is Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Bahrain etc the sanctions were imposed because of its threat to Israel, not because of its fundementalism.

After the revolution in ’79, Saudi Arabia funded and armed a wave of Wahhabists to try and roll back the revolutionary spirit from Iran spreading, which has never been charctisced by its religious stance but by its anti-imperialism.

Since the revolution of 1979, we’ve seen a ten year war waged against Iran by Iraq funded by US imperialism, using chemical weapons which killed millions of people. We’ve seen Iran become the biggest financial and military backer of Hamas, which has resisted multiple Israeli invasions, they are the biggest financial and military backers of Hezbollah who inflicted Israel possibly its greatest defeat in 2006. We’ve seen some of the harshest sanctions ever implemented on Iran, we’ve seen terrorist attacks occur in Iran itself and we’ve had at least 7 years of Israel trying to drum up a war against Iran.

What was this about if there was no fundamental antagonistism between Iran and imperialism? What is it all about? If that is not fundamental, then what is?

Instead, Mike reduces it to tactics and probably most extraordinarily as no different to US imperialism relationship with Saudi Arabia! (I must have missed the ten year war waged against it by US imperialism)

Over the past 35 years, it would be hard to find a country which has lost more people due to US imperialism, yet Mike has turned Iran into a sub-imperialist country engaged in Shiite sectarian politics (funding that well known Shiite group Hamas) and made it seem that US was engaged in anti-Sunni politics (Maliki was never popular with the states, nor was Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, UAE affected by this anti-sunni politics. Bahrain, a mostly Shiite country, didn’t seem to benefit much either.)

I know Syria is the topic of the day for the left (Poor Iran had its day of focus in 2009) and Iran is the comfortable bogeyman in that context but to try and argue that Iran is an imperialist force requires such a re-writing of history and of contemporary reality, not to mention a denial of the lived experience of the Iranian people, that it becomes seriously offensive.

My reply to Tim Dobson on Iran:

When writing this article that Tim is replying to (his comment was first put on his facebook account: https://www.facebook.com/tim.dobson.376/posts/10152117708801514), I thought it possible that I might be treading on the holy grail that many leftists have made of the blood-drenched Iranian theocracy, which some still consider to be, curiously enough, the imperfect embodiment of the revolution that took place way back 35 years ago. But I was a bit taken aback by the extent of Tim’s illusions in the regime.

I certainly concede that some of the ways I expressed myself in the article were rather sweeping, and if Tim looks now he will see I have adjusted and clarified some of my language. I thank Tim for his comment for facilitating these improvements to my article.

That said, I remain convinced of the fundamental (oops, that word again) correctness of my article. I think one of the key problems is perhaps a different understanding of the word “fundamental.” For me, in saying there is no “fundamental” reason for US-Iran antagonism, I simply mean that there is no fundamental reason for ongoing conflict between a capitalist state and imperialism. Many capitalist states have of course had significant conflicts with imperialism, even long-term, but I see such conflict as less fundamental than the conflict between the US and Cuba for example.

Thus not “fundamentally” different does not mean quantitatively similar. Certainly, the expanding capital emanating from the Gulf is far more powerful than that from Iran; certainly, the US has had close relations with the Gulf monarchies, whatever their differences, that are in sharp contrast to US relations with Iran for the last few decades. But whether the difference is “fundamental” or not depends on how we define that term.

Incidentally, the fact that Gulf capital is more powerful than Iranian capital is not necessarily a reason for the US to be always and only linked closely to the former. On the contrary, the very fact of the projection of power by the Gulf in recent years can be one reason, among a number, for the current US partial geopolitical shift, to help balance powerful Gulf interests which are not always in exact accord with overall US and other imperialist interests.

Yet the fact that, as Marxists, we understand that a capitalist regime can have considerable conflict with imperialism without it being of a “fundamental” nature has led Tim, not to deny this understanding, but to deny that a powerful bourgeoisie exists in Iran, meaning all I write is based on an illusion. Tim writes:

“Firstly, what powerful Iranian bourgeoisie exists inside Iran? There isn’t one. The most powerful Iranian bourgeoisie live in Los Angeles and aren’t welcome back in Tehran. Why? Because the most powerful force during the 1979 revolution was the petty bourgeoisie (the Bazaari people) and that remains the case today. This may be peculiar but nonetheless true … Therefore, this process that Mike describing isn’t actually occurring.”

With all due respect to Tim who clearly understands a lot about Iran, I find this extraordinary. Tim is essentially offering up Iran as an example of a permanent “petty-bourgeois state.” Yes it is well-known that the petty-bourgeois bazaari merchants, strongly connected to the mullahs, played a prominent role in the Iranian revolution (another revolution, like the Syrian, with a massive religious “Islamic” component, with the difference that the Islamic hierarchy were the overwhelmingly leading force in Iran in 1979, whereas in Syria the various stripes of Islamists have been one component alongside the strong secular component of the uprising). And so a large part of the existing Iranian big bourgeoisie under the Shah fled to the US after 1979, as Tim explains.

I’m not sure if Tim still sees the theocratic dictatorship as an embodiment of the revolution as some leftists do. For the record, I personally abandoned that view about 30 years ago, so what I wrote here was entirely consistent, and not simply opportunistically related to Syria. That is, once the mullah regime was able to smash all opposition, crush organised labour, organise a bloody cultural counterrevolution on the universities, start lining up literally hundreds of leftists at a time to be publicly shot or hung, once it had killed tens of thousands of leftists, many already in its dungeons, including those who had held grotesque illusions in the mullocracy for the longest (eg, Tudeh), launched a bloody war on Kurdistan, turned the legal value of women into half of that of men and other such triumphs, my view was that the only way to keep speaking of the “revolution” and to say it hadn’t been extinguished was when speaking of the continued ability of those opposed to the regime to resist it, but absolutely not in terms of the regime itself.

I’ve never seen any evidence that this assessment was wrong. But more importantly, what was this all about? Surely it was the reconsolidation of a capitalist state in order for the capitalist class to reconsolidate power. Not necessarily to invite back the old guard bourgeoisie who had fled, the Shah’s narrowly “secular” big bourgeoisie (like Assad’s equivalent), but rather for the more broadly-based, in the real Iran, traditionalist petty-bourgeoisie and smaller bourgeoisie, especially from semi-rural and regional towns, to develop into the new capitalist ruling class and grab the same kind of wealth once held by a narrower, less representative clique – the same process behind “Islamist” leaderships in Egypt, Turkey and Syria and their conflicts with the narrow “secular” capitalist cliques they have replaced or aim to replace.

And, despite Tim, the evidence points to the development of a huge “Islamic” bourgeoisie having developed since 1979, as would be expected in a capitalist society under a petty-bourgeois leadership. The article “Millionaire mullahs” from 2007 (http://www.forbes.com/global/2003/0721/024.html) seems a good place to start, detailing the super-wealth of the new Iranian capitalist class and how it has emerged from the very structures of the petty-bourgeois clerical establishment:

“The 1979 revolution transformed the Rafsanjani clan into commercial pashas. One brother headed the country’s largest copper mine; another took control of the state-owned TV network; a brother-in-law became governor of Kerman province, while a cousin runs an outfit that dominates Iran’s $400 million pistachio export business; a nephew and one of Rafsanjani’s sons took key positions in the Ministry of Oil; another son heads the Tehran Metro construction project (an estimated $700 million spent so far). Today,
operating through various foundations and front companies, the family is also believed to control one of Iran’s biggest oil engineering companies, a plant assembling Daewoo automobiles, and Iran’s best private airline … Rafsanjani’s youngest son, Yaser, owns a 30-acre horse farm in the superfashionable Lavasan neighborhood of north Tehran, where land goes for over $4 million an acre. Just where did Yaser get his money? A Belgian-educated businessman, he runs a large export-import firm that includes baby food, bottled water and industrial machinery.”
Some other useful articles on the development of an Iranian mega-capitalism, including its extension beyond its borders: http://mondediplo.com/2009/06/02iran,
http://www.marxist.com/iran-clumsy-fraud-provokes-two.htm, http://www.csmonitor.com/2009/0806/p06s07-wome.html
The Rafsanjani family is named in this article as a well-known example of the new hyper-capitalists; not surprisingly, his regime (fresh from killing off thousands of leftists in the regime’s dungeons around 1990) launched the new liberalisation and privatization drive, which was continued with gusto under both the alleged “reformist” Khatami regime and the alleged “populist” Ahmedinejad regime. Not surprisingly, therefore, the connection between super-wealth and the prospect of a renewed alliance with US imperialism was expressed well in a recent article fittingly entitled “Revolutionary Pragmatists: Why Iran’s Military Won’t Spoil Détente with the US”:

“Although the Guards were founded as an ideological organization, they have become vastly more pragmatic as they’ve acquired more power in the Iranian establishment. The Revolutionary Guards are no longer simply a military institution. They are among the country’s most important economic actors, controlling an estimated ten percent of the economy, directly and through various subsidiaries. And those economic interests
increasingly trump other concerns. And, although the force can corner a greater share of the domestic market under the sanctions regime imposed by the United States because the private sector has a chronic shortage of funds, many Guardsmen are aware that they stand to gain much more if Iran strengthens its ties to the rest of the world. Companies controlled by the Guards would likely win a lion’s share of new foreign investment. In a speech on October 16, Major Hassan Firouzabadi, chief of staff of the armed forces, was even more explicit. He called on the United States to take advantage of the “historic opportunity” to cooperate with the Islamic Republic in combating extremist groups such
as al Qaeda and in providing stability in the Middle East”
(http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/140253/akbar-ganji/revolutionary-pragmatists?cid=soc-twitter-in-snapshots-revolutionary_pragmatists-111113&utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_term=%2AMideast%20Brief&utm_campaign=Mideast%20Brief%2011-12-2013).

In fact, it seems to me ironic that Tim has missed what has precisely been a major “gain” of the revolution, one which I admit I did not envisage back in the 1980s (and neither did most leftists – many of those talking about an ongoing forever “deepening and broadening” of the “revolution” were imagining the socialist revolution on the horizon): the massive, rapid development of capitalism! As Babrak Zahraie, in an article which by and large is probably closer to Tim’s framework on Iran than my own, explains (http://babakzahraie.blogspot.com/2009/06/whither-iran.html):

“The Iranian revolution of 1979, due to special circumstances of its development, became the spring board for something that was most unexpected: the greatest development of capitalism in the country’s history. This came as a shock to the gang of royalists and the segment of capitalists and landlords that were thrown out of Iran. As far as capitalist development, Iran was cruising, and in their absence it was cruising faster than ever in its history.”

In and of itself, this was actually progressive compared to the rule by the relatively narrow state-led elite in the Shah’s time. In fact, just like the massive, rapid development of capitalism in China, this had many positive effects in terms of overall modernisation, despite the extreme backwardness of clerical rule in the social field. While somewhat unnecessarily romanticised, the following gives a reasonable overview:

“Peasants were transformed into farmers. Villages gained electricity, bathhouses, libraries, and access to healthcare. Roads and travel by automobile expanded. Internal air travel became a common option. Magazines and books appeared in the languages of national minorities. Ordinary folks would travel in the region regularly for religious duties or tours. Schools and universities multiplied. Women came to represent 62% of university students. Farsi became the fourth most utilized language on the Internet for bloggers.”

Though he also emphasises the limits to this “Further capitalist development was not able to address the key tasks of industrialization and agriculture. In a country that needs development in every conceivable area of health, education, urban and rural development, industry, agriculture and defense, the Iranian state advocated policies that revived the old capitalist state apparatus after the revolution”

Yet, he stresses, perhaps in a way that “permanent revolutionists” never quite got, that while this actual progress can take place, this nevertheless remains capitalism, the regime of our class enemy:

“We must not misunderstand: the greatest cycle of capitalist development meant more people than ever before in the history of Iran were getting rich – even super rich. These occurrences became a source of envy for the entire model of semi-colonial capitalism throughout the region. The rich in the region all envied Iran’s ‘model’ for the quick acquisition of wealth through land and other speculations. Meanwhile, the profits amassed by the rich in Iran created an increasing gap between the rich and the poor.”

Interestingly, all this sounds remarkably similar to developments in Turkey under the AKP: a terrific expansion of capitalism as the productive forces of the Anatolian regions were liberated from the strictures of the elite “secular” Kemalist state; a rapid development of infrastructure, poverty reduction, real gains for the masses; yet despite this, a growing gap between rich and poor as the new bourgeoisie goes on a neo-liberal craze.

In Babrak’s opinion, how did the US view this massive independent development of capitalism:

“Iranian capitalist development and the extension of capitalist relations, which received a major boost after the Iraq war, became a demon to imperialism. Washington would look to Iran and see its own face, as if it was waking up each morning and looking with hatred at itself in the mirror”

And thus tried to be rid of this new capitalist kid on the block. But ultimately, this is a strategy that will need to change, as Washington needs to catch up with the other imperialist powers who never (until the 2009 round of sanctions) stopped dealing with Iranian capitalism, and reincorporate Iranian capitalism into its system of capitalist relations:

“Iran’s progress, thanks to its mighty revolution and its increasing strength in the Middle East and South Asia region, has forced Washington to come up with a new approach … The US policy of cultivating an overt threat of war, imposing sanctions and labeling Iran as ‘axis of evil’ has given way to a more sober realization of the need for diplomacy. The plan of diplomacy requires recognizing the Iranian revolution of 1979 through acknowledging the gains and leaderships resulting from it, rescinding all sanctions, and freeing blocked Iranian assets in the US”

But he notes that the current regime, in 2009, was still not ready for this necessity. However, what if it is now?

And what does all this “the greatest development of capitalism in the country’s history” mean in terms of capitalist expansion outside of Iran’s borders? Why would it act any differently to any other capitalism? Well, it hasn’t: Iranian “Islamic” capitalist investment abroad has been ongoing since the 1980s. It has reached a stage – with significant influence in Iraq, Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Syria, Lebanon etc to be referred to, loosely, as a case of “sub-imperialism” in rivalry with other (albeit more powerful “sub-imperialisms”, such as in the GCC).

This article on Iranian economic influence in Iraq (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/17/world/middleeast/17iran.html) and this one on Afghanistan – if we can ignore the obvious propaganda and just focus on Iranian economic penetration (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6741095.stm) are good examples of this entirely natural process.

Let’s just clarify that for a moment: at one point Tim accuses me of arguing that “Iran is an imperialist force.” I do nothing of the sort. However, the term “sub-imperialism” has always seemed useful to me, even though banned under orthodox Trotskyism, to describe the very normal process of medium-sized capitalist, non-imperialist, countries, expanding economically beyond their borders, and the subsequent rivalries, geopolitical maneuvering etc that goes with this, which can at times be useful as partners to imperialism and at other times be seen as dangerously independent by imperialism. The five famous ‘BRICS’ fall into this category, and it seems to me the GCC, Iran and Turkey fit the bill as well. If you want to think of it as more “descriptive” than “scientific”, then that’s OK with me.

Strangely, not only does Tim think that Iran is not “sub-imperialist” in this sense, or even properly capitalist, but also that Iranian policy is virtually consistent in its “anti-imperialism,” and certainly not sectarian. Indeed, imperialism has apparently never either demonised, nor penalised, Iran for Islamism, but only for “anti-imperialism.”

First, imperialism definitely has demonised Iran for “Islamic fundamentalism,” hypocrisy aside. It has been a very large part of the post-Cold War propaganda; and also a genuine fear of the potential for “Islamic”-led revolt, a la Iran, in neighbouring Muslim states: regardless of whether the outcome may be progressive or reactionary, the US didn’t want these regimes destabilised.

Where I agree is that of course imperialism doesn’t penalise states for having reactionary-Islamist theocratic governments, otherwise Saudi Arabia would have been penalised more than Iran. I’ve given my overall analysis above of why I think the US has been largely hostile to Iran since the revolution, and yes the degree of independence of the new, assertive Iranian mega-capitalist class is part of this, for good or for bad.

You can of course call that “anti-imperialism” if you want (and in some cases it is), but to see it as consistent, or as consistently non-sectarian, is entirely wrong and rests on massive illusions in the anti-imperialist consistency of a marauding, mass-murdering capitalist elite.

That of course doesn’t mean Iranian foreign policy is always bad (let alone as monstrous as it is in Syria). Iran’s support for Hezbollah’s struggle against Israeli occupation of Lebanon should certainly be hailed, and as Tim knows I wrote extensively supporting Hezbollah in 2006.

Indeed, getting back to my opposition to bullshit-style “anti-imperialism,” you might remember that my conflict with this kind of politics actually originated in the 1990s with my defense of Bosnia against Serbian fascism; many of these types fantasised that “the West” had ganged up on Serbia and so, though the West was in fact doing nothing but imposing a criminal military blockade on besieged Bosnia, they still thought they had to support Serbian aggression and anti-Muslim genocide in Bosnia. I still have no idea why. But in any case, Iran, for its own geopolitical reasons, became the chief supplier of the Bosnian army, doing its best to evade the imperialist-enforced arms embargo. What was hilarious was watching the “anti-imperialists” of the day find clear evidence of “US intervention” when, two-thirds of the way into the war, the US announced it would stop enforcing the imperialist arms embargo (while UK and France continued to enforce it), thus refusing to continue to actively prevent Iranian arms deliveries! Rotten imperialists refusing to militarily prevent Iran from carrying out its activity half a world away from the US borders!

So, in that case, I also hailed Iran. Whether Iran’s activities could still be called “anti-imperialist” after the US stopped enforcing the embargo though really depends on how people choose to fit facts into their “neat” categories. Indeed, despite Tim, and despite the current “anti-imperialist” support for Iran due to its bolstering of Assad’s tyranny, another “anti-imperialist” mantra I have often heard is along the lines that “Iran has collaborated with US imperialism in three major conflicts, in Bosnia, Afghanistan and Iraq, proving how phoney it is.” For me, this is merely the reverse nonsense of the same mechanical “anti-imperialist” line.

Yet, how consistent is Iran? Isn’t it true that Iran effectively collaborated with the US in both the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, because it was in sectarian and geopolitical conflict with the regimes that the US deposed? What of the role of the Iran-based Badr Brigades during and after the US invasion of Iraq? Are you sure it was consistent anti-imperialism (not to mention anything even remotely progressive)? Or its support for Karzai and the Northern Alliance? What of its long-term excellent relations with the Turkish regime, especially under the AKP, on an anti-Kurdish basis?

Iran’s support for Hezbollah and, until recently, Hamas, was to be welcomed, but Iran’s economic and geostrategic intervention into the Arab world necessitated breaking from the Shah’s pro-Israeli legacy (in the same way that Erdogan and the AKP have had to the same re the Turkish generals’ pro-Israeli legacy). Being far away from Palestine makes this easy: note that the verbally “rejectionist” states have always been distant from the action (Iran, Saddam’s Iraq, Gaddafi’s Libya, Algeria, the old South Yemen). Iran’s actions such as these are aimed at some kind of deal recognising its role in the region.

Of course Tim is correct to note that Hamas is Sunni; so, I might add, were the Bosnian Muslims, and most of the Afghan Northern Alliance. Sectarianism as policy is not consistent, because by definition it is only a tool of a capitalist ruling class in its geopolitical rivalry. After all, Saudi Arabia’s on-again, off-again relationship with the “Alawite” Assad regime in Syria over the decades is another example, including full-scale Saudi support to the Syrian invasion of Lebanon at a time when the majority of Lebanese Muslims aligned to the Palestinian-leftist coalition, crushed by Assad, were Sunni; the Saudi-Syrian accord of 1991 held Lebanon together the next 15 years. And the Saudis just backed the overthrow of the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood regime in Egypt, bringing to power Mubarakist generals who … see themselves in brotherly solidarity with the “Alawite” Assad regime!

Don’t try to make too much sense of it. However, sectarianism is one of the weapons. Tim forgets to tell us that, after the Assad regime had slaughtered a certain proportion of the Syrian (Sunni Muslim) population via high-tech savagery, Hamas could no longer bear the “neutrality” and declared support for its brothers and sisters in their uprising for the same kind of human dignity the Palestinians have long been fighting for, against the same kind of barbarism. Not the mention the fact that Palestinians in Syria are part of the uprising and that the regime has barbarously besieged and starved Palestinian camps there, and tortured and murdered Palestinian militants. And after that point, Iran, in sectarian, or geopolitical, or whatever you call it, solidarity with Assad, cut off its support for Hamas: its solidarity with some tyrant slaughtering his people was far more important than its solidarity with the Palestinian struggle.

Indeed, prodding Hezbollah into its suicidal adventure in Lebanon may have been one sectarian step too far.

Furthermore, if its about consistency, what can one say about Iran and Hezbollah having the complete opposite view on Syria and Libya? Surely, if it is “anti-imperialism,” then the 10,000 NATO bombs on Libya would be more significant than the handful of flack jacks, night goggles, “ready-meals”, and other such rubbish, but not a single gun or bullet, that the US has supplied the FSA in 3 years?

Yet both Iran and Hezbollah supported the rebellion against Gaddafi right to the end, and even celebrated when he was sodomised to death with a knife after being captured in a tunnel due to a NATO bombing raid. The difference: the sectarian need to relate to the Lebanese Shia community, which still remembers that Musa Sadr went missing in Libya 35 years ago.

Finally, Tim says that

“Since the revolution of 1979, we’ve seen a ten year war waged against Iran by Iraq funded by US imperialism, using chemical weapons which killed millions of people … We’ve seen some of the harshest sanctions ever implemented on Iran, we’ve seen terrorist attacks occur in Iran itself and we’ve had at least 7 years of Israel trying to drum up a war against Iran … Over the past 35 years, it would be hard to find a country which has lost more people due to US imperialism”

… so that to even question the left narrative about the allegedly continuing Iranian “revolution” (often coming from people who don’t recognise a revolution in their face in Syria today), “it becomes seriously offensive.”

I’ll tell you who got “the harshest sanctions ever implemented,” significantly hasher than Iran has had just for the last 4 years: Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, for a period four times as long, during which time anywhere upwards of 500,000 people died as a direct result. The sanctions on Iran since 2009 certainly have been harsh, and criminal, and of course I welcomed their very partial end at the beginning of my article, but they don’t compare to the Iraqi genocide, and as for the 3 decades prior to the 2009 tightening of sanctions on Iran, the US’s Iran sanctions didn’t even come close to the Iraqi sanctions-genocide.

What should we decide from this? That Hussein’s bloodthirsty, ultra-repressive capitalist tyranny was some “anti-imperialist fighter” state that still imperfectly represented the continuity of the 1958 revolution? If you say similar stuff about Iran, why not?

Tim says that few have lost more people to US imperialism than Iran has, but most of it seems to be the Iran-Iraq war, where Tim seems to say that Hussein’s chemical war “killed millions.” Of course it did nothing of the sort, but all in all it is estimated that over a million Iranians and Iraqis were killed in that war, and Tim is right that Iraq holds the main responsibility for launching the war, and for using chemicals much later in the war. He is also right that the US bears responsibility for its initial encouragement of Hussein into this catastrophe.

But after this encouragement, the US basically left Iraq in the lurch; the US view was well-expressed by Kissinger in the 1980s: the US interest was for them to bleed each other, to fight on, to “both lose.” Most of Iraq’s weapons throughout the war came from France and the Soviet Union, hardly any, if any, from the US; more US and British weapons actually found their way to Iran, and not only via the famous Iran-hostage-contra dealing between the US and “anti-imperialist” Iran. Israel in particular openly advocated an Iranian victory, seeing Hussein as its worst enemy at the time (Iraq was closer, and Arab); Israel openly provided weapons to Iran. US intervention against Iran came mostly in the last year of war, with Iran on the offensive, and mostly in the form of protecting “re-flagged” Kuwaiti oil tankers.

And this was the Iraq that the US then turned around and destroyed in 1991 (with implicit Iranian support and direct participation of Assad’s Syrian regime), and then imposed 12 years of history’s worst sanctions on before invading, killing a million people and destroying the country – the actions of this Iraq allows you to say that “imperialism” has killed “millions” of Iranians. And yet this extraordinary imperialist treatment of Iraq does not for one moment make me turn around and declare the Hussein tyranny “anti-imperialist.”

To see the whole million or so killed on both sides of the Iran-Iraq war as all the fault of Iraq, or even all the fault of US imperialism, is just pro-mullah delusion; it avoids the inconvenient fact that after Iranian forces drove Iraq right out of every inch of Iran by mid-1982, two years into the war; and Hussein began suing for peace on the basis of the international border which he had repudiated (while his invasion was reactionary, this repudiation was just: the mullah regime maintained the new border that the Shah had created by invading part of Iraq); that the only reason the war continued for the next 6 years – ie, an entire three-quarters of the war and the killings of hundreds of thousands of Iranian and Iraqi workers – was due to the mullah regime crossing this international border, invading actual Iraq, occupying Iraqi territory, and declaring it would not end its invasion until it forcibly overthrew Hussein’s regime, a prospect most Iraqis considered terrifying.

I know these facts might not be popular on the left, but they nevertheless are true. Millions were killed by the regime. I still find it breathtaking 30 years later that much of the left believed Iranian workers should have to continue to slaughter Iraqi workers, and get slaughtered, on the altar of Khomeini\s entirely reactionary war to decimate and subjugate Iran’s bourgeois rival, based on the sensationally fertile imagination that this would result in the “extension of the revolution.”

The US, Iran, Russia-Syria and the geopolitical shift (December 2013): Anything for the region’s oppressed?

In recent weeks and months, a pronounced geopolitical shift in US policy related to the Middle East has been widely discussed. This shift consists mainly of the US-Russia deal with Syria’s Assad regime to get rid of its chemical arsenal, in exchange for the US dropping its brief threat of air strikes over Assad’s chemical attack on August 21; and the high-level US-Iran negotiations over its nuclear arsenal, which led to a new agreement, involving a slight reduction on imperialist sanctions on Iran in exchange for Iranian concessions on its civilian nuclear program.   

 In a very general sense, it is a good thing to reduce tensions. In the Syrian case, if it headed off potentially catastrophic US “punishment strikes” on Syria, it can be called the lesser evil at that particular moment, but at that moment only; in the Iranian case, if it reduces (and eventually leads to the abolition of) imperialist sanctions on Iran, which cripple the ordinary people but do little to hit the theocracy, then that is certainly a good thing.

 It is even more a good thing if it moves the region further away from the possibility of a US or Israeli attack on Iran over their bogus claim of an Iranian nuclear weapons program; it would even be better if both the Syrian and Iranian processes exposed Israel as the only state in the region with a massive nuclear weapons’ arsenal and made it more difficult for Israel to maintain it, an unlikely outcome at this stage however. Finally, to the extent that regional tensions of a sectarian nature are reduced (if this were to be the effect, which is doubtful), then that should also be welcome.

At the same time we ought to remember that the US isn’t reducing tensions to please the international left and progressive and anti-war movements, still less as a concession to the oppressed in the region, but for the sake of imperialist stability, something badly disrupted by the Arab Spring and the ensuing genuine people’s revolutionary movements, not only by the sectarian and geopolitical tensions which often overlay this.

 Before looking at this, it is first worthwhile understanding how genuine these moves are. Three recent revelations underline this.

 First, the revelation that the US and Iran, whatever the public displays, had been secretly engaged in these negotiations for many months before they became public, and the US had not only not shared this information with the Saudis, but also not even with Israel, the local white racist outpost that expects the US to only do things in consultation with it. These talks were going on during the period since early 2013 when Iran was drastically stepping up its military support to the Assad regime’s savage war against its people: http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/.premium-1.559788

 Second, the revelation that the US government had been well aware that the Assad regime had used small amounts of chemical weapons over the last year and “had watched the regime carry out about a dozen small-scale chemical attacks before the big one,” the whole time suppressing the information, seeing it as essentially routine, while also denying opposition requests for provision of gas masks. In addition, US and Israeli intelligence had intercepted Assad regime communications from three days before the massive August 21 attack, but “had not yet translated them,” but officials claimed that even if they had been translated, “they likely wouldn’t have acted because there were no indications it would be out of the ordinary”:

http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303914304579194203188283242

Third, perhaps the most surprising, though hardly after the last two were revealed: the UK has been mediating indirect secret talks between US and Hezbollah over a number of months, reportedly dealing with “the fight against al-Qaida, regional stability and other Lebanese political issues” and “are aimed at keeping tabs on the changes in the region and the world, and prepare for the upcoming return of Iran to the
international community” (http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Report-London-is-mediating-indirect-secret-talks-between-US-and-Hezbollah-333245).

On the other hand, understanding how genuine these geopolitical moves are should not be understood to mean the US is doing a complete shift and is about to dump its traditional allies, such as the Gulf monarchies, let alone Israel. Rather, the US is simply doing what it does best: looking after its strategic interests, not subservient to anyone. It will maintain its geopolitical alliances, and adopt new ones as it sees fit; if older allies complain, tough. 

 The US overtures to Iran and positive Iranian response have to be understood as part of a long-term process of bringing the relatively powerful Iranian bourgeoisie back into the fold – militarily, diplomatically and economically (http://eaworldview.com/2013/11/iran-spotlight-western-oil-companies-tehran-ready-make-deals) – where it always belonged. It has clearly been useful in the post Cold War era for the US and Israel to use Iran, as part of using “Islamic fundamentalism” (whether Shia or Sunni or both) as a scarecrow to replace “communism” in order to maintain a permanent war threat in the region, sell lots of weapons, feed the masses with irrational fear of an “enemy” and so on. Despite this, the fact remains that Iran is a very capitalist state, and as such, there has been nothing about the Iranian bourgeoisie for decades, since its very bloody suppression of the revolution there in the 1980s, that necessarily stands in fundamental conflict with imperialism.

Certainly, Iran’s relationship with imperialism has been of an antagonistic nature to an extent that appears qualitatively greater than conflicts such as those, for example, that have pit Saudi Arabia and its GCC allies against imperialism, such as the 1973 Arab oil embargo, or Saudi anger with Washington today. I would argue, however, that the difference is quantitative, even if the “quantity” is significant. To some extent there is the grandstanding of a powerful and growing Iranian national bourgeoisie, which can have its own tactical conflicts with greater imperialist interests; and specifically, the interests of this rising bourgeoisie often clashes with the interests of more powerful rival regional bourgeoisies, particularly those of the Gulf, which have had Washington’s favour for a protracted period. However, the greater power of the Gulf bourgeoisie, and Washington’s long-term relationship with it, does not necessarily mean that Washington must always favour this bloc as if such an alliance is as fundamental as its alliance with Israel. It is not. In fact, when the Gulf bourgeoisie throws its weight around too much, that might be precisely the point at which the US looks to balance this by bringing in a lesser, but rising, Iranian rival.

In fact, it is not just over Syria that the US and Saudi Arabia have blown apart (despite the fantasies of a lot of the left that they are allied over Syria); they have also long had a different perspective over Iraq, given that it was the US that essentially brought the Shia-led Maliki regime to power, which the Saudis viewed as facilitating an Iranian regional victory, while the Saudis actively back rival Sunni-led forces there. Indeed, since the Saudis played such a prominent role in mobilizing Sunni forces into the ‘Sawha’ (Awakening) militias to defeat Al-Qaida in Iraq, they expected a better deal from Washington. This article looks at how active this conflict still is:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/25022013-saudi-arabia-and-qatar-ratcheting-up-sectarian-and-ethnic-tensions-in-iraq-oped

It is in US interests to shift the balance of power around between such regional heavy-weight bourgeoisies with their clashing regional projects. The assertions sometimes made in tabloid-left analyses that there exists a solid, long-term US “pro-Sunni” bias are superficial to put it mildly. If anything it was distinctively “anti-Sunni” for a time after 9/11; and Iranian and US interests partially coincided over the US invasions of both Afghanistan and Iraq. However, precisely the subsequent Iranian/”Shiite” advances in Iraq and Afghanistan along with Hezbollah’s moment of glory in 2006 may have shifted the US tilt back to “Sunni” powers after that.

We need to understand such “Sunni” and “Shia” blocs as representing the attempts by powerful regional “sub-imperialist” forces to project their geopolitical interests in the region under these ideological covers; at the same time we also need to understand that there is nothing absolute about them, and that there are vast differences within each alleged “bloc.” For example, the “Sunni” bloc consists of a Qatar/Turkey/Muslim Brotherhood bloc, a Saudi/GCC (except Qatar) monarchial bloc, and an Al-Qaida bloc (largely privately funded by sections of the Gulf bourgeoisie opposed to the narrow monarchial regimes), and all are mutually hostile, in addition to other secular regimes in Sunni-majority states outside any of these frameworks, eg Gaddafi’s Libya. The “Shia” bloc is also divided; while currently the “Alawite”-led regime in Syria is conveniently classed as “Shia” to ideologically justify the Iranian and Hezbollah alliance, before the Arab Spring, the Assad regime’s closes allies in the region were Qatar and Turkey (and both, along with Saudi Arabia, initially came out strongly in support of Assad when the Syrian uprising began), while different Shia blocs inside Iraq have differing perspectives on regional issues.

But the Arab Spring – the revolutionary uprising of the Arab masses – has been overwhelmingly a Sunni-based affair; and at a similarly fundamental level, the Palestinian population are overwhelmingly Sunni. That obviously does not mean the US wants to shift all support to an Iranian/Shia bloc; that would be entirely counterproductive from the point of view of quelling the Sunni-based uprisings. But it does perhaps mean it is time for more balance of power, especially given the situation in Syria.

The Syrian situation is perhaps the most widely misunderstood in this regard. Both the Saudis and Iranians see it in sectarian/geopolitical terms; the US sees it as requiring the victory of counterrevolution. Of course the Saudis and Iranians also want counterrevolution, naturally enough, but it matters to each how it happens. The US preference for either continuing bloodshed to weaken all sides, or a restabilisation involving the core of the current Assad regime (perhaps without Assad himself) but broadened to include some bourgeois opposition figures, both represent outcomes based on balance. In fact, most likely the first followed by the second.

And both these US preferences represent the Israeli interest, that is, the interest of the US’s main ally in the region that has no love for either Muslim-based project getting too powerful. For Israel, and thus for the US, if Sunni and Shia jihadists are fighting it out and bleeding each other in Syria, and sucking in the energies of Iran and the Arab states, then that’s OK for Israel.

But ultimately even for Israel, as for the US, restabilisation is necessary. And this can only occur with the core of the current regime in one way or another maintaining power. And the irony of the current situation is that, while on a regional level Israel’s saber-rattling has long been directed against distant Iran and the pretence that it has nuclear weapons which threaten Israel (something they know is a lie), on the more local level Israeli and Iranian interests partly coincide in Syria, much more so than either do with Saudi/Gulf interests. I know that this is disputed (and certain individual Israeli leaders have said different), but at a fundamental level it is true – they both prefer the Assad regime, or some modification of it, over a victory EITHER of secular, democratic revolution OR Saudi-aligned Sunni Islamists OR Sunni jihadists a la Al-Qaida, OR any combination of these, especially if any of those alternatives were to come anywhere near the Israeli-stolen Syrian Golan Heights – which the Assad regime has protected without a shot being fired in 40 years, a policy Israel does not trust any of the alternatives to continue with.

 It may be objected that the growing dependence of Assad on Hezbollah, Iraqi Shia gangs and Iranian Revolutionary Guards in 2013 now equalizes the two sides in Syria from the point of view of Israeli interests. To some extent this is true. But as long as Hezbollah is bloodily wasting its cadres and resources in Syria rather than in Lebanon or anywhere near the borders of Israel, then that suits Israel very well. Israel’s occasional attacks have very clearly been directed against shipments of advanced Iranian weapons from Syrian territory to Hezbollah in Lebanon, never against Hezbollah using its weaponry to kill Arabs in Syria. This factor merely means Israeli preference for both sides fighting on and bleeding each other is enhanced. But it in no way changes the Israeli preference, stated repeatedly over the last three years, for at least the main core of the Assad regime to remain in power to prevent a victory of any combination of opposition forces. 

 This was explained recently by Professor Eyal Zisser of Tel Aviv University, one of Israel’s best-known academic experts on Syria and Lebanon and the former director of the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies:

“At first, Israel wanted Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to stay in power, thinking it was “the devil we know” and fearing the spread of chaos along the border. Then Israeli leaders came to the conclusion that Assad is finished. But then they became aware of the presence of al-Qaeda elements in Syria, like the rebel Nusra Front. So now the real position—not the official one—is that we wish both sides good luck and that it is in the interest of Israel that they continue fighting. Essentially, we want Assad to stay in power. We want him to be strong enough to keep the border quiet but weak enough so he will not present any real threat to Israel” (http://carnegie-mec.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=53831).

This highlights an important difference between current Israeli and Saudi opposition to Washington’s current strategy, involving the nuclear dealing with Iran and the chemical dealing with Assad and Russia. Saudi Arabia views Iran through the prism of Syria (and other regional conflicts where Saudi-Iranian rivalry are played out, such as Iraq and Bahrain, but principally Syria at the moment); whereas Israel, on the odd occasions when it puts on its hawkish rather than dovish face over Syria, is viewing Syria through the prism of Iran.

 That is, for Saudi Arabia, the US-Russia deal over Syria, essentially aimed at bolstering Assad, after the Saudis had invested so much in publicly helping the Syrian opposition (indeed the secular opposition, the SMC and SNC, which they had actually helped much more than Washington had wanted them to), made them feel they were being laughed at in the face by Washington; the Saudis were thus already furious about this before the onset of US dealing with Iran consolidated the idea that Washington was presenting Iran with a regional victory. Thus Saudi Arabia has reacted by “going its own way” in Syria. On the actual nuclear deal with Iran, as opposed to the geopolitical shift behind it, the Saudis are not so concerned; indeed, the official statement by Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states gave it cautious support as the beginnings of comprehensive solution for Iran’s nuclear program; moreover, both Saudi Arabia (http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2013/11/25/Riyadh-Solution-on-Iran-needs-goodwill-.html) and Qatar (http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2013/11/25/Qatar-Kuwait-welcome-Iran-s-nuclear-deal-with-world-powers.html) stressed this could lead to, in the words of Saudi Minister of Culture and Information Abdulaziz bin Mohieddin Khoja, “the “removal of all weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear, from the Middle East and the Gulf” – an obvious reference to Israel’s massive nuclear arsenal.

For Israel it is the complete opposite. Israeli leaders put out mixed reactions to the US-Russia dealing over Syria; reactions in general though were cautiously positive. In fact, what Israeli leaders had continually stressed was that the “worst possible outcome” in Syria, and, as Yuval Steinitz, Israeli Minister of Intelligence and Strategic Affairs, explained, the only reason Israel would ever intervene was if Sunni jihadists got their hands on Assad’s chemical weapons in the case that the regime should collapse (http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505263_162-57582025/syrian-rebels-to-get-1st-direct-u.s-support-as-$8m-in-medical-supplies-rations-set-for-delivery/); whereas, as Defense Ministry strategist Amos Gilad explained in May, Israel was not currently interested in attacking Syria’s chemical weapons’ stock because “the good news is that this is under full control (of the Syrian government)” (http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/04/us-syria-crisis-chemical-israel-idUSBRE94309720130504). Thus the chemical deal basically addresses this Israeli concern; in fact, the Saudi-backed leader of the Syrian National Coalition, Ahmad Jarba, described the US deal with Assad on chemicals as the adoption of the Israeli interest.

 To the extent that Israel was somewhat cautious in its support however was entirely related to the Iranian issue; when the US did not go ahead with threatened strikes on Syria over a “red line” on a form of WMD that the US had drawn, Israel’s concern was what this would mean for the US-Israeli red-line on Iran over nuclear weapons. So when the subsequent negotiations with Iran opened soon after, Israel’s opposition was very much within this context. How can you use the Iranian nuclear “threat” to keep the whole region, and the Israeli public, on a permanent war footing, in a permanent state of crisis, if the US takes away the imaginary pretext.

 For these reasons, and others, the fantasies of Israeli-Saudi alliances being pushed by the conspiracist wing of the left and the tabloid wing of imperialist journalism are impossible. The LondonDaily Mail’s claim that Israel and Saudi Arabia had agreed to jointly attack Iran in reaction to the deal is inconceivably insane. Saudi Arabia’s reaction to this article, that it is fiction and that it has “no relations or contact with Israel of any kind at any level” (http://world.einnews.com/article/177082808/-XymoaCc3o3Ar1OJ?afid=777&utm_source=MailingList&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Breaking+News%3A+world540-Tuesday), is in fact highly believable. From a purely pragmatic point of view, if Israel did attack Iran (which is also very unlikely), it would bolster Iran’s standing among Muslims – Sunni and Shia alike – in the region, just at the moment when Iran’s and Hezbollah’s standing has dropped so low among the vast masses of Sunni Arabs due to Syria. If Saudi   Arabia participated in such an attack, it could lead to the overthrow of the Saudi monarchy by both the Shia masses in the east and the Sunni jihadists, even if both then slaughtered each other.

 Little wonder, therefore, that in 2012 Saudi Arabia had threatened to shoot down any Israeli aircraft over its airspace en route to Iran (http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article32129.htm); similarly, Qatari Foreign Minister Hamad Al Thani had declared “we will not accept any aggressive action against Iran from Qatar” (http://www.jpost.com/Headlines/Article.aspx?id=263818).

 (As an aside, a Sunday Times story several months ago, that alleged a military agreement between Israel, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the UAE and Turkey to cooperate against Iran (http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/world_news/Middle_East/article1255088.ec)was angrily denied not only by Saudi Arabia, but by Turkey, which described it as “manipulative reports which have nothing to do with the reality” (http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-foreign-ministry-dismisses-report-on-regional-cooperation-against-iran.aspx?pageID=238&nID=46250&NewsCatID=338). The inclusion of Turkey, if anything, made it more of a joke; Turkey’s relations with Israel have been bad for years, and while relations deteriorated with Iran over Syria, Turkey has opposed any US or Israeli aggression against Iran, explicitly giving strong support to Iran’s nuclear program (http://www.payvand.com/news/12/mar/1271.html); and anyone interested in the geopolitics of Mediterranean gas will be well aware of the rapprochement between Israel and Greece and Cyprus on an anti-Turkish basis).

 Furthermore, the Saudi monarchy, whose legitimacy is based on protecting Mecca and Medina, cannot simply “go into alliance” with a regime illegally occupying Jerusalem of all places (on top of a regime illegally occupying any Arab or “Muslim” territory) and survive. Just because the monarchy is reactionary and would probably be happy for the entire Palestinian people to disappear, this doesn’t alter the fact that they have not disappeared and the occupation is a fact; it is not coincidental at all that two major Arab-wide peace initiatives, the 1982 Fahd Plan and the 2003 Saudi Plan, were launched by Saudi Arabia; both had the support of virtually all Arab states (only Libya dissented in 1982, and no-one in 2003); in 1982 had the support of the PLO and in 2003 the support of both Fatah and Hamas; and both demanded the complete withdrawal of Israel from all Palestinian and Syrian territories occupied or annexed by Israel since 1967 and the right of Palestinians to set up their independent state over the entire part of Palestine occupied in 1967. This would the minimum for a Saudi-Israeli “alliance,” and it is clear that this has never been the plan of any wing of the Zionist leadership, including most “doves.”

 When discussing the effect of the US dealing with Iran perhaps moving the US away from Israel, these fundamental facts have to be taken into consideration. How likely is it that the US will now turn around and demand Israel accept and act on international law and withdraw from the occupied territories, when for years the US hasn’t even objected to the continual and massive increase of Israeli “settlement” of the West Bank? In other words, while the new regional dealing is bad news for the Syrian oppressed, is it possible that it may have spin-offs for other sections of the oppressed in the region due to geopolitical coincidence? I suggest, highly unlikely. So far, there is not a scrap of evidence that the super-oppressed Palestinians will be among those benefiting; if anything, with Israel demagogically screaming blue murder about the Iranian deal, the most likely US response will be to allow Israel to get away with more settlement building, more ethnic cleansing, and more murder.  Indeed, as Ali Abunimah suggests, Israel may already be “reaping rewards from Iran deal at Palestinian expense” (http://electronicintifada.net/blogs/ali-abunimah/israel-already-reaping-rewards-iran-deal-palestinian-expense?utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter).

 The one section of the region’s oppressed who stand to gain are the Iranian masses, to the extent it brings some mild relief from imperialist sanctions. This is certainly not unimportant. At the same time, this should not be exaggerated: while Rouhani has been projecting “moderate” image to the West, that is a desire to work with imperialism, back home there has been a surge of executions – some 500 for the year, but 200 since Rouhani came to power in August. This includes political opponents, disproportionately Kurds.

 In fact, while all deals involve a certain amount of compromise, at least cosmetically, on both sides, the revelation that the UK has been organising secret negotiations between the US and Hezbollah over a number of months (http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Report-London-is-mediating-indirect-secret-talks-between-US-and-Hezbollah-333245) suggests the likely direction of the pressure that will be exerted. Iran’s support for Hezbollah and the latter’s alleged “threat” to Israel is a major US-Iranian difference; but the negotiations suggest attempts to ensure Iran’s interests in Lebanon while presumably trying to keep Hezbollah tamed. The fact the negotiations include the topic if “fighting Al-Qaida” suggests a very different western view of Hezbollah’s involvement in Syria than that publicly projected (And the fact that the CIA warned Lebanese officials last week that al Qaida-linked groups are planning to bomb Beirut’s Hezbollah-dominated southern suburbs, “with the understanding that it would be passed to Hezbollah,” and which Hezbollah acknowledged (http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/07/15/196755/lebanese-officials-say-cia-warned.html#.Ug6CQLzgKCQ) suggests this orientation is already being acted upon).

What is often forgotten is that Hezbollah’s success in driving the Israeli occupation out of Lebanon – ie the reason it was seen as the “resistance” – is over a decade old, and even the 2006 moment is a long time ago. Hezbollah has not fired a shot at Israel since then, the Lebanese people have no appetite to undergo such slaughter again, only the relatively tiny Shaaba Farms remain in Israeli hands to give “resistance” any clear meaning, and the link with Hamas in Palestine which was an important aspect of the “resistance” back then has been broken over Hezbollah’s support for Assad. It is therefore not hard to imagine a deal that allows Hezbollah to continue with a certain amount of bluster but in fact continue to do what it has been doing, with a “new Iran” guaranteeing this situation.  

 All that said, will current US geopolitical dealing with Russia, Iran and the Assad regime in Syria simply mean an out and out support for victory of the latter? Or might Iran’s role with the Syrian solution, while reactionary to boot, perhaps be to help edge Assad aside and allow a ‘Yemeni solution’, an ‘Assad regime without Assad’, that the US and other imperialist powers have long believed was the only way to bring the revolution to a grinding halt and end the destabilization that is boosting the anti-imperialist jihadist fringe?

 The answer to that of course remains to be seen. It is possible however to sketch some possible scenarios and examine some hints.  

First, in the short-term, the outcome has been a victory for Assad’s regime of bloody counterrevolution. Assad successfully tested the US “red-line,” and now, under the guise of cooperating with the US and Russia to get rid of its chemical weapons, Assad has been assured a year or so of unfettered – indeed stepped up – use of his massive arsenal of conventional WMD with which he has done nearly all his killing anyway; to this has been added a series of horrific starvation sieges on various towns around Damascus and Homs. The US has essentially moved into alliance with the regime; indeed, the Assad plan of cleansing the region from Damascus to the Alawite heartland on the coast is being justified as necessary to secure the path for vehicles removing the chemicals to ports. In October, even the minimalist non-lethal US aid to the FSA in the north was officially halted (http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/us-halts-aid-to-syrian-rebels.aspx?pageID=238&nID=56624&NewsCatID=358). As Iran and Hezbollah continue to play a significant role in the slaughter – indeed Hezbollah has been heavily involved in the regime’s recent bloody offensives around Damascus – the distinctly counterrevolutionary nature of the US-Syrian and US-Iranian understanding is clear.

Recent articles in the mainstream media have clarified this further. Former senior US diplomats Daniel Kurtzer and Thomas Pickering and former Iranian Ambassador Seyyed Hossein Mousavian wrote this week for Al-Monitor that “timely implementation [of the joint plan of action] will not only build trust and credibility, but will also significantly improve the atmosphere and prospects for a full agreement within the next six months. Such a trend would facilitate further constructive cooperation between Iran and the world powers on other crises in the Middle East such as Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq. The interim agreement — and its faithful implementation — is a significant opportunity which should not be missed or it will constitute a failure of unimaginable proportions” (http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/12/syria-emirate-fears-iran-nuclear-deal-week-in-review.html#).

More specifically regarding the Assad regime, the December 3 New York Times reported:

“Some analysts and American officials say the chaos there could force the Obama administration to take a more active role to stave off potential threats among the opposition groups fighting against the government of President Bashar al-Assad. But striking at jihadist groups in Syria would pose formidable political, military and legal obstacles, and could come at the cost of some kind of accommodation — even if only temporary or tactical — with Mr. Assad’s brutal but secular government, analysts say.
“We need to start talking to the Assad regime again” about counterterrorism and other issues of shared concern, said Ryan C. Crocker, a veteran diplomat who has served in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan. “It will have to be done very, very quietly. But bad as Assad is, he is not as bad as the jihadis who would take over in his absence” (http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/04/world/middleeast/jihadist-groups-gain-in-turmoil-across-middle-east.html?partner=rss&emc=rss&smid=tw-nytimesworld&pagewanted=all&_r=1&).

These views have been bolstered by almost daily rhetoric in the mainstream media about the jihadist threat in Syria, and by almost daily statements by ruling class figures that an Assad victory is currently the most preferable outcome: Michael Hayden, retired US Air Force general and CIA head till 2009, and former chief of staff of the Israeli Defense Forces, Dan Halutz, have said as much in recent days (http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2013/Dec-13/240934-assad-win-may-be-syrias-best-option-ex-cia-chief.ashx#axzz2nKspUd4f, http://www.timesofisrael.com/ex-idf-chief-israel-prefers-that-assad-stay-in-power).

More long-term, however, the US will still have the problem of restabilising Syria, and unless the unlikely scenario of a total crushing of the revolt by Assad comes to pass, ultimately the same issues will remain. Certainly, the leeway being given to Assad currently to smash the revolution will significantly weaken it, thus forcing the opposition to agree to a worse bargain than they may have otherwise hoped for, and this is undoubtedly the imperialist plan. But most likely, opposition in parts of the country will remain; and the simple demographics of a country where 70 percent of the population are (mostly poor) Sunnis under an Alawi-dominated ruling clique strongly suggests that some broadening of power in the central regime, while maintaining it military-security-bureaucratic core, giving the dictatorship a cosmetic facelift, will be essential to winning a significant enough section of the bourgeois opposition leadership over to the perspective of some kind of ceasefire. Given regional dynamics, this would also be the minimum concession necessary for Saudi/GCC agreement to a settlement.

 While in theory, a broadening of the regime to include some bourgeois oppositionist and Sunni figures may be possible with Assad still in some kind of role, in practice he is seen as the key symbol of the regime that has waged ferocious war on the people for 3 years and no section of the opposition so far has said it will even consider an agreement that does not involve Assad stepping down. Indeed, much of the opposition refuses to even attend the Geneva talks, scheduled for late January, if Assad is present. Under massive American pressure, the main exile-based Syrian opposition leadership, the Syrian National Coalition (SNC), has agreed to drop this condition and will attend Geneva, alongside the Assad regime and some other smaller forces. But the SNC still insists it will not agree to anything that leaves him in power; they see leaving the regime in power as compromise enough, while Assad has insisted there is no way he won’t stay in power.

 It may be that Iran’s role will be to try to edge Assad out, secure some safe place for him and ensure the interests of the Alawite and Shia factors in the make-up of the regime’s new face. There are a number of indications of Iran’s flexibility on this question. The chemical attack itself strained Assad’ relations with both Iran and Hezbollah, especially given Iran’s own history of suffering chemical attack by the Iraqi Baath regime in the 1980s; some Iranian leaders explicitly blamed Assad for the attack (I guess they weren’t reading “Global Research”). Leading Iraqi Shiite Ayatollah Sistani recently called on Assad, and Iraq’s Shiite leader Maliki, to step down; Iran and Turkey, a country prominently backing the Syrian opposition, recently made a joint call on government and opposition to stop fighting and declare a ceasefire even before Geneva, to ensure Geneva proceeds (http://eaworldview.com/2013/11/iran-forecast-turkey-tehran-proclaim-reconciliation/); the two states also called for reconciliation and a joint approach to the region’s problems. And on a tour of the Gulf, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif called on Saudi Arabia to cooperate with Tehran on “achieving regional stability” (http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2013/Dec-02/239605-irans-zarif-urges-saudi-to-work-jointly-for-stability.ashx#axzz2mQ3jab6V).

 Finally, some Iranian revolutionary guards have expressed criticism of the Syrian military, whether on the one hand, due to oppressive practices towards the people, or on the other, due to the fact that many ordinary Syrian soldiers, quite rightly, have little interest in fighting (http://www.albawaba.com/news/syria-iran-military-536246), unlike these foreign mercenaries. The recent abandonment of Hezbollah ‘true-believers’ by Assad’s army south of Damascus during an opposition counterattack, leaving them to face the music, may have also opened a few eyes there.

   On the other hand, what even this regional and pan-Syrian agreement from the top can achieve is dubious. While the SNC has accepted going to Geneva, on the ground none of the fighting forces have: not only the jihadist groups, but also the mainstream Islamic groups gathered in the new Islamic Front, and even the secular exile-based Supreme Military Command (SMC) of the FSA have all refused to attend; indeed, the SMC/FSA has insisted it will not even announce a ceasefire during talks, putting it at odds with its SNC partners (http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/26/us-syria-crisis-talks-rebels-idusbre9ap0bb20131126?utm_source=sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_term=%2amideast%20brief&utm_campaign=mideast%20brief%2011-26-2013). Just what can be achieved without fighters represented is unclear. Even among the political opposition, a major section of the Syrian National Coalition, the Syrian National Council (the first exile-based opposition group) has rejected attendance at Geneva (http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2013/10/13/Key-Syrian-opposition-group-rejects-peace-talks-.html).

 Arguably a ceasefire achieved via a political solution at Geneva, however transitory, would be a positive step compared to the ongoing war with its catastrophic bloodshed, absolute military superiority of the regime, and political inability of the opposition to win certain sectors of the population (particularly minorities). While the proposed set-ups, featuring the maintenance of the core of the regime, are far from ideal, whether it is positive or negative depends a lot on the detail, and on the relationship of forces. For US imperialism and its current allies, the aim would be to stabilise Syria’s capitalist state and contain the revolution enough to be able to crush any recalcitrant elements; however, given the alternative being a continuation of the current bloody stalemate, for the Syrian revolution the aim would be to take advantage of any such opening to deepen and broaden the revolutionary struggle by allowing a return to mass civil struggle and allowing the people some relief from the impossible situation.

 However, this is just the analysis of a writer from afar. If things are seen by those on the ground differently to how it may look to us from afar, it is best to try to understand why, especially given the fact that in rejecting attendance at Geneva, they are standing up to massive imperialist pressure to take part. Aside from the question of Assad’s attendance at the conference, the broader question is the relationship of forces. The FSA leadership did not reject negotiations in principle, but stressed the conditions are not right; they clearly see they are being railroaded into a potential agreement in conditions when they have been starved of weaponry by the same imperialist powers who insist they attend, thus attending at a moment when they are in a weakened bargaining position. Their gamble is that fighting on may either reverse this before future negotiations, or lead to uprising within the centres of regime control. From afar, such scenarios seem highly unlikely. But the unanimity among fighting forces on the ground, from the most secular through to the jihadists suggests they may know things we don’t.

More recently, there have been contradictory indications from the SMC, some suggesting they would attend Geneva after all despite Assad’s presence, with the very strict condition that Geneva must lead to Assad’s departure; yet at the very moment that such flexibility has been expressed, imperialist states have apparently seen it as a sign of weakness, with a December 18 report claiming “Western nations have indicated to the Syrian opposition that peace next month talks may not lead to the removal of President Bashar al-Assad and that his Alawite minority will remain key in any transitional administration,” because “because they think chaos and an Islamist militant takeover would ensue” (http://in.news.yahoo.com/exclusive-west-signals-syrian-opposition-assad-may-stay-193919109.html). Where exactly this would leave SMC or even SNC participation remains to be seen.

 Whether this plan by virtually the entire armed opposition to fight on will work any more than the US-Russia-Turkey-Iran plan to stabilise a modified regime remains to be seen. But as someone recently posted to the FSA website, there remains another scenario: the regime and main opposition leadership attend Geneva; they are forced into agreement, which is imposed on Syria; the US then declares all those on the ground opposed to the “international” agreement to be “terrorists,” with whatever punishment that flows from that … .  

For a Civil, Secular State: 106 Groups Unite in the Union of Free Syrians: 2013

Introduction by Michael Karadjis

The article below reports an extremely important development in Syria. Within days of the announcement of the formation of the “Islamic Front” by six major Islamist (non-jihadist) groups (some of which are themselves coalitions, like the Islamic Army, which includes one major and 40 minor militias), we have this formation of what is basically its secular equivalent, a bloc of 106 revolutionary military and civil groups with an explicitly secular, democratic program.

As the Islamic Front itself is made up mostly of groups that have a good working relationship with the secular FSA, and are hostile to the main global-jihadist group (ISIS), these two new large coalitions should not be seen so much as rivals but as allies, who however have ideological differences. Arguably this clearer coalescence around two large clearly defined allied formations will be a strength for the revolution.

This formation, with the impressive list below, clearly makes minced meat out of the imperialist propaganda, first spread by the New York Times back in April (but then lapped up and spread further by pro-Assad leftists who thought they were being anti-imperialist), that there were no secular armed groups in Syria, only varying shades of Islamists. I have already dealt with the issue of the FSA and secular armed resistance a number of times (eg, https://mkaradjis.wordpress.com/2013/09/26/empowering-the-democratic-resistance-in-syria or https://mkaradjis.wordpress.com/2013/09/24/report-on-relative-strength-of-armed-rebels-in-syria), while this development spells the facts out yet again.

 That is not to say that the secular armed resistance hasn’t weakened in relation to the mild Islamist resistance and the hard-line jihadist groups. This has occurred, largely due to the better funding of Islamist groups, whether from governments or wealthy private individuals from the Gulf, whereas to date, “the West,” which claims to support “moderates,” has supplied the FSA with some night goggles, some flak jaks, ancient radios, and some inedible “ready meals,” and a few tents. As none of these are very useful against either the massive heavy weaponry and high tech slaughter by the regime, or even against the middle-range weaponry of ISIS which spends most of its energy attacking the FSA in the back rather than fighting the regime (and vice versa), there has naturally been a trend, rooted in material reality, for fighters to join better equipped and resourced middle Islamist outfits.

 Vast amounts of evidence suggests that this does not, for the most part, indicate a change in the basic motivations of the fighters, rooted mostly in poor peasant and poor working class families, whose aims remain fighting for the original democratic goals of the revolution. There will of course be contradictions in many cases between such goals and the goals of some of the leaders, but more so in the more clearly jihadist fringe. But it is wrong to judge every “Islamist” outfit in an Islamic country as crazed fundamentalists, terrorists and sectarians in full Orientalist fashion; at this stage of the revolution, they largely represent the more traditionalist urban and rural poor who never really took part in the secular project of the bourgeois nationalist regime, and even less so in its neo-liberal period since 2000.

 All that said, however, it remains important to know that he more explicitly secular resistance, both civil and armed, remains a major factor in Syria and is now trying to organise on the ground better.    

 

For a Civil, Secular State: 100+ Groups Unite in the   Union of Free Syrians

by Not George Sabra

[Translation by Ahmed El-Khatib and Sam Charles Hamad.]

http://notgeorgesabra.wordpress.com/2013/11/25/for-a-civil-secular-state-100-groups-unite-in-the-union-of-free-syrians/

On October 13, 2013, about 106 military, media, and civil formations have assembled at Anatolia café in Elrihania city on the Syrian-Turkish border to form a conglomerate that is considered the biggest of its kind- according to some participants – to form what is called (Ahrar Syrian Union [Free Syrian Union]). The thing that is so special about this union is that it includes military units, civilian organizations, media people, and rescue squads, so it includes all aspects of revolutionary work. The members of the union say that they acknowledge the revolution’s flag that the protesters held in the beginning of the revolution. They believe that the 1950 constitution is the suitable one for the new Syria and they will do their best to adhere to the laws and international treaties after the breakdown of the regime. They also talked about the separation of legislative, executive, juridical authorities.

Oh free sons of Syria:

We announce the formation of our union (Ahrar Syrian Union) that is the fruit of recent continuous efforts amongst many of our politicians, media people, revolutionists, and military fighting formations in the struggle. The summary of our deep discussion concerning the revolution and the current situation was that they all shared a common vision to announce a new formation to contribute with other revolutionary forces to achieve the revolution’s objectives: to end the criminal regime of al-Assad; to work on building a nation of dignity, freedom, law, fair, and justice among its all people based on a modern constitution that grants the freedom and justice to all Syrian people regardless of their national affiliation or religion; to establish the separation of the legislative, executive, and juridical powers; to create a Syria that is dedicated to ensuring civil peace and security to all citizens; to develop Syria economically, scientifically, and culturally; and to keep regional and international peace.

Members announced that the union was born due to difficult circumstances and the necessity of having a new formation that contributes with other formations to all aspects of the revolution toward the break down of the regime.

The heads of the conference have agreed to a statement called “The Founding Statement for the Free Syrian Union”:

Oh free sons and daughters of Syria:

Our national revolution was launched under the flag of peace to build a state of justice and equality. The al-Assad criminal gang insisted on standing against the nation’s will and used inhuman tools to stop everything. The result so far has been hundreds of thousands of martyrs, detainees, and injured people and more than seven million became homeless and refugees.

It was very clear to all countries of the world that the ruling terrorist gang is practicing genocide against our people, relying on external allied forces to break the nation’s will and attack the revolution in spite of all the Arabic and national attempts and efforts and the insistent will of the Syrian peaceful to find a peaceful solution that achieves the revolution’s goals and saves Syria from the international interference that will destroy the remaining building blocks of the country.

The commitment to all international agreements and treaties is not opposition to national sovereignty. In the current situation we believe that our commitment to the revolutionary force that raised the independence flag that is it is acceptable to rely on the 1950 constitution until the preparation of a new constitution that reflects the whole of Syrian society.

Oh free Syrian people, oh revolutionists in the battle field:

We swear to Allah and promise you that we are committed to the revolution and honor our pure martyrs’ blood. We urge you to work together for the sake of our union with all means and powers through widening the political, media, military, and revolutionary base and the submission of all forms of support to achieve our revolution’s goals of freedom and respect.

Mercy to the souls of our martyrs.

Freedom to the arrested and the recovery of the injured.

For the return of our sons to their families and homes.

Victory to our people and its blessed revolution.

In a private meeting with media activist Khalid Abo Elfida – one of the participants in the union – said:

“Thank Allah we have just finished uniting 106 brigades all from the inside of different Syrian cities. Where they are agreed to be one hand and hold one line working for the breakdown of the criminal regime in Syria and building the new independent Syria. And a founding statement has been declared that explains the principles that unites all revolutionary figures. We hope Allah guides us regarding the goal we are all agreed upon.”

He added: “some of the most important forces that participated in this union are:

  • Division 77 — Northern Region
  • Third Division — Qalamoun
  • Brigade Lightning Victory — Rural Idlib, Hama
  • Brigade 90 — west of Damascus
  • Brigade Dawn — Gota Bank
  • Brigade Saif al-Sham — Gota Bank
  • Brigade Umayyad — Damascus and its countryside
  • Brigade Martyrs Badia — Idlib
  • Brigade Peace in the Levant — Idlib
  • Brigade Soldiers Rahman Idlib and Abu Aldhor
  • Brigade Raya — Abou Aldhor
  • The Banner of Jesus Christ — Damascus
  • Brigade Omar Mukhtar — Idlib countryside and mount corner
  • Brigade Beloved Prophet; Brigade Billah –Idlib
  • Brigade Abu Bakr — Aleppo
  • brigade Hussein Harmoush — Lattakia
  • Brigade Sincere Promise — Lattakia
  • Brigade The Martyrs of Islam and the Al-Sham — Aleppo and Homs fronts (one of which was destroyed at Wadi Barada)
  • Unity and Liberaton Front including six brigades in al-Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor and EZ
  • Brigade Muawiyah — Rastan
  • Brigade Martyrs of Islam — Qalamoun to Oaabdal Sham destroyed and Wadi Barada
  • Brigade Hamzah — BaradaValley
  • Brigade Martyrs of Dignity — BaradaValley
  • Brigade Martyr Samir Aldhak — Rastan
  • Brigade Eagles
  • Brigade بيارق Islam
  • Brigade Saifullah Maslool
  • Brigade Dawn of the Mujahideen
  • Brigade Hittin
  • Brigade Flag — Khanasser
  • Brigade Soldiers Rahman — Aleppo countryside
  • Brigade Martyr Mazen Missile Defence
  • Brigade Martyrs Secretariat — Hama
  • Brigade Martyrs Dignity — Khan Shaikhoun
  • Brigade Victory in God — Khan Shaikhoun
  • Brigade 533 Commando — Hama Northern
  • Brigade 633 Infantry — Khan Shaikhoun
  • Brigade Caliph — Ma’arrat Nu’man
  • BrigadeHawksMountain — MountHhacbo
  • Battalion Hill Pottery — Aleppo countryside
  • Battalion Tasks — Damascus Madaya
  • Brigades Punishment — Qalamun
  • Brigade Rebels — Khan Shaikhoun
  • Regiment 465 Martyrs — Khan Shaikhoun
  • Brigade Martyrs — Mount Hermon
  • The Banner of Free Rural Western Brigades, Revolutionary Military Council — Damascus”

The original Arabic statement below was taken from All for Syria.

How many have died in Syria?

By Michael Karadjis

[This article was written in late 2013. Of course, the regime’s mass murder policy intensified vastly after this; in January 2016, the UN released data showing 400,000 had been killed as a direct result of war (ie, shooting,, bombing etc) and at least another 70,000 from the impacts of war (starvation, not being able to access medical care due to destroyed health facilities etc), no doubt a vast underestimate. Hence this figure of some 470,000 has tended to stick – as if no-one had been killed since January 2016! The numbers now are more likely around the 700-800,000 mark – and this leaves aside the numbers wounded, crippled for life, and the plurality of the population which has been uprooted. As such, while some claim the term ‘genocide’ is technically incorrect because the people getting massacred – Syrians – are the same people as the regime perpetrating it, and hence some term like ‘politicide’ is preferable, the point remains the same: we are not simply dealing with any old ‘authoritarian’ regime carrying out regulation ‘repression’, but something on a scale with only a few parallels in recent history]

The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (one of many bodies attempting to report death tolls in Syria), has released a report that claims that some 115,000 have been killed in Syria since the beginning of the war (http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/10/03/204186/syrian-observatory-says-115000.html#storylink=cpy). Among other things, the summary by Mark Seibel for McClatchy notes that “pro-Assad forces continue to make up the largest group of the dead – around 41 percent, followed by civilians, who may be on either side, or neither. Rebel forces make up the smallest fraction of the dead, just under 21 percent. It is simply incorrect when Western officials imply that the Syrian government has killed more than 100,000 of its own people.”

It certainly would be unusual if in any war all deaths were directly caused by the regime in power. I doubt that ever happened. It is not usually the way one judges overall responsibility for deaths in war. But there is far more to delve into in relation to these figures.

First, let’s assume we take the report by the Syrian Observatory at face value, and accept that some 40 percent of the dead are either regular Syrian troops or pro-regime paramilitaries. It’s a sad fact to contemplate, but it is true that when a regime wages war against its people and they fight back, regime troops get killed. I know that may sound quite remarkable, but in fact Syria is not the first time that ever happened. Rather a lot of South Vietnamese troops were killed during that war for example (indeed, lots of army and police were already being killed in the late 1950s by NLF …. “terrorism,” long before the mass intervention of either the US or the northern Vietnamese regular forces.

As for calling the regime troops “pro-Assad forces,” or even more, the heading of the Observatory’s June report – that 43 percent of the dead were “Assad-backers” (http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/06/03/192881/assad-backers-reportedly-make.html) – that seems an entirely unwarranted way to describe regular army troops that haven’t yet deserted. Unfortunately, in such wars, many of those killed are on the front lines still “doing their job,” for reasons such as to earn their daily bread, for example.

Second, again if we accept this report, that some 40,000 non-combatant civilians have been killed: who are most of these? To simply claim that civilians “may be on either side” seems to obscure the issue. Is it likely that most might be people massacred by long-range missiles, being bombed from the sky by military aircraft and helicopter gunships, tanks, cluster bombs, long range artillery, and the various enormous massacres from Houla last year to Banyas in May this year? Or are most likely to be the victims of the smaller number of smaller scale massacres committed by Al Qaida or rogue rebel elements using light arms?

The answer is obvious; indeed, the qualitative difference in scale between the systematic crimes of a massively-armed, entrenched state apparatus, and the non-systematic crimes of rogue elements of a guerilla army, is kind of the whole point of the distinction some of us among the left are drawing in this case – as in every other case I’ve ever been aware of. The fact that some on the left don’t make this distinction only in the case of Syria is the curious issue.

What did we say, for example, when during the Second Intifada the kill counts continually showed a Palestinian majority of dead (just as here there is a “Sunni” or “anti-Assad” majority in these figures), but Israeli deaths still hovered around a quarter of the total, nearly 1000 of 4000 killed in 2000-2004 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3694350.stm)? And indeed, in contrast to the Assad side here, the majority of these Israeli deaths were of civilians (about 650 civilians and about 300 “security” personnel)? Did we say therefore that “both sides commit atrocities, they’re both bad?” Or does this kind of liberalism apply uniquely to Syria?

But in any case, we also need to examine the organisation itself and the fact that other reporting organisations exist, including the UN which has its own people on the ground. The well-known fact is that the Observatory is, as the New York Times explained, “virtually a one-man band” run by Rami Abdul Rahman, who fled Syria 13 years ago and who “operates out of a semidetached red-brick house on an ordinary residential street in this drab industrial city, using the simplest, cheapest Internet technology available” (http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/10/world/middleeast/the-man-behind-the-casualty-figures-in-syria.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0). He claims to rely on some 200 personal informants on the ground in Syria. I don’t say this to disparage the obviously dedicated work of the Abdul Rahman, but 200 in a population of 24 million is in fact thin, and even he has reportedly said that the real figures could well be double.

Indeed, when his June report claimed 96,000 deaths (with the UN claiming 93,000), the Observatory noted the real figure could be around 130,000, and the UN said its figures excluded some 38 000 reported killings “because records – which require the victim’s full name and date and location of death – were incomplete”

(http://www.sabc.co.za/news/a/cb267a804ffa543cbd33bffa0a2af236/UN-says-93-000-killed-in-Syrian-conflict-20131306).

The Syrian Observatory is not the only centre collecting death statistics. For example, the Syrian Network for Human Rights (http://www.syrianhr.org) currently documents 83,598 deaths, of which 75,992 were civilians and 7,606 were rebel fighters (while not attempting to collect figures for regime casualties). These figures are slightly higher than those of the Violations Documentation Centre in Syria (http://www.vdc-sy.info), which has documented 55,786 civilians and 18,889 rebel fighters, along with 11,400 regime military deaths.

Now I don’t know which body is more accurate, and I reckon no-one knows that. But the big discrepancy is that both these reports show a much higher number, and proportion, of civilians killed than the Observatory, and the Observatory shows a much higher proportion of regime troops.

However, the Observatory’s very high figure for regime troops is also at odds with the Observatory itself.

In April, the Observatory released its report for the end of March (http://www.sabc.co.za/news/a/c4d437804f1ad8e8b978bb1e5d06aea0/Last-month-deadliest-in-Syria-conflict:-NGO-20130104). According to this report, at that point 62,594 people had been killed in the conflict (the UN figure at that time was 70,000), and this included “at least 30,782 civilians, 15,283 troops, and 14,302 rebels.”

Thus, about 50 percent civilians, and 25 percent each for rebels and regime troops, a ratio of 2:1:1 civilians:rebels:regime troops.

The proportions of the 6005 actually killed in March were 2080 civilians, 2074 rebels and 1464 regime troops (with 387 “whose identities were impossible to verify”), thus the proportion of regime troops was even less than in the total figures. The ratio for the month was thus about 4:4:3 civilians:rebels:regime troops.

Yet in its report released in June, the Observatory’s figures had jumped to 96,431 (http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/06/03/192881/assad-backers-reportedly-make.html), including 35,479 civilians, 16,699 rebels and 41,793 regime troops and militia (the latter covering 24,617 troops and 17,031 militia, plus 145 Hezbollah). All of a sudden, the ratio had completely changed to around 7:3:8 civilians:rebels:regime troops.

The current report (http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/10/03/204186/syrian-observatory-says-115000.html#storylink=cpy) essentially continues that latest ratio, showing 40,146 civilian deaths, 23,707 rebel deaths and 47,206 (28804/18228/174) regime deaths, a ratio of around 8:5:9.

The increases between June and September were nearly 5000 civilians, 7000 rebels and 5500 regime troops, or a ratio of close to 1:1:1, especially if we exclude foreign fighters from rebel figures and Hezbollah from regime figures. Thus, this returns to figures similar to the monthly toll in the April report, and the total toll until then (the biggest increase since June was in rebel deaths and the smallest was in regime “militia” deaths).

Therefore, the single gigantic anomaly, in sharp contrast to all other total and monthly figures, was the alleged spike in regime deaths, from 15,283 in the April report to 41,793 in the June report.

Is this logical? It was during this period that the Assad army conquered Qusayr, and went on an offensive around the country, retaking a few other minor parts, in an operation that many observers imagined meant “Assad was winning.” It is possible that more troops died in that period. But most reports spoke of the increased role of the “militia” and the specific role of Hezbollah in Qusayr, usually noting the Assad preferred not to use his army too much due to concerns about loyalty. And in any case, civilians and rebels also suffered massively during these offensives, which can thus hardly explain such a spike.

The Observatory itself claims the new regime figures “were drawn up after it received thousands of names it hadn’t previously recorded from areas controlled by the Syrian government.” These new informants were allegedly in Latakia, among Alawite friends Rahman had known from school days, who had contact with people in the military, where Alawites have a large influence at the officer level. The regime itself doesn’t publish figures, but these informants allegedly had access to regime figures. No explanation has ever been given about how this anomalous group of figures were collected.

The reporter David Enders for McClatchy noted that in his trip to Damascus last year, “speaking to witnesses in the neighborhoods involved (ie, regime-controlled) required avoiding police and army checkpoints and an ever-present risk of raids by militia or government troops. The Syrian government has granted reporters some access to the country and has allowed video and photography of military funerals, but reporting without a government minder remains difficult.”

All in all, therefore, the VDC reports and figures seem the most likely to me, and their ratios in any case are not that different to those of the Observatory if we subtract the one highly anomalous spike in regime figures which contradict all other monthly and total reports by the organisation itself.

Empowering the Democratic Resistance in Syria

This very well researched report linked to below, by the Arab Reform Initiative, provides quite a thorough study on the explicitly secular part of the Syrian resistance. This itself belies claims that “there are no secular armed rebels groups” in Syria, that all are explicitly “Islamist” etc, a claim made by the New York Times some months ago in order to justify US imperialist policy of refusing to send even a few light arms to the rebels (indeed, of actively blocking their receipt of portable anti-aircraft guns). This clearly false assertion was repeated by a great many leftists, as usual not noticing that they were saying the same thing as those they thought they were criticising.

This also chimes in well with a recent report from Jane’s defense consultants which gave a break-down of the armed opposition, claiming some 30% were explicitly “secular” and/or “nationalist” (ie, generally called Free Syrian Army – FSA, and officially under the Supreme Military Council – SMC), and another 30% were “moderates belonging to groups that have an Islamic character”, ie the FSA-aligned soft Islamists grouped together as the Syrian Islamic Liberation Front (SILF). As opposed to another 30,000 in the hard-line Salafist, but Syrian nationalist, Syrian Islamic Front (SIF) and 10% in the two Al-Qaida groups who have a global agenda.

I write about this article and the meaning of this break-down at https://mkaradjis.wordpress.com/2013/09/24/report-on-relative-strength-of-armed-rebels-in-syria/

This report also notes that the moderate Islamist forces aligned with the FSA (ie, broadly meaning the SILF) could have been included in the report into “democratic” resistance groups, and warns not to confuse them with hard-line jihadists:

“It would have been justified to include other groups described as moderate or mainstream Islamists, who should be clearly distinguished from the extremist and Jihadi groups. They reflect the moderate Islam, which Syrians like to call social Islam traditionally prevalent among the Sunni community in Syria and therefore are part of the social fabric of the country. Some are known to be close to the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. The political leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood is committed to a democratic and pluralistic agenda for post-Assad Syria. This is clearly stated in the political platform of the Muslim Brotherhood published in 2004 and re-confirmed in a document published in 2012. Several conservative religious leaders have also indicated their commitment to a political system that protects the rights of all minorities. Syrians from all communities and ideological backgrounds do not question the right of these figures to be part of the political transition and to play a role in the future political system.”

It is important to understand this, so as not to crudely divide everyone in the Syrian resistance into “secular” folk that us western leftists like, and everyone else that is in some form an “Islamist”. That is liberal imperialist thinking. We need to get away from those kinds of obsessions. Especially given the nature of the revolution as arising from the marginalised rural peasantry hit by Assad’s neoliberal reforms and the masses of urban poor, often first generation from the countryside, sectors more likely to be religious to some degree than the Syrian bourgeoisie and upper middle classes, the base of the “secular” bourgeois Baath regime.

The report clearly distinguishes the mainstream FSA-aligned “Islamist” groups from the hard-line jihadists, including Al Qaida:

“Extremist Jihadi groups pose a problem of a different kind. Most Syrians see them as alien to the social and political fabric of the country. They run wild and shut down civilian life, calling for establishing an Islamic theocracy more often than they mention the fall of Assad.”

Indeed, the soft-Islamist groups – notably Al-Farouq, Liwa al-Tawheed, Liwa al-Islam and Ahfad al Rasul – have been alongside the FSA in clashes with Al Qaida all over Syria in recent months (as has been widely reported).

However, the purpose of this report is explicitly to describe in detail the explicitly secular resistance, to counter the lazy description of the whole resistance as “Islamist”. This is thus a very valuable contribution for this reason.

Clip from report:

Recent developments, have encouraged a change of attitude among liberals and among non-politicized armed groups which are generally averse to the Islamists’ political agenda. In liberated areas such as al-Raqqa, al-Tabqa, Douma, the countryside of Aleppo and Idlib province, there has been a steadily growing trend over the last year of increasing resentment among those who want a liberal democratic Syria. In the name of protecting a sacred unity in face of the regime, liberal democratic armed groups have remained discreet about their resentment and largely powerless lacking the basic means to challenge the radical groups. Many of their leaders believed that the showdown with the extremists was inevitable but considered that the time had not come for opening this second front. They thought that this could only benefit Assad and that it should be postponed until after the fall of the regime. Instead, they sought dialogue and sought a modus vivendi with Islamist groups.

The change of attitude has been induced by several factors. First, the extremists of Jabhat al-Nosra and the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (both offshoots of al-Qaeda) began to impose strict rules and provocative measures which alienated large segments of the Syrian population thus showing what many saw as their “true (ugly) face”. Second, the earlier successes of the Jihadis have not been consolidated and have failed to tip the balance in favor of the anti-Assad resistance. Third, the opposition, both political and military, has come to believe that the motto of unity has become counterproductive, that it has been used by the Islamist forces and their patrons as a cover to dominate the political opposition and the resistance, and that it has frightened a large portion of the hesitant Syrians sitting on the fence, thus damaging the image of the revolution altogether. Lastly, the debates in the United States Congress, the British Parliament and the European Union on the dangers related to the delivery of sophisticated weapons to the opposition for fear that the arms might end in the hands of extremists has undoubtedly emboldened some groups to come out and state clearly where they want to belong. But their message is invariably the same: if the means are made available, we will be in a position to reverse the trend on the ground.

Liberated areas offer stark examples of the unwillingness of resistance groups and of the civilian population to provide cover for the abuses of the extremists. Section IV below provides examples from the field of the clashes that are multiplying between mainstream resistance groups and radical Jihadis. These cannot be equated with infighting within an already fractious armed opposition. Rather, they are attempts to rid the resistance of alien elements who worked their way into Syria and stand as an obstacle to unifying the ranks of the FSA. These efforts contribute to the goal of re-syrianizing the movement. FSA leaders (and hopefully their foreign patrons) now understand the damage caused by the willingness of some FSA units to work with Jabhat al-Nosra and realize that this cooperation made the West reluctant to provide military aid and gave Mr. Assad an opportunity to depict the entire opposition as driven by foreign-backed extremists…..

……… The consensus among groups had so far been to protect the unity of arms, and numerous examples exist of tensions resolved through peaceful means. However, the level of resentment against Jihadi groups by the civilian population and part of the FSA has grown to the point where it became clear to many that radical Jihadis had become a serious threat to the revolution. The Sacred Union that had prevented infighting within the armed opposition is not upheld at any price anymore. It should not be seen as further division within the uprising but rather as an attempt at re-gaining control of the resistance and its original objectives. Yet it does imply a painful recognition that the conflict has become a triangular struggle involving the regime, radical Jihadis and the democratic opposition…..

Download full document here http://www.arab-reform.net/sites/default/files/Protecting%20the%20Syrian%20Resistance.pdf

Syria: war threat, the US-Russia deal, and left delusions – September 2013

By Michael Karadjis

For two and a half years, the Assad regime has waged a barbaric war against the Syrian populace, using long-range missiles, fighter aircraft, helicopter gunships, tanks, artillery, cluster bombs and almost certainly chemical weapons, not to forget the everyday machine gunning and torture, in a bid to crush the heroic uprising of Syria’s “wretched of the earth,” the peasants and urban poor, against his gangster-capitalist regime.

Some 110,000 have been killed, hundreds of thousands injured, and 7 million people, a third of the population, turned into refugees, including over 2 million who are overwhelming neighbouring countries, a refugee population resembling the Palestinian refugee population uprooted by the creation of the Zionist regime in Palestine. Half the country has been turned into moonscapes; indeed, if the US did attack, it may find it difficult to find any targets left. The medical system has been smashed to bits with the regime systematically targeting hospitals, ambulances and health infrastructure; thousands are probably on the road to death right now due to lack of medical equipment, water or electricity (see this report for example: https://www.facebook.com/JasminePagesForRevolution/posts/508219659270122).

The war waged by the regime has no other aim than to keep in power a narrow ruling clique that has ruled for 50 years. Despite some “left” fantasies, it has no progressive content whatsoever; the fact that some “leftists” could possibly even imagine this kind of war could have a “progressive aim”, despite such means, says a lot more about these leftists than about the war itself.

Terrified of popular revolution, throughout these 2.5 years, the US and especially Israel have happily watched the slaughter, and despite hypocritical whining about the regime, the US has made sure to not send a single gun or bullet to the armed opposition up till now.[1]

As Chomsky explains:

There are growing claims that the West intends to supply the opposition with arms. I believe this is quite misleading. The fact of the matter is, that were the United States and Israel interested in bringing down the Syrian regime there is a whole package of measures they could take before they came to the arms-supply option. All these other options remain available, including, for example, America encouraging Israel to mobilize its forces along the northern border, a move that would not produce any objections from the international community and which would compel the regime to withdraw its forces from a number of frontline positions and relieve the pressure on the opposition. But this has not happened, nor will it, so long as America and Israel remain unwilling to bring down Assad regime. They may not like the regime, but it is nevertheless a regime that is well practised in accommodating their demands and any unknown alternative might prove worse in this respect. Much better, then, to watch the Syrians fight and destroy each other (http://lb.boell.org/web/113-1317.html).

Nevertheless, as Assad’s regime is clearly a liability – its ultra-brutal repression is only creating more, and more radical, opposition, yet is unable to crush it and thus restore stability – the US has for some time now aimed for a ‘Yemeni solution’, whereby Assad himself and a few top henchmen are stripped of power but the core of the regime and the military-security state remains.

Throughout this time, the Syrian opposition – armed and unarmed – has been divided on the question of supporting an imaginary western intervention to get rid of the regime. However, evidence from the ground, from the less “political” if you like, tends to show that many average Syrians would gladly see a US attack if the US destroyed the “conventional” weapons of mass destruction that Assad has used against them for the last 2.5 years. Average people ducking ballistic missiles smashing into their apartment blocks and hospitals do not tend to spend a lot of time with geopolitics or political philosophy, as people in the west have the luxury of, but with how they can prevent their families getting massacred.

Naturally, the idea that the US, even if it did intervene, would surgically remove Assad’s advanced weapons just to help the revolution is a complete illusion, but that’s another matter.

In fact, the idea that the US has ever wanted to intervene at all, including in this current crisis, is, in my opinion, also largely a grand delusion of western left thinking.

Throughout these years, a significant part of the left has played a disgraceful role, only comparable to the same role many played over the Serbian genocide in Bosnia in the 1990s. In both cases, it has been something of a “Waterloo” for the left. In both cases, however, many principled leftists have opposed this so-called “anti-imperialist” party line, according to which we no longer have to be socialists, we no longer have to care about human solidarity, we no longer have to support the struggle of working people against murderous capitalist cliques elsewhere in the world, it only suffices to be “anti-imperialist” in the narrowest sense, even if it means supporting precisely these murderous capitalist cliques against their people.

Regarding the principled leftists who have opposed this line, this contribution has no argument with them. Thus just a disclaimer: if during this contribution I often refer in shorthand to “the left”, it is only meant to refer to “the part of the left who have become apologists for Assad, and/or those who see a plague on all your houses” – a formulation a little long to continually repeat.

Yet even for the principled left that support the Syrian uprising and have nothing but contempt for the regime, I believe there is still often confusion regarding both the actions and the motivations of imperialism in this war.

In early May, the US announced it had evidence that Assad had used chemical weapons. Several days of tough-sounding chatter followed, when ideas of how the US might intervene were discussed. The idea that the US might just start to think about having a discussion on whether or not it might be a good idea to think about sending some light weapons to some highly “vetted” groups of rebels, faced with this massive onslaught of heavy weaponry, was discussed.

The left went into a tailspin to denounce what they believed was the obviously immanent war. They denounced not just the fantasy suggestions of direct intervention; even the vague suggestion that the US may think about sending a few guns was denounced as a terrible escalation. The left asserted that both sides in Syria were bad, believing this kind of bland meaningless and classless talk to be very profound, just happening to not notice that this was also the opinion of all imperialist leaders, indeed the main reason they refused to send a gun to the rebels. The left indignantly asserted that if the US sent some arms to “moderate” rebels, they might get into the hands of Al-Qaida, again not noticing that the main argument continually put forward by US and other western leaders for not arming any “moderate” rebels was that these arms might reach Al Qaida.

These very moral leftists also often reminded the US ruling class that if any arms got to Al Qaida, that the latter might later turn them against the US. They warned against “blowback,” that wonderful masterpiece of outright imperialist liberalism, which managed to masquerade itself as leftist or even far leftist talk. Curious. In some cases, they would then quote an imperialist leader saying the same as they were, refuse to notice that he/she was saying the same as what they had been saying for 2 years, and rejoice that now “even” some ruling class figures are “beginning to understand” how bad the Islamic terrorists are. Even more curious.

They must have been (silently) horrified to find that within the very same week that began with this US semi-saber-rattling, US leaders announced they were meeting with Russian leaders to get the Geneva peace process started, as there was no possible solution to the Syrian conflict other than a negotiated, political solution. The left probably silently thought, “we could have told you that,” but instead preferred to insist that this was just a time-saver, and a cover, for Obama, that the US ruling class, despite all the evidence, “really” still wanted to attack Syria, for some reason best known to those making the claim.

Naturally, nothing at all came of all the talk of maybe thinking about perhaps considering sending a few arms to some vetted rebels if they were really good.

Then in early July came apparent confirmation that Assad had used chemical weapons. So then it all began again, the entire cycle, the entire circus. The only difference this time was that instead of a hundred “maybe think about its”, Obama declared that the USwould begin to send some arms to vetted groups of rebels. That really made the left mad. Even worse (for them) was that Britain and France engineered the collapse of the EU’s arms embargo against the Syrian rebels.

Once again lots of furious left rhetoric which, like last time, was in fundamental agreement with most imperialist assertions even while imagining them to be different; once again, within the same week of Obama’s announcement was his meeting with Putin at the G8 to launch the Geneva process and again all the declarations about diplomatic solution etc, including the joint G8 declaration, which also stressed that this political, diplomatic solution must preserve “the core” of the Baathist military-security state, and that both regime and rebels ought to turn their guns against Al Qaida, while no mention was made of Assad.

And then “the left” thought it was really bad that the main political and military leaderships of the Syrian opposition rejected this call for surrender.

And once again, despite this time Obama saying he would send arms, not a gun was ever sent to the rebels. And the day after the EU arms embargo was lifted, Britain announced it had only been kidding (ie, that they would make sure not to send any arms), and France announced that it would only send arms to vetted rebels if these good folk promised to use them to attack Al Qaida. Indeed, every statement from US leaders tended to suggest how unlikely any sending of arms, or any kind of intervention, would be, despite Obama’s initial statement. Once again, the left, again feeling cheated of their war, declared all this to be a ruse, while the US was allegedly forever still planning for war.

The “anti-war” (pro-peace? anti-imperialist? left-wing?) rhetoric of the US ruling class reached a crescendo in the very week before Assad’s massive chemical attack on August 21.

On August 13, CIA Deputy Director Michael Morell said that the potential overthrow of Bashar Assad’s regime in Syria is the largest threat to United States national security and may help al-Qaeda acquire chemical weapons (https://www.wsj.com/articles/cia-sees-syria-as-top-threat-1375837710). According to Morell, the Syrian government’s weapons “are going to be up for grabs and up for sale” if Assad is ousted. Unless the US has a plan of attack ready for that moment, munitions and warheads currently controlled by Assad could end up in the hands of just about anyone.

Syria is “probably the most important issue in the world today because of where it is currently heading,” Morell said, putting it ahead of Iran, core al-Qaeda, and North Korea in terms of US national security.

One would think that was clear enough: the overthrow of Assad is the problem (the worst in the world for the US), not the Assad regime; that the US saw a huge danger to imperialist interests in any new regime involving Sunni jihadists (though I believe that, while the US is honest about this, it is also using the bogey of Al Qaida to conceal its opposition to the victory of any and every stripe of the Syrian revolution, not only the reactionary jihadist minority).

Yet “the left” went out of their way to publish articles about Morell’s declaration, claiming it proved that “even” figures in the US ruling class are beginning to understand what the muddle-headed left “already knew” about the danger of Al-Qaida etc. They continued to insult everyone’s intelligence by declaring that “the US was on the same side as Al-Qaida” in Syria and other such bilge.

Then on August 19, just two days before the chemical attacks, chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, said that the Obama administration was opposed to “even limited” US military intervention in Syria as no side represented US interests (http://blogs.reuters.com/david-rohde/2013/08/22/a-moment-of-truth-in-damascus-and-washington):

“Syria today is not about choosing between two sides but rather about choosing one among many sides… It is my belief that the side we choose must be ready to promote their interests and ours when the balance shifts in their favor. Today, they are not.”

Dempsey wrote that while the US could destroy the Syrian regime’s air force, and change the military balance, “it cannot resolve the underlying and historic ethnic, religious and tribal issues that are fueling this conflict.”

So, according to Dempsey, all sides are bad, none represent US interests, it is not a matter of a revolution versus a tyrannical regime, but “ethnic, religious and tribal” conflict etc. From the point of view of the kind of leftists I have been describing in this article, Dempsey must have become a full-blown left radical. They should have tried to recruit him to Information Clearing House, or Global Research, or Ramsey Clarke’s mob, whatever they’re currently called.

In fact, Dempsey was simply describing US imperialist interests, like Morrell, and like US leaders have continually described them for two years, for anyone that wanted to listen.

It isn’t that the US ruling class is not listening to these leftists, it is that these leftists refuse to notice that they are saying the same thing.

Australia’s Tory prime minister elect, Tony Abbott, normally a US-stooge if ever there was one, recently came out with doubts about US action in Syria because Syria is not a matter of “goodies v baddies,” but of “baddies v baddies.” The left should have been thrilled that Abbott had adopted their very left-wing view that both a capitalist state with massive quantities of conventional weapons of mass destruction that it uses on an enormous scale, and a terrorized population, a population fighting to end a dictatorship and being slaughtered like sheep, are all equally bad due to the relatively small number of crimes that sections of the rebels (mainly, though not exclusively, the Al Qaida reactionaries) also commit within this hellish conflict.

This is a left, presumably, that has never read Lenin on Ireland in 1916, nor ever read any accounts of the Algerian war of independence.

A “left-wing” view, did I say? On the contrary, Abbott was being entirely consistent and loyal to his class, unlike the left.

So then came the horrific chemical attacks on August 21, on East Ghoutta, part of the vast swathe of working class outer Damascus fiercely loyal to the revolution, a region where Assad had not been able to crush the uprising despite massive use of his “conventional” missiles, aircraft, helicopter gunships, tanks and artillery. And an area that he continued to attack with all these means for 5 days after the chemical attacks, while holding up a UN team wanting to get in and investigate.

And much of the left wants to believe it may have been a bunch of FSA people, who were unknowingly transferring some containers of sarin from Saudi Arabian contacts in Jordan to Al Qaida, not knowing what it was, who then had an “accident” in a tunnel, tripped over and spilt the sarin. And apparently this not only killed everyone in the tunnel (except some who apparently survived to tell the tale), but also people scattered over 12 villages in the region (though separated by some areas that somehow weren’t affected). When that Japanese fruitcake released sarin in a subway in Japan years ago, 13 people were killed, all in the subway. This time, the left wants to believe the sarin wickedly spread out of the tunnel and killed hundreds of people over an area far and wide.

Of course while the story sounds stupid enough already, for anyone who actually knows anything, the idea of Saudi Arabia providing chemical weapons to Al-Qaida, their arch enemy whose reason for existence is the overthrow of those they consider the Saudi apostates, is completely stupid; the creators of conspiracist tales ought to do their homework better.

And in the meantime, since I began writing this, the whole stupid story has been exposed as a fraud (see among others this apology to its readers even from the red-brown, conspiracist antiwar.com http://antiwar.com/blog/2013/09/20/retraction-and-apology-to-our-readers-for-mint-press-article-on-syria-gas-attack/, and further this interesting stuff: http://www.al-bab.com/blog/2013/september/yahya-ababneh-exposed.htm#sthash.nFcwkPNT.dpbs).

But I digress. So, since Obama had declared a year earlier that the use of chemical weapons by the regime would be a “red-line” for the US, and several smaller instances had been ignored, the perpetration of such a massive attack could not be ignored. Obama, Cameron and Hollande drew up plans for a military strike on Syria, as imperialist “credibility” is at stake. Assad kill 100,000 people with “conventional” weapons, flatten whole cities, turn the country into a moonscape, create 7 million refugees? Fine. But cross an imperialist-declared red-line and kill 400-1400 people? Not fine.

Imperialist “credibility” is the issue, not any fundamental problem with the regime or even its repression.

Besides, unlike all the “conventional” weapons of mass destruction, non-conventional ones (nuclear, chemical, biological etc) should only be in the hands of the imperialist powers themselves (including little ones like Israel), that’s where a “red-line” is necessary, to show who is ultimately boss.

In other words, Obama and co don’t really give a fig about Syrian people getting killed by Syrian chemical weapons, but they do care that, in the case of some future confrontation between a non-imperialist state (such as Syria after a revolution ousts Assad) and imperialism, the small state is able to equalize the amount of terror that the imperialist state possesses.

That it is more of a concern about who might get these chemicals if Assad falls, rather than about Assad having them, was made abundantly clear in the Morrell quote above (and again, for “Al-Qaida”, read “any Syrian revolutionaries”). It is also abundantly clear from almost every statement coming from US, and especially Israeli, leaders over the last two years:

Israel’s overall stance was explained by Yuval Steinitz, Israeli Minister of Intelligence and Strategic Affairs, who stressed the “only scenario” for Israeli military action in Syria would be to “prevent the delivering of arms, chemical weapons and other kinds of weapons into the hands of terrorists” (http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505263_162-57582025/syrian-rebels-to-get-1st-direct-u.s-support-as-$8m-in-medical-supplies-rations-set-for-delivery/). As Netanyahu explained, he considered the Syrian rebel groups among “the worst Islamist radicals in the world (http://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-wary-quiet-on-syrian-front-may-soon-end).

As Defense Ministry strategist Amos Gilad explained following Israel’s May attack on rockets in Damascus bound for Hezbollah in Lebanon, while “Israel has long made clear it is prepared to resort to force to prevent advanced Syrian weapons reaching Hezbollah or jihadi rebels,” it was not interested in attacking Syria’s chemical weapons because “the good news is that this is under full control (of the
Syrian government)” (http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/04/us-syria-crisis-chemical-israel-idUSBRE94309720130504).

At least, they were firmly under Syrian regime control at the time. But as every US and Israeli leader and strategist explains, like Morrell, if Assad falls, then there is danger. And it is possible that Israel’s relatively hawkish-sounding view during the latest crisis, compared to the previous two years, may also be due to concerns that it may not necessarily have been the regime itself that decided on the chemical attack, but perhaps a rogue military faction within the regime, indicating the possible loosening of the regime’s control (see http://solidarity-us.org/current/node/4000#comment-3578 for this suggestion), though this is only speculation.

So, therefore, we can say that, yes, Obama and other imperialist leaders do have real reasons, of imperialist “credibility,” and of preventing either a revolutionary or and Islamist Syria from inheriting these weapons, to want to go to war.

But that’s why, from the start, Obama insisted the action would be “limited” in nature, would have as its aim the punishment of the regime so that it knows not to do it again, and would definitely not aim at changing the regime or even changing the relative strength of regime and opposition on the ground; it would in no way signify any intervention into the war. At least that’s what Obama said in every statement, regardless of what the left think they heard him say.

However, these very conditions listed by Obama also indicate that the US ruling class has real reasons for not wanting to go to war in Syria at all.

Therefore, it was no surprise that Obama took the historic decision to take a pending war to Congress before beginning hostilities, rather than later while already in the thick of a war (when Congress is more likely to give approval to “support our troops”). US presidents have enormous war-making powers, and don’t need to go to Congress first; unless I’ve got it wrong, the last time a US president took it to Congress first was in … 1941.

And it soon became obvious that there was no way the bulk of US imperialist representatives seated in Congress were going to vote for war; if Obama took it to Congress, he would face a huge defeat, from both Republicans and Democrats.

Obama didn’t want the embarrassment of defeat in the imperialist Congress; however, neither did he really want his stupid “punishment” strikes for US credibility, because he was as aware as any of us are that not only would they achieve nothing, but they would risk even further escalating the situation, to no good effect for anyone.

Just then, Russia came to his rescue. How about we ensure that Assad hands over his chemical weapons? We (US and Russia) can collaborate on this via the UN. Then the Assad regime agreed. Then the US agreed. A few days of negotiating guidelines with a little tough talk, and finally a formal US-Russia deal. Just like the US-Russia meetings that ended the left’s war party in early May, and again in early July, except that this time the stakes were much higher and the end result much more significant.

A gain to all involved; Russia, which has been arming Assad to the teeth for two years, can say its “diplomatic” approach averted a disastrous US attack (and the left can tail along and call arming a near-genocidal 2-year war and slaughter a “diplomatic means”); the US can claim it was its ‘credible threat of force” which forced Russia’s hand and gives the resolution teeth; and Assad can go on using his massive arsenal of “conventional” weapons of mass destruction to crush the populace, knowing now where the red line really is.

Having the war now stolen from them yet again, when this time they were so sure it was happening, so we could do some “anti-war” work and ignore the fact that most of Syria is already a moonscape after 2 years of war, the left now has to warn that for the US, this is all just time-saving, just a ruse, that imperialism still “really” still wants a war, really wants to intervene in Syria, is still preparing for it etc. Sounds familiar.

And even more, the left want to believe that Obama’s “back-down” from war was due to pressure from … the anti-war movement!

Apparently, the largest anti-war movement in history, right across the globe, could not prevent the US invasion of Iraq, but when a few hundred pro-war, oops, I mean “anti-war”, demonstrators show up to a rally carrying photos of the guy who has waged war on Syria for 30 months, well that really stopped Obama in his tracks.

Much as I don’t want to criticise the principled leftists who condemn Assad but opposed the US war threat out of principle (I was one of them; I spoke at such a rally, making sure to declare my “resolute” support for the Syrian revolution while doing so), nevertheless I can’t help thinking that many of us also sound deluded when we repeat these sound-good mantras.

Is it just possible that, forced into a “credibility-saving” war threat that was clearly at odds with what it was saying loud and clear just the day before (no even small intervention because no-one represents our interests), that the historic act of referring a war to Congress where defeat was certain, that the immediate grabbing the bull by its horns when the Russian offer was made, that these acts demonstrate the fact that, as in the preceding 30 months, the US did not want a war on Syria, did not want to intervene in any way?

The US, no matter how much of a war mongering state it is, does not intervene everywhere in the world where there is conflict. To believe, against all the evidence, that the US “really” wants to intervene but just, one would have to explain why.

There are of course some possible reasons, as alluded to above. As explained, nothing whatever to do with Assad being a “progressive” or even a “thorn in the side” of the US. This is all complete nonsense. But rather, to put an end to the incessant instability (no matter how much the US and Israel benefit from people they don’t like all killing each other for a while, it is hardly the end game); to ensure they have an influence on the outcome; to steer that outcome against either genuine democratic revolution or jihadi take-over; and above all to ensure that Assad’s weapons of mass destruction are not captured either by pro-Assad Hezbollah or anti-Assad Sunni jihadists as the regime collapses.

Against such imperatives however are more fundamental facts: Dempsey wasn’t kidding when he said no-one in Syria represented US interests; he was simply voicing the obvious class interests of the US ruling class. And any form of intervention, from rapid, small-scale “punishment strikes” to full-scale regime change, immediately poses the question of what happens next and who takes power.

Of course, the first option does not necessarily pose it; a chastened Assad remains in power. But the danger of even a small scale attack leading to uncontrollable repercussions, of things spinning out of control, is something much more obvious to the US ruling class than it is to the leftists who made a point of warning the US government about it.

The second option (the so-called “Libyan solution”), of course, has never been on the cards, even remotely; however, if things did spin out of control, as a result of the first option, it could become inevitable. And of course then there is the problem that there is no-one to put into power that the US likes. Of course, there are some ex-Baathist officers being assembled by the US and the Saudis in Jordan that they could try to ferry to power; but, firstly, a small bunch of people cannot control a country just because the US puts them there; they would need a base among the real FSA on the ground. And as every single report has shown, the exile political and military leaderships simply have no authority on the ground – they do not control the armed revolutionary populace.

Such regime change, therefore, would be reactionary on many levels; being brought to power that way would be the surest way to fully hijack such a bunch of exile leaders, strip them of whatever revolutionary authority they may have claimed; yet while that may sound good to the US, their lack of control would mean it was useless without the full-scale power of the US military remaining behind to back it up.

Meanwhile, it would also be reactionary in relation to the section of the Damascus and Aleppo urban populations that still block with the regime, as well as the Alawite minority. While these urban sectors are very much the middle and upper classes (Syria is fundamentally a class war), not all these comfortable middle class sectors should be seen as the enemy, but rather as people unconvinced due to many of the well-known political short-falls, to put it mildly, of sections of the opposition leaderships, and more so with the rise of the jihadist fringe. As such, the task remains ultimately political, and forcible overthrow by a foreign power is not a good way to convince people politically.

But leftists needn’t worry: it remains the strategy that has been the furthest from imperialist thinking all along.

Those leftists and liberals prepared to give critical support to a US intervention tend to imagine a scenario intermediate between small punishment strikes and full-scale regime change. The US either will, they think, or else “should”, launch clinical strikes that will meticulously knock out Assad’s massive air power and other command and control facilities which give his regime such overwhelming superiority over the armed opposition, destroy the chemical weapons, and make sure to avoid bombing civilians or civilian infrastructure. Therefore, evening up the battlefield will allow the opposition to fight on a level playing field without fear of Assad’s aerial slaughter and give them a chance of either winning outright, or at least forcing Assad to the negotiating table with the opposition having stronger bargaining power.

What the pro-war left would need to figure with would be why they think the US would act so completely against its own class interests, especially when it has never been known to have done so before.

And what the anti-war left needs to figure with is that, given that reality, why do they imagine the US is hell-bent on making war and intervening, no matter how much it conflicts with available evidence?

The US is not a peaceful power. For some 5 years now, the US has been engaged in a terrible war all over the Middle East, launching murderous drone attacks on civilians over a wide arc from Pakistan, through Yemen, to Somalia, killing many thousands of people, including hundreds of children. There has been no declaration of war, not once has anyone suggested taking it to Congress. Why does the left imagine the attitude to Syria has been so different (with the exception that the US may be considering drone attacks against Al Qaida in Syria as well)?

All that said, what attitude should leftists take to the US-Russia deal to disarm Syria of chemical weapons?

On the one hand, if it prevents a catastrophic US attack, it is welcome. And if it helps disarm a regime that has massacred 100,000 people and destroyed its country of an extremely lethal weapon, the so much the better. And, while little sympathy should be felt for the Russian government that has poured heavy weapons into Assad’s murder machine for 30 months, if the deal suggests that to Russia, its “place in the world” is ultimately more important than its relations with some tyrant, then in the circumstances that’s not such a bad thing either (same goes for the new Iranian government’s overtures).

On the other hand, for those opposed to the proposed US attack because we oppose imperialist intervention in general, how much less of an intervention is it now that significant numbers (hundreds? more?) UN troops will be all over Syria “ensuring compliance”? Instead of US cruise missiles, will it mean US and Russian troops, along with others, crawling over the country? Hard to know before details appear. Will it turn into the Iraqi situation of the 1990s?

Will a Syria disarmed of chemicals – something I see no problem with as such – then stand more naked before a chemical and nuclear armed Israel? Or, alternatively will Syrian compliance with destruction of its chemical weapons now put renewed global pressure on Israel to do the same?

Above all, for Syrian people, is this simply Assad gaining a mini-victory: his gamble with the red-line has at least clarified how far he can go; clarifying that all the conventional weapons of mass destruction he has been using for 30 months are no problem to the world, so now that’s clear, under cover of being “good” and complying, which will take a long time, he can get on with the job of waging his near-genocidal war against the Syrian people, just without chemicals.

None of this can be answered with any certainty. The left should be able to simply understand that, from where we stand, this outcome is better than a US strike, while still recognizing that it has its own serious problems.

The revolutionary forces in Syria simply had no say, and have no say; they can hardly be blamed for not welcoming it with open arms. If in the best case scenario, this leads to some kind of ceasefire, the revolutionary forces would need to use such a situation to rebuild the mass movement that has been battered down by Assad’s war; this is something necessary in any case, given the impossibility of outright military victory, the need to convince other sectors of the population, and the need for some recovery for the Syrian people from such a terrible catastrophe.

However, despite some “left” equalizing of the oppressor and oppressed, it has never been up to the poorly armed resistance, which originally took up arms following 8 months of Assad’s slaughter of their peaceful protest, to guarantee a ceasefire; it is not their fault that there is not one. It is scandalous that some of the left blame them for receiving a trickle of arms from Saudi Arabia and Qatar, or even for receiving some US arms in the future, perhaps – this, they think, is ‘escalation”, and can be blamed for continuing the war.

To again quote Chomsky, regarding the initial arming of the revolution:

“I don’t think the Syrians made a choice. It happened in the wake of the Assad regime’s repressive response. Syrians could either have surrendered or taken up arms. To blame them is akin to saying that the Vietnamese made a mistake responding by force when their US-backed government started committing massacres. Sure, the Vietnamese made a choice to arm themselves, but the alternative was accept still more massacres. It’s not a serious critique” (http://lb.boell.org/web/113-1317.html).

Let’s just clarify: a ceasefire would be an excellent thing; it is the massively armed regime which pulverizes its whole country that is the block to one; getting a few small arms for self-defense does not hold off a ceasefire, unless those leftists pushing this view mean total surrender, the “peace of the grave”; and indeed, it may precisely be via getting better weapons that the resistance may be in some position to force Assad to the negotiating table, whereas with absolute military superiority, he has little incentive.

So, therefore, if the US-Russia chemical deal does not lead to a ceasefire, and Assad just continues the killing, it is simply back to square one; no-ne should have had any illusions the US was about to help the revolution.

Palace coup?

There is one “solution” the US has long planned for Syria. Given the mess Assad has made, the impossibility of him crushing either the revolution or the jihadists, the US has long preferred the “Yemeni solution”, that of a palace coup from within the regime, or an agreed cosmetic change within the regime that removes Assad and his closest henchmen but retains the core of the regime, and especially the military-security apparatus, to maintain Assad’s Syrian ruling class in power to be able to deal with threats to class power. That represents US ruling class interests.

Is there something in the offing now, a further plan being hatched up behind closed doors by the US and Russia, which, despite outward appearances, have ultimately had a fundamentally similar position on Syria?

As al-Monitor reports (http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/09/syria-general-defects-russian-solution-plan.html?utm_source=&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=8), speculation abounds about the escape, or trip abroad, of high-ranking Syrian Alawite officer, Gen. Ali
Habib, following the chemical attacks, which perhaps have provided the opportunity, as the aftermath forced Assad to turn even more completely to Moscow. According to the report, rumours have it that his departure was made in agreement with Moscow.

On Habib himself, the Monitor reports:
“He served as chief of staff from 2004 to 2009, and then assumed the position of defense minister until his retirement on Aug. 8, 2011 following the eruption of the Syrian crisis. If the news is confirmed, Habib will be the most prominent officer to leave the country. This is especially significant given that he is an Alawite from the town of al-Mandara, in
Safita, on the Syrian coast. The Americans and Saudis know Habib very well, since he led the Syrian military units that participated alongside NATO in the war of liberation of Kuwait, after former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein invaded and occupied Kuwait in 1990. A commander of Saudi forces in that war, Khaled bin Sultan, highly praises Habib in his memoir Desert Warrior.”

In many respects, the perfect candidate.

Would that require a US war? Perhaps not. Perhaps even limited strikes would put that in jeopardy. But does the current crisis situation, and its apparent resolution via high-level mediation between the US and Russia, facilitate the atmosphere for such a solution? Undoubtedly, yes.

Would that at least bring about a ceasefire, that the revolutionary forces could exploit? Perhaps. Hopefully. Quite possibly not. No guarantee at all. Just Assadism with Assad? Probably. But a temporary respite, perhaps.

Would it solve the problems that led to the revolt of the Syrian sansculottes, for which they have paid in rivers of blood? No. The revolution, in one form or another, will most certainly continue, the people having sacrificed too much, freed themselves from fear, and with too much at stake, for the revolution to go away.


[1] As I write, there are indications that the first few guns may have arrived; but the numbers and kind so insignificant, and the wait till now so long, that it changes nothing in this contribution.

Report on relative strength of armed rebels in Syria 2014

By Michael Karadjis

Report on relative strength of armed rebels in Syria

September 24, 2013 (partially updated January 25, 2014)

The September 15 Telegraph had an article summarising a very interesting report from IHS-Janes on the relative strengths of different parts of the Syrian armed opposition (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/10311007/Syria-nearly-half-rebel-fighters-are-jihadists-or-hardline-Islamists-says-IHS-Janes-report.html). As a report from the defense consultancy IHS Jane’s, it is probably reasonably accurate, but as expected, the Telegraph translation of it was less so.
Of course, the purpose for the Telegraph was to show how terrible the Syrian opposition is, because so many of them are dreaded “Islamists” of some stripe or another. As the article says, this report allegedly confirms what US and other western leaders have been saying about Syria forever, ie, that they hate the Syrian opposition, because so many of them are people the US doesn’t like, and this is the reason used forever for never sending them a single rifle.

The amusing thing, of course, is that much of the left used the report in the exact same way, to show how bad the opposition is, as there are so many “Islamists.” Amusingly, however, the left will claim that this is a different view to that of western leaders who agree with them.

Many will even more amusingly claim the Telegraph is finally admitting “the truth” that only the Islamophobic “left” knew along, perhaps that imperialists are finally seeing the light, and will mumble liberal stuff about “blowback” etc.

But let’s look at the Jane’s report at face value. Basically it says that the most hardened, outright counterrevolutionary section of the armed revolt – the Al-Qaida linked groups – account for about 10,000 troops, or 10% of the armed opposition. Then there are some 15,000-20,000 other “hard-line” Salafist groups (the Telegraph erroneously put the figure at 30,000), another 30,000-39,000 “moderates belonging to groups that have an Islamic character”, leaving therefore some 30,000-35,000 in outright democratic-secular formations, if the total figure for armed resistance fighters is correct at around 100,000.
The Telegraph puts its own special spin on the final figure, claiming it means “only a small minority of the rebels are linked to secular or purely nationalist groups”, a “stark assessment.”

So, 30-35,000 secular rebels, out of 100,000 are “only a small minority,” not a rather large one? And when we add a similar number of “moderates belonging to groups with an Islamic character”, meaning two thirds to three quarters of the armed rebels are not “hard-line” Islamists, this is “stark”, is it?
Perhaps from the point of view of imperialism, for whom all of those vaguely Islamist moderates would still be considered enemies of imperialist interests (would even “moderate Islamists” be as dedicated to protecting the Israeli annexation of the Golan as Assad has been? Would they likely make war on the Palestinians as often as Assad did?); but also, since for the US “moderate” doesn’t just mean secular, but rather pro-imperialist, the fact of 30% secular fighters also gives no clue one way or another whether they are prepared to serve imperialist interests. Why would any of these secular rebels, steeped in Syrian and Arab nationalist traditions, and heroically fighting for freedom, feel any more likely than the Islamists to betray the Palestinians or the Golan? As chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, stated on August 19, no-one in Syria represents US interests.

While some on the left may unrealistically believe that anything less than a vast majority of secular fighters means a hopeless situation, nevertheless the finding that over 30 percent of rebels are secular and at least two thirds are not “hard-line” Salafist/jihadist, is a vast improvement on the stark New York Times article from April, that the Islamophobic left quoted so widely back then, that laughably claimed “nowhere in rebel-controlled Syria is there a secular fighting force to speak of” (http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/28/world/middleeast/islamist-rebels-gains-in-syria-create-dilemma-for-us.html?pagewanted=all&_r=2&)ps).

And of course, it also depends on what is meant by the 30,000 “hard-line” Islamist rebels who share much of the ideology of Al Qaida without its global aims. While these leaderships are indeed hard-line, the evidence of many fighters slipping between groups, because some have better arms supplies (first the jihadists, due to the open Iraqi border with Al Qaida in Iraq, and oil deals with Assad, have the best arms and supplies, next other Islamists have more supplies from the Gulf than the secular rebels have), but with no real commitment to their ideology, is quite abundant. Indeed, this is also true in reverse, in a sense, of the Islamist groups in the category of “moderates belonging to groups with an Islamic character” – while this well defines the memberships and overall goals of the fighters, some of the leaderships may at times appear as “hard-line” as the groups classed that way. Below I will explain my understanding of the difference.

Indeed, we need to better understand what it means in many cases to be an “Islamist” in Syria and not judge everything by how often a fighter yells “Allah Akbar” (like how an angry western radical might yell “Jesus Christ!”). A great many “Islamists” on the ground are not necessarily “Islamists” in a political sense at all, but they adopt some of the religious phraseology of their culture in their struggle. In particular, given the fundamental class divide that characterises the Syrian revolution, the base of the revolution is the peasantry, devastated by Assad Junior’s neoliberal reforms, and the urban poor, first generation from the countryside with extensive links to country cousins; and in “secular” bourgeois nationalist Syria, like “secular” Egypt”, “secular’ Turkey, “secular” Iran in 1979, “secular” Palestine – the “secularism” only ever went as far as the bourgeois limitations of the process could take it, and remains a largely middle and upper class phenomenon. Thus it is not surprising that peasants and urban poor, when they began organising political and then military formations, often adopted religious names, to the vast horror of all kinds of crusading “left” exponents of “secular” chauvinism in the distant West.

Summary of strength of the armed components of the struggle

Below is my summary of what I understand about the relative sizes of these various parts of the secular and Islamist resistance groups, based on the Janes report but also on a variety of other sources (these were the existing formations before the formation of the Islamic Front in November 2003 out of some of these groups – while this does change some things, basically much of the outline still applies, with the new Front essentially a combination of major components of the SILF and the SIF fronts discussed here. See brief updates through this section and at the end):

1. The more or less secular armed struggle, that is the militias throughout Syria generally known as the Free Syrian Army (FSA), and which are theoretically loyal to the Supreme Military Command (SMC), the main exile-based military leadership body, based in Turkey and Jordan, and led by former Baathist officers who defected. Overwhelmingly, the FSA on the ground is simply the armed local people, and the soldiers who defected and refused to fire on the crowds. It is secular in as much as its goals are entirely secular and democratic, but naturally in composition it will reflect the norm of Syrian society, thus including everyone from atheists to the highly religious. Its loyalty to the SMC however is only nominal; in reality, the SMC has very little or no control over their operations. Estimates of its strength vary; IHS Janes study gives it over 30 percent of the armed opposition (or about 31,000 fighters, see good summary at http://www.businessinsider.com.au/graphic-the-most-accurate-breakdown-of-the-syrian-rebels-2013-9, and Charles Litser’s summary at http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/09/09/syrias_insurgency_beyond_good_guys_and_bad_guys#.Ui6lwS-cszh.twitter); another study by Ken Sofer and Juliana Shafroth of the Center for American Progress claimed 50,000 fighters, out of a total figure of 120-130,000 fighters (http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/report/2013/05/14/63221/the-structure-and-organization-of-the-syrian-opposition); Aron Lund quoted SMC chief, General Salim Idriss, claiming to command 80,000 troops, but this included 35-40,000 in the SILF (see next section), meaning about 40-45,000 for the FSA out of some 120,000 armed fighters (http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/freedom-fighters-cannibals-the-truth-about-syrias-rebels-8662618.html). Based on the numbers for explicitly secular fighters provided by a rather through report by the Arab Reform Initiative (http://www.arab-reform.net/sites/default/files/Protecting%20the%20Syrian%20Resistance.pdf), a rough calculation of some 35,000 or more can be made, but this study unaccountably omitted the largest known secular fighting force in the FSA, the Syrian Martyrs Brigade, which is generally thought to have some 7-12,000 troops in Idlib (http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/10/01/rebels_with_a_cause_but_not_much_consensus?page=full&wp_login_redirect=0), meaning a possible 45,000 FSA fighters if they are included.

However, as Nader Atassi explains, it is very difficult to definitely establish numbers of the real FSA on the ground: “Many Syrian villages and towns have civil defense militias, composed of locals from the neighbourhood, to fend off Assad forces, yet we don’t hear about them, because they are not trans-regional, we hear about Ahrar al-Sham, Jaysh al-Islam, the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, because they have the resources to be trans-regional, to travel around from place to place, whereas one militia, composed of 20 people from your neighbourhood, defending it, are never heard of” (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jxCICHpiL7A2). Therefore, even these numbers showing the secular FSA to be a significant minority may be understated.

(Shortly after the November 2013 formation of the Islamic Front (see below), the Syrian Revolutionaries Front was formed by some largely secular FSA militias in the northwest of the country (http://carnegie-mec.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=53910), including the Syrian Martyrs Brigade and sections of the formerly SILF-aligned Farouk Brigades, while 106 civil and armed secular opposition groups formed the Union of Free Syrians around the same time, http://notgeorgesabra.wordpress.com/2013/11/25/for-a-civil-secular-state-100-groups-unite-in-the-union-of-free-syrians/. These are just two of the criss-crossing formations formed n the ground by secular FSA groups, mostly based in the north and west; meanwhile, in the south, from Deraa up to the Damascus suburbs, secular FSA forces generally dominate the struggle and Islamism is a minority current).

2. The Syrian Islamic Liberation Front (SILF), a large group of powerful militias which, in religious terms, stand between the secular FSA and the radical Salafists. While the Muslim Brotherhood is not much on the ground (as opposed to its role in the exile leadership), nevertheless these groups (the largest being the Farouk Brigade in Homs, Liwa al-Tawhid in Aleppo, Liwa al-Islam in Damascus, and Suqor al-Sham in Idlib) fill that kind of space, ie, they believe, like the Brotherhood (or the AKP), that they can slowly bring about more religious laws, a more “Islamist” regime, via bourgeois democracy or at least via persuasion and discussion, not by force. Their minimal program promises to protect minorities. The SILF lashed out at Al-Nusra when it declared its links to Al-Qaida, declaring “The relentless pursuit of power should not be one of our goals … We don’t need imported charters or a new understanding of the nation’s religion” (http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/13/world/middleeast/syrian-rebels-break-with-radical-group.html?_r=0). While vaguely grouped together as the SILF, they are also officially loyal to the SMC, and have representatives within it; indeed, these groups have often been lead players in FSA clashes with Al Qaida.

According to the Jane’s report, the SILF has some 39,000 fighters (though Charles Lister, from Jane’s is not sure whether one of the groups, Suquor al-Sham and its 8-9000 fighters, might be too hard-line for inclusion here, despite its formal adherence to SILF; and the leader of another group, Liwa al-Islam, Zahran Alloush, recently launched a blistering anti-Shia and anti-Alawi speech which was uncharacteristic of the group’s declarations in general, and certainly at odds with their actions). Most other reports tend to roughly agree on this size for the SILF, and the breakdown is usually given as around 14,000 (previously up to 20,000) for the Farouk Brigades, anywhere from 3500 to 10,000 for Liwa al-Tawhid, 8-9,000 for Suquor al-Sham and an unknown number of thousands for Liwa al-Islam). Both Saudi Arabia and Qatar (via its Muslim Brotherhood allies) are thought to have armed some of these groups (indeed, the paper-thin “Islamisation” of the initially secular-FSA Farouk Brigades is generally thought to have been a question of funding, Liwa al-Tawhid has apparently had some Qatari or MB funding, Liwa al-Islam has apparent Saudi connections), but there is no evidence of any specific external loyalty of these fiercely independent groups and even these funding claims are vague.

While the rhetoric of some leaders (eg Alloush) may at times compare to that of more “hard-line” groups such as the SIF below, two things stand out about these groups: first, none have been involved in any known or documented attacks on minorities (indeed, Liwa al-Tawhid explicitly protects Christians in Aleppo http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2013/Sep-21/232025-christian-hostel-in-aleppo-has-own-view-of-jihadist-rebels.ashx#axzz2gfb4z1J2), or on secular FSA forces, with whom they cooperate closely; and secondly, unlike both the SIF groups (eg Ahrar al-Sham) and the Al-Qaida connected groups, which are dedicated jihadist cadre groups with chapters spread across the country, all these major SILF groups are clearly attached to one region, demonstrating that their “Islamism” has a rather “organic” connection to the socially-conservative sectors of the rebellion (especially peasants) in their regions, and as such are more likely to be distorted vehicles of the masses democratic aspirations compared to the dedicated cadre groups.

2A. Ahfad al Rasul is an independent nation-wide front that is also loyal to the SMC and is ideologically very close to the SILF and the “soft-Islamist” viewpoint, and has also been an important player in clashes with Al-Qaida. It has allegedly been funded by both Qatar and Saudi Arabia, but does not show any obvious signs of specific loyalty to outside forces, and has a strong reputation as a genuine anti-regime fighting group, and has been a special target of the jihadist groups, especially ISIS. It is estimated to have 10-15,000 members.

2B. Commission of the Revolution’s Shields (CSR), is the semi-official militia wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, allegedly consisting of some 43 fighting units, but with altogether at most a few thousand fighters, with a very moderate Islamist program, loyal to the SMC and fighting alongside the FSA. Overwhelmingly, however, the Brotherhood is an exile-based political organisation, powerful in the Syrian National Congress wing of the Syrian Coalition, and its fighting strength on the ground is much smaller (http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/05/07/struggling-to-adapt-muslim-brotherhood-in-new-syria/g2qm#).

These three formations – the SILF, Ahfad al-Rasul and the CSR – may be considered Jane’s “moderates belonging to groups that have an Islamic character,” or are probably best referred to as mainstream Islamists.

2B. The Authenticity and Development Front (Jabhat Alassalah Wa Attanmyyah) is a smallish front (though claiming some 30 battalions or brigades, with no clear information on what this means in terms of size). It is a front of “non-political Salafists”, meaning they advocate a hard “Islamist” policy in the social field but have no claims to clerical rule in politics. This seems to fit well with the Saudi view, which maintains puitanical religious repression at home with the understanding from the Wahabbi order that the church is kept out of political rule, and thus is highly suspicious of revolutionary Islamist movements. Not surprisingly, the literature has it as a bonafide Saudi front. It seems to be a coalition the Saudis have consciously packed together, from split-offs from various SILF or SIF groups, defector officers, “quietist” Salafis and pro-Saudi tribal chiefs (http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/08/09/external_support_and_the_syrian_insurgency). Its small size is perhaps indicative of the difficulties Saudi Arabia faces in balancing these two aspects. It is politically loyal to the SMC, which is official Saudi policy.

Thus, the combined number of fighters in one way or another connected to the SMC, and covering secular and mainstream Islamist fighters, is according to differing estimates anywhere between 62,000-100,000, ie, anywhere from 60-80 percent of the armed opposition, depending again on the estimated total size of armed opposition.

3. The Syrian Islamic Front (SIF), a coalition of hard-line Salafists, or “national-jihadists,” completely dominated by the nation-wide cadre-based militia Ahrar al-Sham, who are fighting for an Islamic state, but unlike al-Qaida, their goals are entirely Syrian. They are completely outside the SMC, but tactically collaborate on the ground with FSA and SILF in operations against the regime, while also cooperating with Al-Nusra at this operational level. They actively denounce Al-Nusra’s ties to Al Qaida and global jihad, and even more ISIS’s role as an Iraqi-based front. While Salafists, they see the fight with the regime as paramount, and for the most part seem little implicated in any ‘theocratic’ repression in liberated zones; their “national” character, in a sense, tames their theocratic impulse in as much as it conflicts with Syrian society, and unlike Al-Qaida, they claim to only want to impose their reactionary vision after Assad is defeated, rather than now during the struggle. There have, however, been some unfortunate cases of such cooperation with al-Nusra or ISIS, most notoriously in Ahrar al-Sham’s mid-2013 collaboration with ISIS repression in Raqqa (where ISIS bombed Afhfad al-Rasoul and other FSA groups out of the city), which later backfired against it when ISIS began to viciously attack them more recently; and Ahrar al-Sham even took part in the ISIS and al-Nusra attack on Alawites in Latakia in August, though it denies any role in killing civilians (indeed, the HRC report into the events suggested the overwhelming majority of the gratuitous killing was carried out by ISIS and its small Chechen-led satellite militia, even al-Nusra coming off relatively lightly).

Jane’s report estimates the SIF has 15-20,000 fighters, while the other reports noted above give their strength as anywhere between 13,000 and 25,000 (the initial report on Jane’s report by the Telegraph claimed this tendency had some 30-35,000 fighters; it seems the Telegraph either made up the figure out of thin air, or added together the maximum alleged figures for the SIF with those of the two Al-Qaida groups). While some reports have claimed past Saudi support to Ahrar al-Sham (perhaps an attempt to find a “national” Salafist group as a wedge between the soft-line, Qatari backed Brotherhood on one side and the global-jihadist groups on the other), if true such a policy seems to have been dropped long ago, given Ahrar’s close coordination on the ground with Jabhat a-Nusra and its well-known support from certain anti-monarchial Kuwaiti clerics (http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/08/09/external_support_and_the_syrian_insurgency).

Update: The formation of the Islamic Front in November 2013 by seven Islamist militias (http://eaworldview.com/2013/11/syria-analysis-significant-insurgent-formation-islamic-front/) cannot be fully discussed here; see later blog articles. However, it is worth noting that the IF essentially joined together the three largest sections of the SILF (except the Farouk Brigades) with Ahrar al-Sham from the SIF, thereby dissolving these two former alliances into one. Some aspects of this suggest a radicalisation of the SILF groups while other aspects suggest a moderation of Ahrar al-Sham.

4. The two Al-Qaida linked groups, Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), that is, the “Salafist/jihadis” who have a global agenda. Most foreign jihadis join these groups. Like the SIF, they are nation-wide cadre-based jihadists. They likewise aim for a theocracy, but are more hard-line in practice than the SIF, and in particular are explicitly sectarian, promising oppression to Alawites and Shiites (though Christians and Jews are allegedly to be respected, as long as they don’t expect to take part in Sunni Islamic state power). However, there is an important difference in practice; al-Nusra is largely Syrian, despite its global agenda, while ISIS is heavily Iraqi and foreign – while al-Nusra had plenty of Iraqi members and foreign recruits, nearly all went with ISIS when they split in April 2013. Al-Nusra has been overshadowed by ISIS in recent months, and most of the gruesome sectarian attacks on Alawi and Shia, which increased in the second half of 2013, are the handiwork of ISIS, which represents a counterrevolutionary mirror of the regime.

Al-Nusra has certainly also engaged in attacks on minorities, such as the massacre of 60 Shia in Halita in the east in June 2013; and while completely overshadowed by the bloodthirsty role in ISIS in the attack on the Latakia Alawites in August, al-Nusra’s role was hardly innocent either, and to even take part in such an attack demonstrates sectarian thinking even if there had been no victims. Al-Nusra’s own sectarian foray into the historic Christian town of Maaloula later in the year apparently did not result in massacres or attacks on churches (http://www.syrianobserver.com/News/News/Maaloula+Churches+Safe+Says+Nun), and while this may indicate a growing divergence with ISIS in practice, for a known jihadist group to even enter such a town further demonstrates a deeply sectarian view of the struggle (al-Nusra’s move was criticised not only by local non-Islamist FSA groups but even by Ahrar al-Sham: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-24148322). In practice, it stands between ISIS and other Islamists in the degree of theocratic repression or active sectarianism it dishes out; but to generalise, in the second half of 2013, its split with ISIS, its growing Syrianisation, a number of defeats by the regular FSA on the one hand and by ISIS on the other, and even the colonisation of some al-Nusra branches by former FSA cadres (due to resource issues, particularly in Raqqa), have tended to somewhat soften its penchant for “Islamic” repression, and by and large it focuses on fighting the regime.

ISIS has gone the other way, and by late 2013 was so associated with theocratic repression, murder and torture of FSA and mainstream Islamist fighters and civil resistance cadres, and gratuitous murder of minorities – while barely fighting the regime and vice versa – that it had alienated the entire spectrum of anti-Assad opposition, including al-Nusra. This was the background to the combined offensive of all other rebel groups to try to defeat ISIS in early 2014. ISIS should not be regarded as part of the movement in any form, but rather as the alternative pole of counterrevolution, and much evidence suggests a great deal more coordination between the regime and ISIS than meets the eye.

The estimates of their combined strength range from around 5000 to some 12,000 fighters (the higher figure according to Lister from Jane’s). Claims of Saudi support to such organisations by many western leftists, despite what may seem logical due to their shared “Wahabbi” philosophy, are in fact absurd and not supported by a shred of evidence; Al-Qaida sees the House of Saud as arch-apostates and its original raison-de’tre was precisely its overthrow. By all accounts, the Saudis measure their hostility to parts of the Syrian rebellion on the basis of closeness or distance from the Al-Qaida groups just as much as does the US.

To sum up, the following are the range of estimates of the size of various parts of the armed resistance:
a. FSA (ie, secular, directly loyal to SMC): 30-50,000
b. SILF (moderate-Islamist, indirectly loyal to SMC): 37-40,000
c. Ahfad al Rasul (moderate-Islamist, loyal to SMC): 10-15,000
d. CSR (moderate-Islamist, loyal to SMC, Muslim Brotherhood-linked): perhaps a few thousand
e. Authenticity and Development Front (“non-political” Salafist, loyal to SMC and to Saudis): perhaps a few thousand
f. SIF (hard-line “national” Salafist, not loyal to SMC): 13,000-25,000
f. Al-Qaida-connected (global-jihadist, hostile to SMC): 5000-12,000.

Total: 95,000 – 145,000

Comment on ‘secular’ and “Islamist’ division

Thus whether we take the lowest or highest estimates, the secular fighters account for about a third of the total fighting force, and the hard-line national and global Salafists for somewhere between one fifth and one quarter. Thus claims of “no secular fighters”, or of all the resistance between “jihadis”, are entirely fictional. However, the meaning of the large middle bloc of “mainstream-Islamists,” the nature and causes of religious naming in Syria, and the flexibility of membership between various groups, all need to be discussed, from a materialist point of view, but require a separate article.

As leftists, we do not support Islamism, even its moderate varieties, politically; we are opposed to an “Islamic state.” “Islamic fundamentalism” is a non-working class ideology. While this “Islamism” reflects the traditionalism of the peasantry and urban poor, excluded from the “secular” project Baath bourgeois-nationalist project, it also reflects that these layers lack their own leadership after decades of viciously repressive rule, and are led by the urban and rural petty-bourgeoisie and smaller bourgeois layers also excluded by the Baathist mega—capitalist elite. While fighting together against the regime, it would of course be wise for the FSA and other secular and democratic fighters and activists to watch their backs.

However, while it is important to know that some 60 percent of the rebels are either secular or “moderates in groups with an Islamic character,” and thus the whole rebellion has not become a giant jihadist plot, at the same time, leftists in the West need to get off the “secular” bandwagon of insisting that peasants and urban poor over in Syria trying to overthrow a monstrously brutal dictatorship have to first get a western-left, or western-liberal, or western-right, star of approval for their “secularism.” The momentum of the struggle against a regime that jails and tortures tens of thousands while dropping barrel bombs on cities, firing ballistic missiles at apartment blocks, strafing the country with MiG warplanes and helicopter gunships and besieging and starving countless population centres, is a democratic momentum and it is the original aims of the revolution which most are fighting for, including most within the Islamist formations, other than the most extreme. Leftists in the West should be concerned, but we cannot define their struggle, and dictate their necessary alliances, based on our conceptions and prejudices; and emphasising this grand ‘secularism” too much, at this stage of the struggle, would essentially exclude large sections of the urban and ruling poor.

By the same token, however, in a country where there are large non-Sunni minority populations (Alawi, Shia, Christians, Druze), if this “Islamism” is too Sunni-specific and sectarian, it will inevitably exclude these minorities from the struggle. And to the extent that Sunni extremist forces are involved, particularly the al-Qaida-linked groups, it encourage these minorities to stick with the regime as their best defense. A complete domination of the struggle by extreme Sunni sectarians would abolish the revolution and leave two anti-democratic formations facing each other. The revolutionary offensive against ISIS rule in January 2014 (see below) makes this outcome much less likely.

Nonetheless, much of the damage may have been done, and supporters of the revolution, while not at all neutral in the military struggle, may have to recognise that there is no ultimate military “solution” in these circumstances (any more than there is a diplomatic “solution” of the type they are attempting to stitch up at Geneva II); there is only a revolutionary solution, and military struggle is only one tactic within an ongoing revolutionary process, and ultimately subject to politics, including this major political weakness. Therefore I agree with the view of Darth Nader that the revolutionary forces should take advantage of any ceasefire, in the case it were possible to force the regime to agree to one, to re-ignite the mass civil struggle, even if this were the result of the corrupt and regime-saving process of Geneva II (http://darthnader.net/2014/01/22/how-geneva-2-can-help-syrians).

Update: The uprising against ISIS in January 2014: How this impacts on our analysis

While this piece was originally written in September 2013 and many changes have taken place, the fundamentals here remain the same as far as can see. On the one hand, there has undoubtedly been a further drift towards “Islamisation”, a further strengthening of Islamist elements versus secular elements, at least on paper. While this has tended to go towards the “centre (ie, the new Islamic Front) rather than the jihadist extremes, the program of the Islamic Front itself is arguably more radical than that of its largely former SILF components. It explicitly calls for an Islamic state, namely “establishing the state in which justice and development will prevail under Islam’s umbrella and Sharia’s dominion,” but on the other hand it stresses that “it does not consider itself as the national alternative” but rather a fighting force, in collaboration with others, to bring down the regime, and while it officially contrasts “democracy” with the rule of “God,” it immediately stresses that “this does not mean we want arbitrary and authoritarian regime, but national matters cannot be rectified except by consultation in principle and application” (http://notgeorgesabra.wordpress.com/2013/11/29/full-english-text-of-the-islamic-fronts-founding-declaration). What this highly contradictory formulations mean kin practice will be determined more by the momentum of the struggle than by the formulations themselves.
And this is where there is some hope, because on the other hand, the offensive launched in early 2014 against ISIS’s increasing imposition of a vicious theocratic dictatorship over large parts of Syria – an offensive launched jointly by the FSA, the Islamic Front, a new moderate Islamist formation called the Army of Mujahideen (less radical than IF) and by Jabhat al-Nusra – is a new upsurge of the revolution. Despite the role of the IF and even al-Nusra in this operation, it is false to see this as just a turf war between rival Islamists in which some just happen to be less vicious than others. Rather, this offensive was a response to a grass-roots upsurge against ISIS rule at the beginning of 2014, and this mobilisation against theocratic repression will make it much harder for any of the Islamist groups currently siding with the people to turn around an impose similar repression.

A very good specific example of this was the fact that in the northeastern city of Raqqa, a region where jihadist-leaning forces are more dominant than elsewhere (given its proximity to Iraq’s Anbar province), it was Ahrar al-Sham and Jabhat al-Nusra, rather than secular FSA, that liberated two churches from ISIS and removed the black flags that ISIS had flown from their spires. As Robin Yassin-Kassab explains, “this was because al-Nusra in Raqqa is manned by ex-Free Syrian Army fighters” (http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/01/rise-fall-isil-syria-201411572925799732.html). Yes, precisely: and this is the point.

Yet at the time that the FSA’s 11th Division in Raqqa “defected” to al-Nusra last September, it was generally interpreted as further evidence of this growing “Islamisation” of the struggle and the gradual collapse of the FSA. What this latest incident reveals is that this defection may be just as easily interpreted as an FSA “colonisation” of al-Nusra. The numbers further suggest that – according to an FSA commander in Raqqa at the time, the FSA had over 1000 fighters and al-Nusra only a few hundred, and were confronted by a murderous ISIS force of 400. ISIS was far more powerful due its money and arms, of course; as the FSA commander noted, “we have not received any support since the beginning of the revolution. Obama and Cameron are liars. If they had arms this never would have happened” (http://beta.syriadeeply.org/2013/09/raqqas-fsa-brigades-join-jabhat-al-nusra). Yet even then, if both confronted by ISIS, why did the more powerful-in-numbers FSA dissolve into the smaller al-Nusra rather than vice-versa? And it seems the answer would be the same as for the reason ISIS was more powerful than both: massively more Gulf money and arms will flow to something labelled “al-Nusra” than to something labelled FSA.

If an FSA-colonised “al-Nusra” can liberate Christian churches from ISIS, this needs to be borne in mind when assessing the role of the Islamic Front, which appease a paragion of moderation compared to a-Nusra generally

Syrian revolution: Class against class basis of uprising

Published in Alford, J & Wilson, A (2016) Khiyana: Daesh, The Left and the Unmaking of the Syrian Revolution, Unkant Publishers, London.

Countless articles have described the social background to the Syrian revolution, and a good bibliography would be a useful tool to be put together at some stage. Below this brief introduction is a fairly straightforward one, but the fundamental facts are well-known. The early Baath Party governments of the 1960s built a base among the peasantry via land reforms and rural subsidy programs, and many Baath political and military leaders had their origins in rural areas, eclipsing the traditional urban-based bourgeoisie. At that stage the main Muslim Brotherhood opposition tended to represent the opposition of the Sunni urban bourgeoisie. However, as a new more powerful capitalist class consolidated itself through the state apparatus – the typical process of Nasserite/Baathist/Kemalist development – the rural dwellers again got left behind.

But it was not until this new elite, under Bashar Assad after 2000, launched neo-liberal “reforms” that the new divide widened into an abyss. These reforms transformed the countryside, leaving it prey to a new class of big capitalist landowners, connected to the regime, driving large numbers of peasants into landlessness, while the abolition of subsidies and freeing of prices and similar measures further hammered the peasantry and also the growing urban poor – themselves first and second generations from the impoverished countryside, with family and other links to rural Syria – who formed great new shanty-suburban rings around Damascus and Aleppo.

While, as elsewhere in the Arab Spring, the first sparks of revolt in early 2011 occurred in urban areas, in Syria these tended to be the smaller towns and cities located in impoverished regional areas, large rural towns essentially, from Daraa in the south to Idlib in the north; the movement in Damascus and Aleppo at this early stage did not look as magnificent as in Cairo and Tunis. From these rural towns the revolt spread like wildfire to the now vigorously anti-Baath countryside. Eventually, the revolution did come to the two big cities, by mid-2012, and the divide between regime-control and opposition-control in both cities is virtually a lesson in sociology: the suburbs dominated by the urban poor are controlled by the revolution, the more established middle and upper class suburbs are under the regime.

Indeed, as virtually all analyses tell you, innocently enough, one of the sections of the population that has remained tied to the regime, apart from much of the Alawite and Christian minority population, is the Sunni “business classes” in Damascus and Aleppo. Unlike in Egypt, Tunisia, and in its different way, Libya, the Syrian capitalist class, a creature of the Baath, has remained tied solidly to the regime (indeed, this has to be understood as part of imperialism’s problem all along – where is the section of the ruling class to replace a discredited Assad with?).

Of course it is not only the capitalist class – much of the secular, comfortable, established Sunni and Christian middle classes in these two cities remain tied to regime, if often grudgingly, or at least neutral, due to the clear political limitations of much of the opposition leadership: a movement based among the overwhelmingly Sunni peasantry and urban poor, which has taken up arms, and which is overall more traditional and religious in outlook than the older established elites, may indeed look frightening to many. Of course, this “religiosity” is also what many in the western left are obsessed with, often in a way indistinguishable from the Islamophobic right; yet while there clearly are seriously reactionary jihadist formations in Syria, overall, the moderate Islamist rebel groups (or indeed even the adoption of religious names by some politically-secular FSA brigades), simply reflect the greater religiosity of the urban and rural poor, ie, those sectors left out of the bourgeois “secular” Baath project, especially after 2000.

Thus, a revolution that for many is nothing but a “sectarian” clash is in reality the sharpest class against class clash in the Arab Spring, thus its extraordinary tenacity and ferocity; its sectarian element is, at base, an overlay of this. That doesn’t mean it hasn’t gone further than this, and cannot go even further and become purely and simply a sectarian war (which is manifestly not the case yet); but even if that did eventuate, it wouldn’t cancel out the social origins of this phenomenon.

Interestingly, the Syrian revolution can be seen as the mirror image, in class/sectarian terms, of the Bahrain uprising, while understanding obviously how different the two societies are: there the state is controlled by a royal elite from the Sunni minority, which rules over an impoverished Shiite majority, the urban and rural poor, whose uprising was partially led by Shia clerics and was overwhelmingly more religious in outlook than the regime and the established classes which stood behind it; the regime and its Saudi and Gulf backers were able to slander the uprising as an Iranian 5th column. Whereas in Syria, the state in dominated by a political and military elite from the Alawite minority (even if it rules for a mixed Alawite-Sunni capitalist class), which rules over a vast Sunni majority of the rural and urban poor, whose revolt is slandered by the regime as a Saudi/Gulf 5th column. But enough from me.  Here first is a brief clip from the article that underlines the point I am making here, and below it the article itself:

(clip) The revolution in Syria, in contrast to the uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen, was at its base a peasants’ revolt, a protest by the Sunni periphery against what was perceived as the Baath regime’s turning its back on the country’s rural population … … And so, from the time the revolution broke out in March 2011 in the city of Dar’a,
the rebellion spread like wildfire to all the rural areas and the periphery, including the northern part of the state, the Jazira region, and later, the agricultural towns of Homs and Hama … … Another source of regime strength lies in the fact that while turmoil has come to the suburbs and the slums of Aleppo and Damascus, the revolution has not ignited among urban Syrians, including the Sunni bourgeoisie of the big cities … … Part of the reluctance stems from the economic benefits the urban bourgeoisie enjoy, especially during recent years thanks to the regime’s economic policies. Some have to do with the bourgeoisie’s age-old resentments, reservations, and aversion toward the
periphery and the rural regions and their inhabitants … … Since most opposition activists come from rural areas, most incursions into the big cities, including Damascus, Aleppo, and Homs, have been carried out by insurgents from nearby rural regions. They penetrate the big cities mostly through the slum neighborhoods and suburbs, which are often inhabited by recent migrants from the periphery and rural areas. These migrants generally maintain connections with relatives back home, and it is from there that the armed bands come. But because the bourgeoisie of Damascus and Aleppo have refrained from joining the insurgents,[14] the Syrian opposition has been denied victory photos such as those from Cairo’s Tahrir Square …

Can Assads Syria Survive Revolution?
by Eyal Zisser
Middle East Quarterly
Spring 2013, pp. 65-71 (view PDF)

http://www.meforum.org/3529/assad-syria-revolution

The outbreak of the Syrian revolution in March 2011 surprised many people. Until that time, it seemed that the 40-year reign of the Assad dynasty, at first under its founder, Hafiz, and then under his son and heir, Bashar, had succeeded in turning Syria into a strong and stable state with governmental institutions, military, and security forces.
Even social and economic systems appeared quite sturdy and effective.

Yet a year and a half of bloody fighting between the regime and the rebels has undermined most of the achievements of the Assad dynasty and turned Syria into a failing state on the verge of disintegration. Most state institutions have ceased to function. The bonds that united the various religious and ethnic communities, tribes, and regions-that took many long years of hard work to forge-are rapidly unraveling. In
addition, Syria has become a kind of punching bag with foreign actors, both regional and international, intervening freely in the country’s internal affairs.

How did the revolt spread so quickly to all parts of Syria, striking such deep roots among wide segments of the Syrian society? How has the Assad regime managed, for the time being and in contrast to other Arab regimes rocked by the recent upheavals, to survive the lethal challenges facing it? And how has it been able to maintain its cohesion and
strength to the point where many observers do not preclude the possibility of its ultimate survival?

The Outbreak of the Syrian Revolution

The revolution in Syria, in contrast to the uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen, was at its base a peasants’ revolt, a protest by the Sunni periphery against what was perceived as the Baath regime’s turning its back on the country’s rural population. Only later did the rebellion take on additional dimensions with jihadists joining the struggle
because of the regime’s “heretical” Alawite nature and because of its alliance with Shiite Iran and Hezbollah. In the name of jihad, thousands of volunteers have streamed into Syria from all over the Arab and Muslim world[1] though jihadist slogans probably did little to arouse Syrians to join the ranks of the revolution.

Revenge was another dimension that developed with time, stemming from the regime’s increasingly violent efforts to suppress the waves of protest. It is clear that the regime’s brutality served to expand the circle of participants in the revolution. Many who joined were motivated specifically by the desire to take revenge for the spilled blood of their family members and relatives or for the destruction of their home villages and towns by the regime’s forces.[2]

Bombed-out buildings in Aleppo, October 3, 2012, show the devastation perpetrated on civilians. The Assad regime’s brutal response to the revolt has only widened the circle of rebellion. Many who have joined the fighting are motivated by the desire to take revenge for the spilled blood of their relatives or the destruction of their homes and communities.

Paradoxically, in the past, the Sunni rural population had been one of the regime’s foremost mainstays. It was one of the main partners in Syria’s ruling coalition of minorities and the periphery, led by members of the Alawite community, who were in turn headed by the Assad dynasty. This coalition served as the basis for the Baath revolution of March 1963, and later as the basis of support for the “Corrective Movement” and for Hafiz al-Assad’s seizure of power in November 1970.

With the passage of time and especially from the beginning of the 2000s, it seemed as if the Syrian regime had ceased reflecting Syrian society. The regime even seemed to have turned its back on the rural areas and the periphery. Beginning in 2006, Syria experienced one of the worst droughts the state had ever known with the damage felt most intensely in the Jazira region of northeastern Syria and in the south, especially in the Hawran region and its central city of Dar’a.

These regions were also adversely affected by the government’s new economic policies, which aimed at changing the character of the Syrian economy from a socialist orientation into a “social market economy.” The aim of these policies, led by Vice Prime Minister Abdullah Dardari, was to open Syria to the world economy, encourage foreign investment, and promote activity in the domestic private sector so as to ensure economic
growth and enable the regime to cope with its domestic and economic challenges: rapid growth of the population, backward infrastructure and lack of advanced industry, over-reliance on agriculture, etc. The new policy was backed by Bashar al-Assad, who seemed to have underestimated the importance of the Baath party’s socialist ideology as well as its institutions and networking, mainly in the periphery. One conclusion to be drawn from the negative reactions to this policy in the periphery was that while the Syrian regime did indeed manage to preserve its image of strength and solidity during the first decade of the 2000s, its support base was considerably narrowed. It lost the broad popular support that it had enjoyed among the Sunni population in the rural areas and the periphery after it turned its back on them.[3]

And so, from the time the revolution broke out in March 2011 in the city of Dar’a, the rebellion spread like wildfire to all the rural areas and the periphery, including the northern part of the state, the Jazira region, and later, the agricultural towns of Homs and Hama. The revolution reached the large cities, Damascus and Aleppo, only at a much later stage.

The Tlas Family and the Town of Rastan

An illustration of this turmoil can be found in the story of the Tlas family from the small town of Rastan. Headed by Mustafa Tlas, the family was one of the pillars of the Baath regime, a living example of the close alliance between the regime and the Sunni periphery on the one hand, and between the Sunni and the Alawite officers led by the Assad dynasty on the other.

Rastan itself is the third largest town in the Homs district and numbers about 40,000 inhabitants according to a 2004 census. It is located on the main road between Aleppo and Damascus, on the segment between the towns of Homs and Hama, about 20 kilometers from Homs and 22 kilometers from Hama. Rastan’s residents earn their livings from agriculture and light industry, notably the rock quarries for which the town is known.[4]

The town has two main clans, the Hamdan, the larger and stronger of the two, and the Firzat. The Tlas family belongs to the Hamdan clan. One of the family’s members, Abdel Qadr Tlas, served as the mukhtar (administrative head) of Rastan from the end of the Ottoman period into the French Mandate period. As a young man, Mustafa Tlas, Abdel Qadr’s son, became the ally and right hand man of Hafiz al-Assad. The two met at the Homs Military Academy, during the officers’ course in which they were enrolled after joining the Syrian army in November 1952. They were roommates during the course, and their paths never parted thereafter. They advanced in rank together and, in November 1970, seized power in Damascus with Hafiz leading and Mustafa helping him. At that time, Tlas was serving as commander in chief of the army and was quickly appointed minister of defense, a post he held until his retirement in 2004.

Tlas was in office during the brutal suppression of the Islamist revolt against the Baath regime in 1976-82, which peaked with the massacre of the citizens of Hama in February 1982. His last task was, in essence, to help Assad’s son Bashar grow into his father’s big shoes.[5]

Tlas also established an economic empire. One of its showcases was a publishing house. He used this firm as a vehicle for publishing, in addition to works of other authors, his own “scholarly” writings, memoirs, and even poetry. Tlas married Lamya Jabiri, a member of the Aleppine aristocracy, and the couple had four children: two daughters-Nahid, who married a Saudi businessman and moved with him to Paris, and Sarya-and two sons-Firas, who became a successful businessman in Damascus, and Manaf, who chose a military career. Manaf was known as a close friend of Bashar al-Assad and served as a brigade commander in the Republican Guard Division, an elite unit formed to protect the regime.[6]

Rastan and the Start of the Revolt

In addition to being home to the Tlas family, Rastan also serves as a faithful reflection of the Sunni periphery. It is not surprising that when the Syrian revolution broke out, the town became one of the revolt’s focal points. As early as the beginning of April 2011, the town square statue of Hafiz al-Assad was reportedly smashed to pieces as demonstrators shouted with joy.[7] This was a symbolic act clearly expressing the town’s disengagement from the Baath regime and from the Assad dynasty. However, Rastan is too strategically located to be given up. Since it is on a main road linking northern and southern Syria and close to the towns of Homs and Hama, it became a major scene of bloody battles between the regime’s army and the insurgents, in which scores of the town’s residents were killed.

The protest movement in Rastan did not bypass the Tlas family. The members of the family who were officers and soldiers, like many of their friends and colleagues, could not ignore the pressure of the unfolding events or the fate suffered by their relatives, neighbors, and home town.

The first Tlas family member to join the revolt was Abd al-Razzaq Tlas, who announced his desertion from the regular Syrian army as early as June 2011. He has subsequently served as commander of the Faruq battalion associated with the Free Syrian Army, which operates in the region of Homs. As time passed, Abd al-Razzaq has become one of the closely watched symbols of the revolution. Thus, for example, innumerable interpretations were given to the fact that he has begun to grow a beard though this action did not necessarily stem from religious motives. His image was not damaged even after rumors were spread about his involvement in a sex scandal though he was apparently removed from his position as battalion commander.[8] Additional members of the Tlas family followed him into the revolution until finally, in the summer of 2012, the reverberations reached the home of Mustafa Tlas. This was quite late in the game and only after it began to seem as if the days of the Assad regime were numbered.

During the first months of 2012, Mustafa Tlas, suffering from health problems, moved to Paris to be near his daughter Nihad. His son Firas soon followed and established contacts with opposition figures and began participating in resistance events abroad.[9] At the beginning of July 2012, Manaf announced his defection from the ranks of the regime. In an interview with al-Arabiya news network, he explained, “I do not see myself as a senior figure in the ranks of the regime but rather as one of the sons of the Syrian Arab army who opposes barbarism and murder of innocents and the corrupt government … I hope for the establishment of a united Syria and for its rebuilding as a state that does not believe in or promote revenge, discrimination, or selfishness.”[10] Immediately after Manaf’s defection, several opposition figures began to mention him as a possible leader of Syria after Bashar’s hoped-for fall. Other opposition figures, however, came out firmly against the idea.[11]

The steps taken by those members of the Tlas family serve as a graphic example of what was happening all over Syria during the past year and a half. They are good indicators of how people who had been strong supporters of the Assad regime turned their backs on it when they felt that it had betrayed them or no longer served their interests.

The Survival of the Regime

Every coin and almost every story has two sides, and so it is with the story of Syria. One side of the story has to do with the fact that the insurgents’ uprising spread quickly and struck deep roots. The other side of the story has to do with the regime and the undeniable fact that it has so far been able to survive. One explanation for this focuses on
the built-in weaknesses of the opposition,[12] which is a faithful reflection of the Syrian society: Both opposition and society suffer from divisions and fragmentation based upon ethnic, religious, regional, socioeconomic, and other differences. Another explanation focuses on the international community’s lack of will or ability to intervene in Syria. A third explanation highlights the sources of the regime’s strengths, calling attention to the fact that the regime survives, not only because of its opponents’ weaknesses, but also because of the reserves of power at its disposal.

One source of the regime’s strength lies in the support it receives from the members of the minority communities, who serve as its social bases. These include the Alawites (12 percent of the population), the Druze (5 percent), and most of the Christians (13 percent). The Kurds (10 percent), including those who live in the regions bordering Turkey and Iraq, have for the most part, not turned against the government either. Many Kurds have exploited the revolution to throw off government control and advance the cause of partial Kurdish independence. Nevertheless, the Syrian Kurds as a whole have refrained from joining the ranks of the opposition or coming out openly against the Assad regime.

Another source of regime strength lies in the fact that while turmoil has come to the suburbs and the slums of Aleppo and Damascus, the revolution has not ignited among urban Syrians, including the Sunni bourgeoisie of the big cities. Most big city residents have chosen to remain on the sidelines and not support the protests, fearing that this
leap would result in political instability, as happened in Iraq or Lebanon, at immense costs.

Part of the reluctance stems from the economic benefits the urban bourgeoisie enjoy, especially during recent years thanks to the regime’s economic policies. Some have to do with the bourgeoisie’s age-old resentments, reservations, and aversion toward the periphery and the rural regions and their inhabitants. The numbers of urban dwellers are considerable. Some 55.7 percent of Syrians live in cities. Around 8 million (out of the total population of 23 million) live in the country’s three large cities: Aleppo-2.98 million; Damascus-2.52 million; and Homs-1.27 million. Most of the Christians live in these three cities.[13]

Since most opposition activists come from rural areas, most incursions into the big cities, including Damascus, Aleppo, and Homs, have been carried out by insurgents from nearby rural regions. They penetrate the big cities mostly through the slum neighborhoods and suburbs, which are often inhabited by recent migrants from the periphery and rural areas. These migrants generally maintain connections with relatives back home, and it is from there that the armed bands come. But because the bourgeoisie of Damascus and Aleppo have refrained from joining the insurgents,[14] the Syrian opposition has been denied victory photos such as those from Cairo’s Tahrir Square, which made it clear that the die had been cast in Egypt and that the youth were on the revolution’s side. In Syria, for the time being, the youth in the big cities prefer to remain shut up in their homes.

Another source of the regime’s strength lies in the loyalty of its institutions, in particular, the army, the security apparatuses, the state bureaucracy, and the Baath party apparatuses. Indeed, in many cases, using the party’s networks, the regime was able to recruit and mobilize local families in various areas, including Sunni neighborhoods, which have become local militias fighting for the regime. These include members of the Sunni community in particular with the emphasis on the Sunni periphery.

Loyalists in Rastan

Returning to Rastan, it is clearly not a big city but of the rebel periphery. But it is also undisputable that many of its residents remain loyal to the regime. In the Tlas family, some have joined the ranks of the rebels, but others maintain neutrality, and still others continue to work for the government. Thus, Talal Tlas serves as Syria’s deputy minister of defense and Ahmad Tlas serves as the commander of the First Corps, the most important military unit in southern Syria.[15] And the various branches of the Tlas family continue to live together in Rastan; battles in the town take place between rebels and army forces that come from outside in order to attack.[16]

Beside these two senior Tlas members, there are others still serving loyally as army officers, perhaps because they consider this to be in their best personal interest and a good way to advance their careers. Their position is quite different from that of the younger officers, like Abd al-Razzaq Tlas, who has his whole future before him. Joining
the ranks of the revolution promises him a brilliant future should it succeed. In any case, as a young officer, he did not have nearly as many vested interests to leave behind and potentially lose. The situation of the senior and middle level officers is much different. They could lose everything, all their achievements, their ranks, pensions, possibilities
for further advancement, and other benefits and privileges. Joining the revolution means sacrifice for a vague future full of unknowns. The revolutionary future holds out the promise of great rewards for the youth, but not necessarily for the symbols of the old regime.

It is clear that as long as the members of the Tlas family and people like them give the regime their support, it will be able to survive. Only about 10 percent of the army’s manpower has defected. The other 90 percent, both soldiers and officers, the great majority of whom come from the Sunni periphery, continues to stand united around the regime, giving it the breathing space it so desperately needs.

Conclusions

The story of the Tlas family and their town, Rastan, attests to the complexity of the Syrian picture. The regime is losing blood daily; little by little support for it diminishes. Since the eruption of the revolution, the trend has clearly been in one direction only.
Nevertheless, the regime retains reserves of support that enable it to survive. A dramatic shift in the situation, such as Bashar’s assassination or an unexpected intervention by the international community, could give the insurgents the push they need and bring about
a major change in the course of the conflict. But the example of the Tlas family and Rastan suggests that the struggle for Syria will still take a long time to unfold.

Eyal Zisser is dean of the faculty of humanities and the Yona and Dina Ettinger Chair of Contemporary Middle Eastern History at Tel Aviv University.

[1] The New York Times, Oct. 14, 2012; Al-Monitor, online news, Oct. 18, 2012.
[2] Fouad Ajami, The Syrian Rebellion (Stanford: Stanford University, 2012), pp. 69-156.
[3] Eyal Zisser, “The Renewal of the ‘Struggle for Syria’: The Rise and Fall of the Ba’th Party,” Sharqiya, Fall 2011, pp. 21-9; Hanna Batatu, Syria’s Peasantry: The Descendants of Its Lesser Rural Notables and Their Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 131-75. For economic data, “Syria-Country Report,” Economist Intelligence Unit, Apr. 2011.
[4] The Annual Report for 2004, Central Bureau of Statistics, Prime Minister’s Office, Syrian Arab Republic, Damascus; “Syria: Mining,” Encyclopedia of the Nations, accessed Dec. 7, 2012.
[5] Mustafa Tlas, Mira’t Hayati (Damascus: Dar Tlas lil-Nashr, 1995), vol. 1, pp. 240-310; Sami Moubayed, Steel and Silk, Men and Women Who Shaped Syria, 1900-2000 Seattle: Cune Press, 2006), pp. 89, 255.
[6] Al-Hayat (London), July 12, 2012; al-Jazeera TV (Doha), July 14, 2012.
[7] Asharq al-Awsat (London), Apr. 7, 2011; al-Arabiya TV (Dubai), Apr. 6, 7, 2011.
[8] Reuters, June 6, 7, 2011; al-Jazeera TV, June 6, 2011; BBC Radio in Arabic, Feb. 12, 2012; Aron Lund, “Holy Warriors: A Field Guide to Syria’s Jihadi Groups,” Foreign Policy, Oct. 15, 2012.
[9] Al-Quds al-Arabi (London), June 28, 2012; al-Jazeera TV, July 1, 2012.
[10] Reuters, July 14, 2012; al-Arabiya TV, July 24, 2012.
[11] Al-Hayat, July 19, 24, 2012.
[12] See, for example, BBC News, Nov. 12, 2012; Itamar Rabinovich, “The Anarchy Factor in Syria,” The Straits Times (Singapore), May 3, 2012.
[13] “General Census,” Central Bureau of Statistics, Prime Minister’s Office, Syrian Arab Republic, Damascus, accessed Dec. 21, 2012.
[14] Reuters, July 18, 19, 2012; al-Hayat, Aug. 23, 2012.
[15] Syrian TV-24, Aug. 1, 2012.
[16] “Al-Markaz al-I’lami fi Rastan,” YouTube.com, July 22, 25, 2012