By Michael Karadjis

After a flare-up, both Israel and Iran have declared that their strikes are over, for now, though Israel went right back to bombing southern Lebanon. Will this flare-up derail US-Iran negotiations? While it is obviously a hiccup, it seems more likely that this was an episode in “negotiations with missiles,” drawing lines, assessing each other’s strengths and maintaining credibility.

Since the Israel-Lebanon “ceasefire” on April 17, which Iran demanded as a condition for its separate ceasefire with the US, Israel has bombed Lebanon as heavily as before the “ceasefire” without a break, killing 1023 and injuring 3062 Lebanese since that date, and meticulously destroying entire villages. While Iran was right to make the demand, the ensuing reality can only be deeply humiliating to the Iranian regime. It has again, quite rightly, demanded that a ceasefire in Lebanon be part of any comprehensive deal with the US, though since the previous “ceasefire” is still officially in place, this would need some kind of assurance this time. Especially as even if there were a real ceasefire as part of the deal, that would leave Israel in control of 10 percent of Lebanese territory, depopulated and destroyed.

Several days ago, Trump told Netanyahu not to attack south Beirut; bombing southern Lebanon is OK, but not the capital; he is concerned about his dealing with Iran as he wants out of the humiliating quagmire he landed himself and the US in. As it became clear that Israel intended to do so anyway and Trump would forget what he’d said the day before, Iran felt the need to draw a line which its credibility rested on: if Israel attacks south Beirut, Iran will directly attack Israel.

Israel of course wants to scuttle the US-Iran negotiations, above all because it wants the Litani river in southern Lebanon as its new border, and therefore is against any ‘linkage’ between a US-Iran ceasefire and its Lebanon front, and in any case, ongoing regional crisis and war is the theatre needed behind which to continue advancing Greater Israel.

So Israel attacked south Beirut, and then Iran attacked Israel (all missiles were intercepted). Trump told Iran “You’ve shot your missiles, that’s enough, get back to the table and make a deal,” and said he was going to call Netanyahu and also tell him not to retaliate against Iran, saying “each of them had their fun, Israel had its strike and Iran had its strike, and we don’t need another one.” He also stressed that Netanyahu “won’t have any choice” but to accept whatever deal he comes up with with Iran, as “I call the shots, he doesn’t call the shots,” making clear who is ultimately boss.

But while it’s true that the US “calls the shots” and is not an Israeli puppet as often thought, neither is Israel a US puppet, as others believe. Just as Trump is facing mid-terms and is currently one of the most unpopular presidents ever, especially due to this war, Netanyahu is facing elections later in the year as well. To not retaliate to a direct Iranian hit, because Trump ordered him not to, would be a huge blow to his own credibility.

Israel retaliated hard against Iran, hitting a major petrochemical complex. Iran then also retaliated against Israel, attacking a similar plant in Haifa (which was also intercepted), and this time was joined by the Houthis in norther Yemen also sending a few rockets at Israel, and Israel then claimed to have then attacked and dismantled Iranian air defence systems. Trump demanded “Israel and Iran must immediately stop shooting” and claimed, implausibly, that “Both sides, Israel and Iran, are looking to do an immediate CEASEFIRE!”

In response to Trump’s demand, or because they both felt their point had been made, both Israel and Iran made statements that they would end this rond of fire, for now. Israel then went back to bombing southern Lebanon, “the strikes hit multiple towns and villages in the Tyre, Zahrani, and Bint Jbeil districts, including al-Samaiyya, Burj al-Shamali, Kfarhouna, Khirbet Dweir, al-Khiraib, and Qalawiyah,” according to Dropsite News.

Trump is now one of the most unpopular presidents ever, and his war on Iran is rejected by the vast majority of Americans. With mid-term elections later this year and a global economy crippled by this war and the dual blockade of the Strait, he is desperate for a deal with Iran to extricate the US from the war, but it is even more important that the deal is one he can sell as a “victory.” While I have mentioned both Iranian and Israeli “credibility” above, in Trump’s case the issue is of ten-fold importance; his alleged “credibility” is shot. The continual statements that a deal “is just about to be signed” over weeks and weeks now is entirely about how to thread the needle so that a deal – whose broad outlines are well-known – can be politically saleable by both the US and Iranian leaderships as a “victory,” especially by the US.

One major sticking point is what to do with Iran’s 440 kilograms of highly enriched uranium, which Iran has continually offered to dilute under international supervision (in negotiations before the June war last year, in negotiations before the war this war, and in ongoing negotiations now), but Trump has continually insisted be sent to the US. Russia, China and Pakistan have all offered to take the uranium and dilute it in their countries; in Obama’s JCPOA (Iran nuclear agreement) in 2015, a similar stockpile was sent to Russia. Trump has not been willing to do this. But in a recent tweet, he seemed to bend, stating that one option was for it to be “destroyed on site in Iran.” It is not really an issue.

One very big issue for Iran is that at least some of its tens of billions of assets frozen abroad need to be unfrozen and made available to Iran for reconstruction at the beginning of a negotiated settlement. This should not be controversial; they are Iranian assets, they legally and morally belong to Iran. Unfreezing them is “giving” Iran nothing. Moreover, doing so would allow the US to in effect respond to Iran’s demand for reconstruction funding from the aggressors on the cheap, giving Iran some space to drop that demand. But when Obama unfroze 1.7 billion in Iranian assets in the JCPOA, Trump and other Republican reactionaries condemned him for “giving billions to the terrorist regime.” And this is Trump’s Achilles Heel – whatever comes out of the US-Iran negotiations will almost certainly be similar to the JCPOA. Yet Trump has to try to justify ripping up that agreement which Iran was abiding by, therefore leading to Iran accumulating another 440 kilos of enriched uranium after having got rid of its previous stockpile, and justify months of devastating war, including murdering hundreds of schoolgirls, and bringing massive crisis to the world economy while facilitating Iran’s control of the Strait of Hormuz, by claiming he got a much better deal than Obama got. This is literally impossible; but somehow it must be dressed up that way.

That is why every time we are “close” to an agreement, Trump gets cold feet, and “goes hard.” And this may have also been background to the latest flare-up. Given how important the unfreezing of Iranian assets is to Iran, the statement several days ago by US Treasury secretary Scott Bessent that the US is considering using Iranian assets to pay for reconstruction of Gulf countries hit by Iranian retaliation was a step too far, and may have been a factor in Iran’s decision to act over Israel/Lebanon. If you’re really giving us nothing, we’ll help the war continue.

Trump’s statement in his latest tweet that the naval blockade of Iran will remain in force until a full agreement is reached is another example of total irrationality given his aim is to reach a deal; because if the US blockade continues, Iran will not lift its own semi-closure of the Strait (it lifted it completely on April 17 after the ceasefire, but only closed it again when the US refused to reciprocate, and has since continually offered a dual end to the closure before getting onto substantive issues; only US rejection keeps the Strait closed). Nuts? Yes. But without something to sell as a “victory,” looking “tough” is the next best thing.

And of course Lebanon is part of the process. Iran needs a Lebanese ceasefire as part of the deal. If it cannot at least get that – especially given that Israel would still remain in occupation of the south – then, aside from its right to defend its own country, what is the “resistance” slogan all about? Every respectable sub-imperial power projecting influence in the region must have some red lines that show it is willing to defend vital interests. Palestine of course was never that, just a slogan, to beat from a safe distance; the fact that it receives virtually zero mention in all this is not accidental. Hezbollah is an entirely different matter – it is no coincidence that the Iranian regime’s only actual ‘proxies’ or ‘real allies’ are other Shiite forces in the region – Hezbollah in Lebanon, Shiite militia in Iraq, and the Houthis; the basis of the Iranian regime’s direct regional influence remains sectarian.

It just happens however, even if by an accident of geography, that southern Lebanon is Shiite-populated. For two decades (1978-2000), Israel occupied the south; the resistance to it naturally enough was led by Shia, and Hezbollah eventually came to lead it. Regional Iranian power projection came up against a direct Israeli occupation. However, for the following two decades, after Israel was driven from Lebanon in 2000, there were zero events on the border, except the brief but devastating 2006 war. The Israel-Iran “conflict” was entirely theoretical, basically for internal or regional mobilizational purposes on both sides. However, with the current extremist regime in power in Israel, the concept of Greater Israel has again raised its head; a border at the Litani river in southern Lebanon means the permanent expulsion of a million Shia from the region, Hezbollah’s base. That recreates an actual conflict between the two countries.

In the meantime, Israel has just announced a complete closure of the borders of Gaza; has announced plans to extend its control in Gaza from 58% to 70%; has announced 34 new settlements in the West Bank, and new major settlement blocs in the Jordan Valley and a new wall separating the valley from the rest of the West Bank; and is killing daily in both Gaza and the West Bank with zero international attention. Palestine simply has nothing to do with this war – except in Israel being able to get away with eviscerating it under the cover of the war. Israel is also continuing and stepping up its daily attacks and occupation of southern Syria beyond the occupied Golan. In Lebanon itself it is pushing beyond the Litani to the next river north, the Zahrani. The Israeli opposition agrees with all these policies, and only condemns Netanyhu for not achieving all the goals they all support soon enough or for buckling to Trump and holding back. Tell me again how this is all gong so “badly” for Israel.