Month: July 2026

Assad, Sharaa, the occupied Golan and the question of ‘peace’ with Israel

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By Michael Karadjis

In a recent interview in al-Jazeera, Syrian president Ahmed al-Sharaa repeated the statement made many times that Syria seeks a “security agreement” with Israel, which it is trying to reach by “involving a large group of countries to put pressure on Israel to adopt a balanced policy towards Syria.” He then continued:

“If the security agreement is successful and Israel commits to the security side, and Syria does as well, along with all the conditions of the agreement that may be concluded later, then this could pave the way for a second phase of talks about a comprehensive peace, but without giving up Syria’s right to the occupied Golan.”

When asked if there were “any linkage to the Palestinian issue or a Palestinian state in these future visions, he replied “of course, Syria supported the establishment of a Palestinian state and voted last year with the campaign led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. So Syria is on this path, alongside the Arab path and with the binding global agreements for establishing Palestine.” [18.16-18.30 of linked longer interview]

In 2020, when Assad was asked if it were likely that Syria “will establish diplomatic relations with Israel in the future, as several Arab countries have done recently,” referring to the Assad regime’s best friends in the Arab world (Egypt, UAE, Bahrain etc), which had re-established relations with both his regime and Israel at much the same time, he replied:

“Our position has been very clear since the beginning of the peace talks in the 1990s … We can establish normal relations with Israel only when we regain our land … So, it would be possible when Israel is ready, but it is not … Therefore, theoretically yes, but practically, so far, the answer is no.”

Clearly, the statements are fundamentally similar, yet many see Sharaa’s statements as a break with the past rather than continuity. This is even odder when you look at the statements more carefully: it is actually Assad, not Sharaa, who is being unambiguous that he was ready to normalise with Israel; Sharaa’s more ambiguous formulations only offer “talks” about it.

New Syria: What to support, what to criticise

Before breaking this down, it should be stated clearly: supporting the Syrian people’s glorious revolution that overthrew the half-century of tyrannical rule by the Assad family in no way requires us to give support to the new government led by Ahmed al-Sharaa – in the same way as supporting the 1979 Iranian revolution that overthrew the tyrant Shah did not mean giving support to the new mullah regime, or supporting the overthrow of Philippines dictator Marcos in 1986 did not mean support for the Aquino regime that followed, and supporting the Egyptian revolution against Mubarak at the beginning of the Arab Spring did not require us to give support to Morsi’s Muslim Brotherhood-led government that arose, to list just a few examples of what ought to be obvious.

Rather, in all these cases, removing an entrenched dictatorship opens up the possibilities, gives a degree of democratic space for the people to organise for their rights and freedoms, and gives them a chance to take these revolutions in more radical directions. Al-Sharaa’s Syrian government can be criticised on a great range of matters, indeed condemned outright for certain actions; but there are constant protests, strikes, popular actions all over the country around a huge range of issues, without participants ending up spending decades in Assad’s Sednaya Torture Inc, or disappeared into a mass grave, or having protesting cities bombed by the airforce into oblivion. Not understanding that the situation today is infinitely better than under Assad for the great majority is not really a serious basis for discussion.

Foreign policy: Necessary compromise or capitulation?

Whatever the case domestically, foreign policy presents a different range of issues – a country emerging from an apocalypse, like Syria yesterday, or Gaza tomorrow, has reconstruction of the country and of peoples’ basic needs as first priority; just think of two million of the 14 million displaced still living in tents in the north due to the sheer volume of housing stock destroyed by Assad, or 2.5 million children unable to attend school, or five (of the seven) million still unable to return from exile, among myriad similar issues. I wonder how many realise the sheer extent of the devastation of Syria by a decade of Assad and Putin destroying entire Syrian cities with their airforces, long-range missiles, chemical weapons and the like. It is not quite Gaza post-2023, but it is the closest thing in the region. And given where money for such reconstruction and economic revival exists in today’s world, compromise with harsh realities is necessary, and those sitting in comfort on computers in the West need to check their privilege before being too critical.

When you inherit a country from a regime which destroyed it, it is your responsibility to reconstruct it – people’s everyday lives, jobs, housing, schools, hospitals, infrastructure depend on it. If you are given a message that the US will end sanctions on your economy and facilitate reconstruction aid, loans and investment if you sell out your own territory in the Golan and sign an unequal peace with Israel, you are at least required to diplomatically engage with this, to play along as best you can; surely, the fact that the new Syrian government has not carried out this demanded capitulation ought to earn it great respect in the circumstances.

That said, principle still matters. But the problem is not that new Syria’s foreign policy cannot also be subject to criticism, within reason. The problem is that a huge amount of the criticism it has been subjected to by a strong section of the privileged western left is both based on extraordinary ignorance, and motivated by malice – by an attempt to show that the revolution delivered Syria from a supposedly “anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist resistance” stance under Assad to a stance of “capitulation” under Sharaa.

Yet nothing could be further from the truth.

Those who think this is the reality seize on social media-generated headlines about statements made by Syrian leaders such as the above. A context-free headline that says “Sharaa wants a security deal with Israel” or some such concoction is followed, on social media, by dozens or hundreds of screwballs writing “Mossad agent,” “al-Qaeda works for Israel,” “that’s why they put him in power,” “I’m missing Assad now” and similar statements of sheer brilliance (for a lettuce, that is).

I even saw one, under an article that merely stated that Sharaa wants the “security agreement” with Israel, who wrote that such a headline several years ago would have seemed like parallel universe! The sheer irony of that particular gem was that “several years ago” we were living through the fifth decade of Assad’s security agreement with Israel that Sharaa merely wants to return to.

Yet when you look at the statements above by Assad and Sharaa, you see they are fundamentally similar. Tankies don’t know that, because their attention spans are inherently limited, but even countless more discerning leftists may not know either due to the way both mainstream media and even much alternative media present these issues.     

In fact, there is a difference between what Assad says here (and both father and son continually said and did) and what Sharaa has continually said, but it is the opposite of what dim tankies and embittered Assadists want it to be. Let’s break it down.

The “security agreement”

First, Sharaa says he wants to reach a “security agreement” with Israel. So what does it mean? In 1974, following the October war the previous year, Israel and Assad senior, through the good offices of war criminal Henry Kissinger, signed a security agreement in which Israeli and Syrian forces “disengaged” along the frontier of the Israeli-occupied Syrian Golan, with UN forces in a buffer zone in between – but without Syria ever recognising the Israeli theft of the Golan. Israel and both Assad regimes maintained this security agreement, this disengagement accord, for the next 50 years without a hiccup. Israeli leaders lauded Assad for never firing a shot; for example, in 2018, as Assad’s forces reconquered southern Syria from the rebels, with the facilitation of Trump, Putin and Israel, Netanyahu declared “We haven’t had a problem with the Assad regime for 40 years, not a single bullet was fired on the Golan Heights,” while his Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Gadi Eisenkot stressed that Israel will allow “only” Assad regime forces to occupy the Golan “border”.

However, the very morning Assad was overthrown on December 8 2024, IDF Chief Herzi Halevi announced that “combat operations” in Syria were to begin, stating that Israel was now fighting on a “fourth front” in Syria in addition to Gaza, West Bank and Lebanon. Israel began a massive air attack on new Syria – till then, Israel’s biggest ever air war – destroying 90 percent of Syria’s strategic weaponry that it had never had a problem with as long as it was safely in Assad’s hands, who they knew would only ever use it against the Syrian people; in fact, Israeli leaders had long promised to do exactly what they now did if Assad were ever overthrown, to prevent the rebels from getting their hands on the weaponry. Israeli leaders all declared relentless hostility to the new Syrian government, calling it “terrorist,” “jihadist,” “extremist” or “al-Qaeda” (sounding much like the tankie ‘left’).

At the same time, Israel ripped up the security agreement it had maintained with Assad for 50 years on the Golan, invading southern Syria beyond the Golan occupation, occupying a new section of Quneitra province and launching continual ground attacks, home invasions, arrests, attacks on agricultural lands, seizure of water supplies and sometimes further airstrikes in southern Syria. This keeps not only that region but the entire country destabilised, a threat to the necessary investment for economic recovery. Interestingly, Israel’s invasion beyond the Golan had began, to a more limited extent, in the last two years under Assad; the difference is that the Assad regime denied it was happening (ie, was complicit), even “order[ing] paramilitary units to withdraw from areas close to Israeli forces,” (as did Russian forces), while the Sharaa government vigorously condemns it daily, right up to the UN, demanding Israel’s withdrawal.

Therefore, by calling for a new “security agreement,” which Syria uncompromisingly conditions on total Israeli withdrawal from all new territory seized since December 2024, Sharaa is merely calling for a return to the situation that existed under the Assads from 1974 to 2024. Israel, by contrast, demands Syria sign a security agreement allowing IDF forces to remain in parts of the newly occupied territories.

One may criticise Syria for not going beyond that and attempting to militarily take back the whole Golan. Most rational observers know that is impossible and suicidal in Syria’s current condition (especially following Israel’s destruction of Syria’s entire arsenal), and would only lead to Israel returning to and intensifying the Assad-Putin destruction of Syria. Nevertheless, if a brave western keyboard warrior insists they must do that, to be consistent they also need to condemn the Assads far more vociferously for never attempting to take back the Golan for 50 years, even at the height of Syria’s military power. Strangely, that often tends to not be the case.

‘Normalisation’ with Israel – what does Assad say? And what did the Assads do?

Next let’s go beyond the Assad/Sharaa security agreements with Israel to the question of establishing full “peace” with Israel involving establishing diplomatic relations (“normalisation”). It is clear in all statements by both Assad and Sharaa that this is impossible without Israel returning the Golan Heights. That is a necessary condition, but is it sufficient? What about the Arab consensus view that this cannot happen without Israeli withdrawal also from the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem and the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state?

What does Assad say? He says Syria “can establish normal relations with Israel” if the Golan is recovered. There is nothing ambiguous there. There is no mention of Palestine or “resistance.” Moreover, there is no question that “normal relations” means normalisation, because the question asked specifically about establishing “diplomatic relations.”

And the context was Assad’s increasingly close alliance with the most Israel-aligned Arab states (UAE, Bahrain, Egypt) on a counterrevolutionary and anti-Muslim Brotherhood basis; given these states normalised with Assad and Israel at the same time (2018-2020 for UAE and Bahrain, Egypt earlier), an Assad-Israel normalisation was a logical step – if only Israel were ever prepared to hand back the Golan. Assad aimed to be Sadat, but Israel wouldn’t let him. By contrast, the Arab states most supportive of the anti-Assad rebels – principally Qatar and to an extent Saudi Arabia – were those who rejected normalisation with Israel without a Palestinian state, plus Turkey, whose older normal relations with Israel were now frozen and hostile under the AKP regime.

Furthermore, under Assad father and son, Syria and Israel had already engaged in normalisation talks in 1993-96, 1999-2000 and 2008-2011. There was no ambiguity; these talks were about the famous “land for peace” formula – return of the Golan in exchange for Syrian recognition of and diplomatic relations with Israel. None of this was ever conditioned on Palestine.   

During the first phase of direct negotiations between Israel and Syria in 1993-96, Assad senior told US President Clinton that Syria had made a “strategic choice for peace” and was ready for “normal, peaceful relations” with Israel in exchange for full withdrawal, and had accepted no linkage with Palestine. Direct negotiations picked up again in 1999-2000 as Clinton brought together Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak and Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk al-Shara. Following Assad senior’s death in 2000, negotiations paused due to events such as the Second Intifada and the new US Bush regime’s extremist foreign policy having little room for such negotiations, though this did not prevent the Assad regime obliging Bush’s “war on terror” by taking Islamist “terror” suspects sent by the US for torture.

Assad junior and Israeli prime minister Olmert returned to indirect talks in 2008, and both sides confirmed they were drawing up an agenda for direct talks, Assad declaring himself ready to meet Olmert, but this was interrupted by Israel’s brutal Gaza Operation Cast Lead in 2008-9. However, they returned to US-mediated talks in 2010. Dennis Ross—an ultra-Zionist in the Obama administration if ever there was one—was convinced that “Syria is ready to move away from Iran and reduce relations with Hezbollah and Hamas, and work with the US in the fight against terrorism,” while Senator John Kerry, soon to be Obama’s Defence Minister—who dined with Assad in Damascus in 2009—said he was “a believer for some period of time that we could make progress in that relationship” [with the Assad regime] “as it embraces a legitimate relationship with the United States and the West.” US mediator Frederic Hof claims to have had an agreement that “went further than any previous document,” which included a pledge by Assad to sever “military ties” with Iran and Hezbollah in exchange the return of the Golan.

In this case, the outbreak of the Syrian uprising in early 2011 cut this off, but Assad’s 2020 statement cited above indicates the regime maintained the same consistent policy; and this background shows that Assad’s statement then was no anomaly.

Left: Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, U.S. President Bill Clinton and Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk al-Shara talk during a walk in Shepherdstown, W.Va., on Jan. 3, 2000, during Israel-Syria normalisation talks; Bashar Assad with US Senator John Kerry during US-mediated Israel-Syria talks in 2010.

Now, one might claim that Sharaa wants to do the same – normalise with Israel in exchange for the Golan and forget Palestine – but even if you did think that, surely this would be continuity with Assad, not a contrast. But what does Sharaa actually say?

‘Normalisation’ with Israel – what does Sharaa say?

Let’s look again. He says that if the security agreement is successful, this “could pave the way for a second phase of talks about a comprehensive peace, but without giving up Syria’s right to the occupied Golan,” then when asked whether the latter would involve any “linkage” to the Palestine issue, he responds “of course, Syria supports the establishment of a Palestinian state.”

But what does any of this mean? In contrast to Assad’s unambiguous yes we can normalise with Israel if the Golan is returned, Sharaa’s statement is completely ambiguous, and in fact promises nothing. It does not say there will be a comprehensive peace – it only offers the possibility of “talks” about it. The additional “of course” does not necessarily mean that Palestine will be linked to the outcome, it could simply be that, separate to the Israel “peace” discussion, he also supports a Palestinian state; but it could mean it is linked. Sharaa’s ambiguity is deliberate – he is addressing different audiences about a completely hypothetical situation, knowing full well that Israel has pledged to never withdraw from the Golan.

OK, one might say this is just the interpretation, the translation, his particular wording at that moment and so on. However, if we look at any reference made by Sharaa or foreign minister Shaibani or other leaders to the issue of normalisation, the same ambiguity always exists. For example:

  • In July 2025, A Syrian foreign ministry spokesperson told al-Hal newspaper (reported in the Syrian Observer) that Syria’s foremost condition for any “peace process” to begin is a “complete Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Golan Heights.” A “peace process” is not a peace agreement; it is, once again, “talks” about one. There is no promise to normalise.
  • The same month, Levant 24 reported that Syrian officials reiterated that “Damascus will not consider any diplomatic initiative that falls short of restoring Syrian sovereignty over all occupied territory, including the entirety of the Golan Heights.” Thus the most promised in exchange for full Israeli withdrawal is a “diplomatic initiative,” ie, talks.
  • Earlier, in April, after two visiting US Congressmen claimed that Sharaa would be willing to sign the Abraham Accords if “the right conditions were met,” Shaibani responded “in fact, the word normalisation was not mentioned, and I was present during this meeting. What was discussed was that we want Syria to live in security and stability. The Israeli incidents that they talk about are a matter of Israeli threats … The Abraham Accords and normalisation were not mentioned.”
  • Earlier still, when asked during a February interview with The Economist whether he was ready to normalise with Israel, Sharaa replied “we want peace with all parties,” but as long as Israel occupied the Golan, any agreement would be premature.”
  • When in the US in September for the UN General Assembly, Sharaa was asked about the Abraham Accord by retired US general David Petraeus. Sharaa replied that “those countries that are part of the Abraham Accords are not Israel’s neighbours,” whereas “Syria, as a neighbour, has been subjected to over 1,000 Israeli raids, strikes, and Israeli incursions into Syria from the Golan Heights – many were killed. So what applies to those who are part of the Abraham Accord does not apply to Syria.” Speaking of the need for calm, stressing that it is Syria’s, rather than Israel’s security under threat, he continued “If we succeed in calming the situation, we can discuss the situation of the Golan Heights and other issues. There is also huge anger over what’s going on in Gaza, not only in Syria but in the entire world, and of course this impacts our position on Israel. We just had our revolution. We are trying to be the voice of the [Syrian] people.” Once again, just hinting at some Palestine conditionality.
  • Asked by Syrian journalist Ibrahim Hamidi in Al-Majalla last August about the Abraham Accords, Sharaa replied: “These accords were concluded between Israel and countries with which it has no direct disputes and that do not share borders with it. Syria’s reality is entirely different. For us, the Golan Heights remain occupied territory.”  

What is clear from all these statements is that there is not a single instance in which Sharaa or any Syrian leader states that they are willing to normalise with Israel, to sign something like the Abraham Accords, even if Israel returned the Golan. Every statement is either ambiguous, or only offers talks, or a “process,” or is stated in the negative – ie, “there can be no discussion of normalisation as long as Israel occupies the Golan,” but never “we can normalise if Israel withdraws from the Golan” – only Assad ever said the latter. In my view, this is because Syria has no interest in normalising with Israel, Golan or otherwise, but the Golan gives Syria cover for rejecting ‘normalisation’ which it does not want in any case.

These are thus all guarded and ambiguous statements; they are not directed at Israel: Israel knows exactly what it is doing (trying to partition Syria and destroy this government) and Syria knows that Israel knows what it is doing; rather, the statements are aimed at keeping the US engaged. Why? Two reasons. First, it is the US that has sanctions hanging over Syria’s head – no other government can end US sanctions except the US! Second, it is only the US that Syria can have any hope for applying some pressure on Israel to desist, at least a little; not that the US has done so, but certainly Israel will listen to no-one else.

And that is precisely the context of Sharaa’s latest statement about the security agreement and the future possibility of “talks about” a comprehensive peace. The US lifted most Syria sanctions last year, and that itself was a struggle that required this kind of deftness from the leadership. But the US government maintains the Syria as a “state sponsor of terrorism” designation. And this still has a significant impact on potential investment in Syria. On the sidelines of the recent NATO summit in Turkiye, Trump stated that he would lift this designation (much to the fury of the Zionist lobby). But now there is 45 days of discussion in Congress on this. Right now, Sharaa must be careful to not put a foot wrong, especially given his continual rejection of Trump’s continual crackpot suggestions that Syria enter Lebanon to fight Hezbollah (Sharaa once again firmly rejected this in this interview).

Of course, one might say, these are all just statements – as they were under Assad. Statements do not preclude Syria sometime capitulating under pressure. But you cannot accuse Syria of wanting to sell the Golan and normalise with Israel, and then confronted with evidence that the current Syrian government continually says the complete opposite, retort “these are only statements.” In reality, weaker states have always compromised under massive pressure in highly unequal conflicts. Consider the Palestinian leadership since the late 1970s, when it began moving from the demand for a democratic, secular state in all Palestine to acceptance of a state in the territories occupied in 1967, ie, of sovereignty over only one-fifth of historic Palestine (combined, of course, with the right of refugees to return to anywhere in Palestine with equal rights). Or look at Ukraine currently, where the entire tankie-inspired left not only accepts that Ukraine will have to give up a fifth of its territory for peace, to end the Russian invasion, but in fact demands that it does (as does US president Trump!). No doubt the same people would be castigating the current Syrian government as “traitors” if they were forced to do the same as what they demand of Ukraine – forced, so that Syrian people can eat, can go to school, can return to rebuilt housing and so on. While I don’t expect this to happen, if it does, surely the blame lies with those who destroyed the country so thoroughly that it had no other choice, no bargaining power – the Assad regime and its allies. Yes, bombing all your own cities and towns into a moonscape is indeed the supreme act of treachery.

Ongoing Israeli attacks

Whatever the case, one thing is clear: Israel itself remains relentlessly hostile to new Syria, regardless of what tankie leftists think about Syria being run by “Mossad” or “capitulating” and so on. A report by SARI Global documented 897 “incidents attributed to Israeli activity in southern Syria.” This included 123 in March 2026 alone, compared to 91 incidents in January and 97 in February. Three times in January, Israeli aircraft sprayed large areas of Quneitra with herbicides, “killing crops, devastating farmers and damaging trees.” Just in the last two weeks of July, Israel has targeted civilians and agricultural targets in a total of 23 artillery and heavy-machine gun incidents, along with 24 ground incursions and 5 arrests; in fact, the week of July 15-22 saw the highest number of Israeli artillery strikes on Syria in 9 months.

Addendum: New Syria – the Golan Heights is Syrian!

It is clear enough from the above that Syria sees the Golan Heights as occupied territory that must be returned, from the continual statements that there can be no “peace talks” or “peace process” that does not involve return of the Golan. Oddly though, the tankosphere is full of claims that new Syria is “giving away the Golan” and the like, unlike “resistant” Assad, ie, the regime that kept the peace on the Golan for 50 years. Whatever. I thought a little addendum with some additional statements by Syrian leaders on the Golan itself, separate from the issue of “peace talks,” could be useful as an antidote:

  • On January 17 2025, Syria’s UN ambassador Koussay Aldahhak, in a UN session condemning Israel’s aggression into the ‘buffer zone’, also “reaffirm[ed] Syria’s inalienable right to recover the occupied Syrian Golan in full.”
  • At another UN session on April 10 2025, Aldahhak demanded implementation of UN resolutions 242, 338 and 497 and “the end of the Israeli occupation of the occupied Syrian Golan.”
  • When Shaibani attended the Munich Security Conference with European and Middle Eastern leaders in February 2025, he stated that the “Golan Heights are Syrian land and no one has the right to give it to anyone.”
  • In April 2025, while condemning ongoing Israeli aggression, he again stressed that “the Golan Heights continue to be considered occupied territory, in clear violation of the UN Charter.”
  • In his interview in Al-Majalla last August 2025, Sharaa declared that Israel’s occupation of the Golan enjoys no “Arab, regional or international legitimacy.”
  • At the 24 October, 2025 Security Council session on the Middle East, Syria’s new Permanent Representative to the UN, Ibrahim Olabi, said Israel must be compelled to withdraw their forces from Syrian territory, including the occupied Golan Heights.
  • In his October 2025 interview with CBS, Sharaa stressed that Syria “seeks a peaceful solution that guarantees Syria’s territorial integrity and its right to the occupied Golan, which the international community still recognizes as Syrian land.”
  • When Trump boasted, last September, that he had “recognized Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights,” Syria’s Foreign Ministry responded by reminding the world of UN Security Council Resolution 497 (1981) which rejected Israeli annexation.
  • At the January 31, 2026 UN Security Council session on Israeli violations in southern Syria, Syria’s UN representative Ibrahim Olabi stated: “Let us be clear, Mr. President. The ceasefire line and the separation zone established by the 1974 agreement constitute a geographical area that separates the Syrian homeland, the Syrian mother from the occupied Syrian Golan. This is not a border with Israel. The question of the occupied Syrian Golan is clear. It is not a disputed area. There is no Israeli sovereignty over this territory. Israel can think whatever it wants about the borders by building barriers or military checkpoints, but that is not realistic from a geographical or political point of view. We will continue to negotiate, but that does not mean that we are abandoning the rights of the Syrian people. If that is what Israel thinks, then Israel is mistaken.
  • In late January 2026, assistant foreign minister Mohammed Taha al-Ahmed, rejecting rumours about Syrian territorial concessions at a January US-mediated meeting, stated “we didn’t agree with Israel to hand over any inch of Syrian land, we will recover every inch of Syria.”
  • At the Antalya Conference in April 2026, Sharaa stated that “any state’s recognition of Israel’s claim over the occupied Syrian Golan – as happened when president Trump recognised the occupied Golan as Israeli – is invalid, because this is a right belonging to the Syrian people,” also noting that just last November, 134 countries “affirmed that the Golan is Syrian land and is occupied by Israel.”

What caused the breakdown of the US-Iran MOU?

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Vessels anchored off Port Sultan Qaboos in Oman on June 19 waiting for full re-opening of Strait of Hormuz

By Michael Karadjis

What caused the breakdown of the US-Iran MOU and the restart of hostilities between the US and Iran? It seems that both the US and Iran decided that the MOU was not perfect enough for their respective needs – especially regarding domestic credibility – and so decided to test it, to push the boundaries, to ‘bargain with fire’.

The US bombings of Iran are so vastly disproportionate in relation to the initial Iranian attacks on oil tankers that it has to be concluded that Trump was just itching for a little more war; the US hit Iran hundreds of times, for thirteen consecutive nights, compared to Iranian hits on only 7 oil tankers or container ships. It is not difficult to understand why Trump might want another chance to look tough, given that the MOU has been widely seen as a defeat and humiliation for the US. Trump aims to get a better deal with some bombing, even though it did not really approach the level of the earlier war. Initially, the US targeted Iranian military targets, but later expanded bombing to clearly civilian targets, including desalination plants. But it is a high risk strategy for Trump, as he is likely to achieve nothing, resulting in even more humiliation. Compared to Iran, the US has the upper hand economically, and it would be more logical to work through the MOU process to push US imperial interests, but logic does not get much of a hearing with Trump.

That said, it is the Iranian regime that sparked the conflict by initiating the first attacks on civilian shipping, for the evidently unjustifiable position that they must not be allowed to sail through sovereign Omani territorial waters. And that is somewhat more difficult to understand.

Iran’s retaliation for these extensive US bombings has been to continually hit US bases mainly in Bahrain, Kuwait and Jordan, though the UAE, Qatar and Oman have also been hit occasionally. While these states condemn the attacks on their soil, nonetheless this time round Iran initially restricted its attacks to US military bases on their soil. The simple fact is that these states cannot host US bases and not expect them to be attacked when the US attacks Iran, even if they don’t allow those bases to be directly used in attacks. They are US military assets, assets of the state attacking Iran, and provide logistical and intelligence roles in the US war whatever the case. Later, however, Iran also began once again expanding to civilian targets, including reportedly a desalination plant in Kuwait.

Saudi Arabia has not been touched this time, but the initial Iranian attacks on shipping were on a Saudi and a Qatari vessel sailing in Omani waters. Yet these three countries – Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Oman – have been the most conciliatory towards Iran and are key components of the Pakistan-led ‘mediation camp’ (as opposed to the more hawkish UAE-Bahrain-Kuwait group), and an emerging regional ‘third force’. So why do this?

Especially since Iranian FM Araghchi had just been in Oman attempting to negotiate some kind of joint arrangement for ships in the Strait of Hormuz. Oman had even stated that it was open to some kind of fee arrangement, if not a formal toll (Iran has proposed insurance, environmental, navigation or ⁠security fees, after the end of the 60 days of negotiations in the MOU). Likewise, in late June, the Qatari PM visited Oman to initiate negotiations involving Iran, Iraq and Gulf Arab states on the Strait of Hormuz, to implement a provision of the MOU calling for Iran to hold talks with Oman, other Gulf states and Iraq on the future management of the ​strait. Separately, Saudi Arabia announced plans for regional ‌reconciliation ⁠talks in Riyadh between Iran, Gulf Arab states and other regional countries.

Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia just sent a high-level delegation to Khamenei’s funeral in Iran, as did Qatar, Oman and other members of the new regional ‘third force’ (Turkey, Pakistan). In fact Pakistan, which Saudi Arabia has a formal defence treaty with, was one of the only countries to send its head of state, as well as head of its armed forces.

So Iran’s initial maritime attacks seem to make little sense.

Spokespeople for Iran, for example, on Al-Jazeera, have not really put forward a convincing case. They argue that by sailing through Omani waters, rather than Iranian waters, these ships are violating Point 5 of the MOU.

To clarify, the Strait runs between Iran and Oman, so both countries hold territorial waters on either side, plus there is a small strip of international waters in between, which however has been heavily mined by Iran. In the discussions about whether Iran has the right to charge some kind of tolls or fees for passage through the Strait, this can only really apply to ships choosing to pass through Iranian waters; it is up to Oman whether or not it chooses to do the same; and there is no law that says ships must pass through Iranian waters. Hence the push for some kind of joint Gulf-state buy-in, or at very least, an Iran-Oman agreement.

So, here is Point 5 of the MOU:

“Upon the signing of this MoU, the Islamic Republic of Iran will make arrangements using its best efforts for the safe passage of commercial vessels, with no charge for 60 days only, from the Persian Gulf to the Sea of Oman, and vice versa. The traffic of commercial vessels will immediately start, and considering the need for removing the technical and military obstacles, and de-mining by the Islamic Republic of Iran, will be instated within 30 days. The Islamic Republic of Iran will conduct dialogue with the Sultanate of Oman, to define the future administration and maritime services in the Strait of Hormuz, in discussions with other Persian Gulf Littoral States, in line with applicable international law and the sovereign rights of coastal states of the Strait of Hormuz.”

Only a very slanted interpretation of the wording would say ships are in violation if they use Oman’s territorial waters. Yes, it says Iran will make arrangements for safe passage of ships through the Strait, but it doesn’t say that ships must pass through the Iranian side to be so “arranged,” in fact by firing on vessels otherwise sailing safely through the Strait, Iran is violating the MOU’s wording about “safe passage.” It says Iran, Oman and other Gulf states will conduct dialogue about the future, but not that ships must choose a particular route now.

Iran argues that the US navy has deliberately opened up this passage through Omani waters so that ships can avoid the Iranian side, even though Iran is not currently charging any fees. The US aim is to establish a precedent whereby, whatever Iran decides to do in the future, ships can simply avoid the Iranian side. Therefore, Iran’s bargaining power is gone.

This may well be the US aim. But sailing through Omani waters has always been an option. The US did not create this option. That is a built-in reality; the wording of the MOU would have needed to be far more explicit for this to be a violation.

And if they require the US navy to escort them through Omani waters for their safety, surely the only thing threatening their safety is Iranian drones or missiles? So this becomes a circular argument – if Iran does not want the US navy there, it would make it clear that ships can sail through Omani waters without being attacked. 

So, if the arguments do not make sense, why is Iran doing this?

I think there are a number of factors.

First is precisely this catch that the MOU’s vague wording does not in fact cover Iran’s need to hold its leverage via the Strait. Given the enormously destructive, totally illegal, and treacherous aggression that Iran was subjected to by the US and Israel – twice in the middle of negotiations – Iran has every right to whatever leverage it can use. Its discovery that it could use the Strait of Hormuz to block the oil trade and disrupt the global economy is a weapon it will understandably not want to give up, at least until there is a final settlement. This is not so much about whether or not fees will ultimately happen (for Iran, fees can help with the massive reconstruction cost, but it may waive this idea if solid reconstruction money, release of frozen funds etc takes place in the final agreement), as about Iranian control. If ships can just choose the Omani side, Iran loses much of its leverage.

That does not mean Oman or the countries owning these ships are doing anything in violation of the MOU or that Iran’s arguments make sense. They do not. But in the context, Iran’s view is understandable. Of course, it would be much better for Iran to get an agreement with Oman and other Gulf states. They view Iran attacking their ships in Omani waters while they are in the midst of these very discussions to be treacherous. However, Iran views the very act of taking Omani waters, turning off signals and gaining US naval protection while these discussions are taking place as treacherous itself, aimed at killing Iran’s leverage.

Secondly, pro-Iran spokespeople argue the question of violating the MOU must be seen in the broader context, because the US and Israel have violated it from the first day. Interestingly, this is almost a confession that it is Iran violating the MOU by attacking ships, but that it is justified as retaliation for US and Israeli violations. For example, Point 1 of the MOU says that upon signing the deal the US and Iran “undertake from now on … to refrain from the *threat* or use of force against each other.” Yet from the very first days of the MOU, Trump was already threatening to drop bombs “right on their heads” if he didn’t get the deal he wants, and even to kill the Iranian negotiators, all long before these Iranian attacks on ships.

Of course, Trump’s deranged threats were then and hardly explain Iran’s reaction some weeks later, but Point 1 of the MOU also declares “the immediate and permanent termination of military operations on all fronts, including in Lebanon” – clearly, Israeli military operations have not been terminated in Lebanon. Soon after the MOU, the US arranged the separate Israel-Lebanon agreement, which allows Israeli forces to stay in Lebanon until such a time that the Lebanese army is able to disarm Hezbollah bit by bit in different pockets, an Oslo-type recipe for forever occupation – but not only that, outside of these proposed zones, Israel is able to just keep up bombing Lebanese targets where Hezbollah operates (or supposedly does). Dozens of Lebanese civilians have been killed since the MOU, and since this separate agreement, while the IDF also continues to meticulously destroy entire towns and villages to prevent return.

These ongoing Israeli actions (as well as the separate agreement itself) are a direct threat to Iran’s credibility. While I doubt Iran will ever get Israel to withdraw from Lebanon, the ongoing killing directly violates the MOU and politically Iran has to react. A million Lebanese Shiites have been uprooted by Israel from the south; the Iran regime’s only solid regional influence (as opposed to transactional relations it has with many states) is among Shiite communities, and political forces, in Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen, so not putting halt to Israel turning south Lebanon into Gaza risks losing a major part of this influence. Likely the attacks are Iran’s indirect way of objecting to the violation of the Lebanon part of the MOU.

Finally, there are the divisions within the Iranian elite and among the Iranian people. While the MOU is widely interpreted as a relative victory to Iran and a defeat for the US, a vocal minority within the Iranian regime and its key institutions sees it as capitulation to the US. Sixty-two members of the powerful Assembly of Experts (nearly three-quarters of them), signed a statement calling the reopening of the Strait a strategic mistake – and the opening of the Omani channel precisely made them look right! Demonstrations have been held by the hard-line Paydari Front denouncing the MOU as betrayal.

While in normal times, these voices could perhaps be brushed aside – it is almost certain that the majority of Iranians prefer peace with some degree of compromise – these events cannot be separated from the context of the mass, week-long, country-wide funeral events for murdered Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, involving millions of people (while some of the figures claiming tens of millions are obvious nonsense, there clearly were millions throughout the country). Many called for vengeance; a prominent call was ‘Kill Trump’. Many slogans denounced signing any agreement with the killer of Khamenei. In some cases, the figures most associated with the MOU framework – Ghalibaf, Araghchi, Pezeshkian – were publicly attacked. While some of this was likely orchestrated by the reactionary right, it seems likely this atmosphere was another factor prompting the Iranian leadership to angle for a stronger deal, at least on Hormuz.

The problem is that with both the US and Iranian regimes motivated to a large degree by issues of domestic political credibility in these renewed clashes (which is also the case in a different way with the Israeli leadership), reaching a deal they can both call a win, in order to return to the MOU process, is even harder than before. It seems unlikely that either side wants a return to full-scale war (although Trump’s threats to start bombing bridges and power plants suggest it is possible). These are battles within the context of an overall negotiations process, drawing out red lines, trying to gain better bargaining positions. While Trump now relishes the chance to look tough again, to spout ugly, hateful, blood-curdling rhetoric again, lest anyone dare call the MOU a US defeat or humiliation, he will be aware that a full escalation risks not achieving any more than last round, while the economic fall-out could have a severe impact on the upcoming mid-term elections.

Trump, in other words, still needs a deal. But it is Trump, after all, so it is not out of the question that he decides the mid-terms will be lost anyway, and therefore he may as well go for broke and risk all to “crush the enemy.” But apart from crazed neocons like the late Lindsay Graham, it seems unlikely that saner voices of US imperialism see that as a good idea.

But this course is also very risky for Iran. The Iranian regime risks overplaying its hand as a result of the view that it has defeated the US, and the view that control of the Strait is some kind of Iranian nuclear weapon. Both ideas need bucket-loads of nuance. Yes it imposed a political defeat on the US, but it is a devastated country with a wrecked economy. It needs hundreds of billions for reconstruction. The people are exhausted. Despite the size of the funerals, Iranians are deeply divided; there were countless scenes of cheering when Khamenei was killed also, but there is nothing like a foreign power slaughtering thousands of civilians to swing much of the population behind even an unpopular regime resisting such savage foreign aggression. Meanwhile, the regime fosters further divisions by using the cover of war to go on a hanging spree against young people involved in January’s mass protest movement.

Relying on the Strait as a weapon may have a short shelf-life. Saudi Arabia, for example, was able to almost keep up the same level of oil exports by using its pipeline to its Red Sea ports – and even though the volume was slightly reduced, it actually made more money due to high oil prices due to the closure of the Strait! It can also build a further branch of the pipeline to pass south through Yemen or Oman directly into the Indian Ocean. No wonder it kept largely quiet. The UAE also has a pipeline to the Indian Ocean running through Oman, through which it could still export some 80 percent of its oil, and is building another through part of its own territory outside the Gulf. Iran could block Iraqi exports, but during the war it made an exception for “brotherly Iraq.” Is it wise to turn an ally into an enemy? In any case, Iraq could start selling more to Europe via pipelines through Turkey and Syria. That leaves Kuwaiti oil and Qatari gas (Bahrain has little of anything). Kuwait could build a pipeline to join the Saudi pipeline. Qatar and Iran actually share a major gasfield!

And all of that is before we even consider future decline of demand for hydrocarbons, which this war and the blockage of the Strait will likely accelerate. With China now the world’s biggest producer of solar panels, batteries, electric cars, wind turbines and so on, it stands to sweep the region in the future as the US petrodollar declines, yet the same process will make the Strait less strategic.

In this sense, Iran is better off trying to mend bridges with its Arab Gulf neighbours, especially the ‘mediation bloc’, rather than widening them via attacks on oil tankers. The Qatari-led talks between Gulf states, Iran and Iraq on finding a joint plan for management of the Strait, the Iran-Oman talks, and the Saudi plan for reconciliation talks in Riyadh were all positives that probably alarmed the US and Israel, and wrecking such initiatives may have been one motivation for Trump angling for more war. But that is what precisely makes it difficult to understand Iran’s actions which have given Trump the pretext.

Iran’s position that it alone controls the Strait is not supported by any of the Gulf states, and crucially, nor is it supported by China, the only other force powerful enough to put some brake on the US (of less relevance is the fact that Iran’s position is also not supported by Russia). Every statement from China has demanded free passage through the Strait, starting with the China-Pakistan joint statement early in the war. China has good relations with Iran, but it also has good relations with all states in the region, and in fact only 20 percent of its oil imports from the Gulf come from Iran, the largest portion comes from Saudi Arabia. If the Iranian regime remains intransigent on this issue, it risks losing the ‘mediation bloc’ if they decide their own security requires them to go all in with the US.

Of course, to re-state: Iran’s position is understandable in the context that the Strait is one of its only strong pieces of leverage against a ruthless superpower like the US that has demonstrated that it can launch a murderous attack in the midst of negotiations. But attacking commercial shipping for the ‘crime’ of using another country’s territorial waters it is a blunt instrument to say the least; ugly regimes like that of the hangmen of Tehran often rely on such blunt instruments because their inability to win the region’s peoples politically is simply an inherent reality, but even this instrument may have a short shelf-life.

The US-Israel-Lebanon ‘Framework’ Agreement – A Challenge to Iran’s regional influence

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Top: US State Secretary Marco Rubio presides over Israel-Lebanon agreement; bottom, US Vice-president JD Vance in same room as Iranian foreign minister Abbas Araghchi for the US-Iran MOU signing, before Araghchi leaves the room.

By Michael Karadjis

The US-mediated Israel-Lebanon ‘framework agreement’ signed by the two countries on June 26 represents a direct challenge to Iran’s attempt to use its new power over the Strait of Hormuz to help achieve a victory for its ally Hezbollah and the south Lebanese Shiite community, a million of whom have been uprooted by Israel’s current occupation of up to one-third of that country.

A victory achieved this way would be a boost to Iran’s regional influence. And if achieved this way via the US-Iranian Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to end the Gulf conflict, it would mean a US role in enhancing Iran’s regional influence at the expense of Israel, as a direct result of Trump’s fateful decision to launch his monstrous war on Iran, which would be unfathomable to Israel – and to the Trump regime.

So, if and Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon and an end to Lebanon’s suffering at Israel’s hands were instead achieved via the new Israel-Lebanon agreement and a negotiated settlement, then surely that is a good thing, isn’t it? Why does Iran get a say in the decisions of the Lebanese government via Hezbollah, the only non-government militia allowed to keep weapons since the end of the Lebanese civil war 35 years ago?

Especially since, so far, Hezbollah’s March 2 decision to join the war in order to avenge Israel’s killing of Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei has only resulted in Israel’s killing of 4000 Lebanese, the uprooting of over a million people from the south and a new Israeli occupation of 10-20 percent of Lebanon, an occupation not there before March.

That at least is the argument put forward by many Lebanese who support this agreement, who say whatever the downsides, Lebanon has suffered enough, an Iranian-backed militia should not have a veto over the national decision, and so this is the only way forward. As Lebanese president, Joseph Aoun says, if you reject the agreement, offer an alternative.

For supporters of Palestine, the fact that the agreement includes clauses about the two countries’ “shared goals to establish stable and peaceful relations” and they declare their intent not only “to conclusively end the [current] conflict” but “to therewith formally conclude any state of war between them,” reads a lot like a normalisation agreement, of the Camp David or Abraham Accords type. The Israeli-Lebanese border has already been long established by the 1949 Armistice, but this did not require full relations, which as with most Arab states, are withheld until Israel agrees to a just resolution of the Palestinian issue.

However, if many Lebanese people decide that having their country destroyed and thousands of their people killed every few years by Israel – which in addition has not led to justice for Palestine – can be ended by signing such an agreement, it is difficult as a non-Lebanese from afar to criticise this desire. And we should not underestimate the degree of support the agreement has from a large section of the population.

But will the agreement lead to Israeli withdrawal?

The problem with this argument is that the agreement does not commit Israel to fully withdrawing its forces. Not only does the agreement stipulate that Hezbollah must be fully disarmed – by the Lebanese government and army – before Israel has to commit to anything, the language remains vague even then.

Israel will carry out “phased withdrawals” from specific “pilot zones” once the Lebanese army has disarmed Hezbollah in those zones, and once complete, new pilot zones can be added. It is unclear how long this process may take, and in the meantime there is nothing preventing Israeli occupation forces continuing to fire on Hezbollah – and for the most part, Lebanese civilians – outside these zones.

In the agreement, Israel states it “has no territorial ambitions in Lebanon” and that disarming Hezbollah and other non-state armed groups, plus “additional security arrangements to be agreed upon,” would “eliminate any future need” for Israeli military action or presence. Needless to say, this is no clear commitment to withdraw from Lebanon. For anyone who has spent even a little time studying the region’s politics, such non-committal language virtually ensures a continual Israeli presence for a substantial period of time, continually dragged out, if not forever.

For example, until recent years, Israel also claimed to have no “territorial ambitions” in the West Bank or Gaza, rather, these were just security-driven “occupations” that just happen to last for decades, due to Palestinian “terrorism,” ie, Palestinian resistance to these occupations. Israel’s continual colonisation and effective annexation of large parts of the West Bank takes place despite having no “territorial ambitions.” From 1978-1990, Israel had not “territorial ambitions’ in Lebanon, but remained in the south until forced out by Lebanese armed resistance in 2000. From 1967 to 1981, Israel allegedly had no “territorial ambitions” in the Syrian Golan Heights, but then it did, and it annexed it. Now Israel does not formally have any “territorial ambitions” in southern Syria outside occupied Golan, but it has occupied a further chunk of Quneitra and Daraa provinces since December 2024; despite the Trump regime supposedly recognising Syria’s territorial integrity, it has not once demanded Israel withdraw to the 1974 UN demarcation lines.

Moreover, two days before the agreement, Netanyahu stated that Israeli occupation forces are actively establishing a fortified military buffer zone across southern Lebanon, which Israel would not withdraw from. The next day, Israeli defence minister Israel Katz repeated his earlier statement that Israeli forces “will remain in the security zones in Lebanon, Syria and Gaza indefinitely.”    

Gaza precedent

Just look at the progress of the ‘Gaza ceasefire’, crowned by Trump’s appointed ‘Board of Peace’ colonial administration. The initial agreement required Israel to gradually withdraw from the 52 percent of Gaza it occupied at the time, to be replaced by an ‘International Stabilisation Force’ which would separate the forces and make way for a Palestinian technical governing authority to replace it, while Hamas agreed to warehouse longer-range weapons but for its full disarmament to take place as part of a pathway towards establishment of a Palestinian state.

The reality is quite different. Apart from continuing to kill Palestinians – over 1000 since the “ceasefire” was established – and continuing to block most desperately needed aid getting into Gaza, Israel first increased its occupation to 58 percent, and has now declared it aims to occupy 70 percent of Gaza, while almost the entire Gaza Palestinian population is pushed into the remaining 30 percent, living on air and desperation. In that majority zone it occupies behind the ‘yellow line’, Israel “has completely bulldozed and razed the area … Israel has built and fortified 38 military bases in eastern Gaza, paved roads leading to the bases, and erected 25 kilometers of massive earth berms to physically divide Gaza.” That is, Israel plans to stay forever.

Rather than insist on Israeli withdrawal, or even allowing in the required amount of humanitarian aid, the Board insists only on complete Hamas disarmament before Israel has to do anything, or before any reconstruction can take place, a complete violation of the terms of the agreement. The Trump regime has left Gaza to its appointed cronies who rule entirely for Israel, with zero pushback or even interest from the US government.

Hezbollah disarmament before Israeli withdrawal

What the Gaza BOD process and this Lebanon framework agreement have in common is that the main armed resistance forces in each arena are required to completely disarm before the occupying power has any obligation to end its occupation of their countries. Yet the occupation is the main reason for the existence of armed resistance movements in the first place. Demanding they disarm before Israeli withdrawal leaves future withdrawal to trust in some imaginary Israeli goodwill. On the basis of experience, this is a big ask to say the least.

The Lebanon agreement thus legitimises Israeli occupation in the south; Israeli forces have a right to be there for Israel’s “security,” despite the security of the Lebanese people being violated by Israel’s atrocious crimes and its meticulous wiping of dozens of towns of villages off the map by dynamiting and bulldozing every home and building, actions which suggest a long-term occupation rather than an emergency security operation. The only enemy in the agreement is deemed to be Hezbollah, the militia resisting this occupation.

Moreover, since Hezbollah takes the opposite view – that disarmament should only proceed once Israeli occupation completely and finally ends – it leaves the situation in deadlock. To put the entire blame on Hezbollah for this is not only to ignore the facts above about Israel’s history of occupations, but also Lebanon’s most recent history. Even after the November 2024 ceasefire, when Hezbollah signed the ceasefire agreement to withdraw north of the Litani and be replaced by the Lebanese army, Israeli forces continued to occupy five small regions across the border, and to launch attacks every day, despite a complete absence of Hezbollah fire throughout that period. And now – regardless of one’s view of Hezbollah’s actions on March 2 or more generally – Hezbollah’s refusal to disarm without Israeli withdrawal cannot be separated from the fact that the million or so uprooted from the south are largely Lebanese Shiites, its communal base, who have no reason to trust Israeli goodwill which it is not even committing to.

But even if many Lebanese disregard this because they believe the alternative is worse, and believe that Hezbollah should disarm in order to strip Israel of excuses to occupy and bomb their country, the fact that it refuses to do so means that eventual disarmament – which most Lebanese see as a valid goal – can only proceed via a process of integration into the Lebanese army as part of an overall political process within Lebanon involving all its components.

By contrast, what this agreement demands is that the Lebanese army forcibly disarms Hezbollah. This can only really mean two things.

In the first scenario, the Lebanese army may not do so beyond declarations, because it knows it is virtually impossible, or instead may attempt a limited operation which is unsuccessful, and in any case, many troops will not want to fight other Lebanese, especially if perceived to be on behalf of the occupation. In this case, the Lebanese government has signed on to the Israeli occupation lasting forever. It will be up to the Lebanese army to prove itself an effective local police force for Israel, and as long as it cannot do so, but keeps attempting on a low level, it becomes a collaborationist ‘Palestinian Authority’ kind of regime in the south, a situation continuing in perpetuity.

Indeed, the parallel to the 1993 Oslo agreement and its decades-long aftermath is unmistakeable – even the concept of “pilot zones” and gradual withdrawal from more of them as ‘security” improves is remarkably similar to the “Gaza and Jericho first” concept in Oslo, which gradually added more Palestinian population centres as Israel annexed everything in between.

In fact, a semi-secret ‘security annex’ of the agreement gives Israel “freedom of military action” within the area still occupied, and even “grants Israel the legal right to re-enter areas at will if it determines that the Lebanese army has failed in its disarmament task,” according to analyst Qassem Qasir. Israel and Lebanon will also establish a Military Coordination Group for Lebanon, “tasked with the mission to operate 24/7, managing deconfliction, verification, and overall implementation,” essentially becoming allies against another Lebanese component.

In the second scenario, the Lebanese army does begin a large-scale military attack on Hezbollah, leading to a renewal of civil war in Lebanon; and given sectarian allegiances, and especially given Israel’s massive dispossession of the Shia, who have nowhere else to turn but to Hezbollah in the circumstances, this means sectarian war. And even then, it is very unlikely that it would be successful. With such massive “instability” and “terrorism” racking its northern neighbour, Israel again has excuses to stay forever in a “security buffer.”

In the final analysis, this is the main problem with the agreement – the requirement to turn the Lebanese army against part of its population on behalf of the enemy. Only if those Lebanese people who understandably support the agreement are asked whether they would be prepared to take part in such an operation, can the real gravity of this agreement be understood.

It is far from inconceivable that creating fratricide in Lebanon is the very aim of Israeli and US leaders. When the host at Channel 13 comments that “It seems we’re leading Lebanon to a civil war. Maybe it’s not so bad for us, let the Lebanese government fight Hezbollah,” the channel’s senior defence correspondent, Alon Ben-David responds “That’s been the goal from the start,” even though he adds “I’m not sure right now, in the current situation, if it has the power to do so. So today, two more signals, let’s call them that, another strike on infrastructure bridges over the Litani River.” Only a television conversation, but rather real: we want the Lebanese army to make war on Hezbollah even though it doesn’t have the power to win, this pointless fratricide allowing us to continue to “send signals.”

Israel’s occupation of southern Lebanon, as of June 18.

Challenge to US-Iran MOU?

This US-mediated agreement represents a direct challenge to the kind of regional power Iran has been attempting to project via the MOU with the US over that war. Before agreeing to lift its closure of the Strait of Hormuz following the April 7 ceasefire, Iran insisted the ceasefire include Lebanon. This was initially rejected by the US. Israel reacted by terror-bombing Beirut. When the US prevailed upon Israel to cool it, and then actually agree to a ceasefire formality, Iran finally opened the Strait ten days later (it then closed it again when the US refused to reciprocate and maintained its blockade of Iranian ports). This showed that Iran could use its new-found power over the Strait to make an impact on the broader region.

Such an outcome was viewed negatively by the US and Israel. However, in reality, the ceasefire favoured Israel, because it left it in occupation of 10 percent of Lebanon, which it had not been in before Hezbollah had launched its strikes on Israel on March 2. Thus, while Iran’s ability to force a change was a political victory for Iran, the actual situation on the ground was a victory for Israel. And it became even more so, because Israel barely adhered to the “ceasefire” for a day and continued killing at an alarming rate, while meticulously destroying everything standing in Lebanese towns and villages it occupied.

This reality was alarming for Iran’s own credibility. So it again insisted on “linkage,” that is, that its MOU with the US specifically include a ceasefire in Lebanon. Given that Israel’s continual actions since then have been on a relatively much lower level than during the first farcical “ceasefire,” this again could be seen as a victory for Iran. Even more, Iran insisted on including recognition of Lebanon’s “territorial integrity” in the language this time, somewhat strengthening it.

However, there is no commitment to Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in the US-Iran MOU any more than there is in the Israel-Lebanon agreement, and in fact Israeli occupation forces occupy a substantially larger region now than at the outset of the April 17 Lebanon ceasefire. The language of “territorial integrity” is not different in substance from the language in this agreement that Israel has no “territorial ambitions” and that both sides support “full Lebanese state sovereignty” and so on. All are similarly vague with no commitment to withdrawal.

So those claiming that Iran had put Israeli withdrawal into the agreement are kidding themselves; of course, in the course of the 60 days of negotiations, Iran may insist on that as part of a final agreement; or it may not, depending on what else is on offer. However, that is not really point – the point remains that the MOU text, signed by the US, formally gives Iran, but not Israel, a say in what happens in Lebanon.

Even worse, the two mediator countries, Pakistan and Qatar, issued a declaration a few days later stating that “a de-confliction cell” would be created involving Iran, the US, Lebanon and the two mediators, “to ensure the adherence of the termination of military operations in Lebanon as per the MoU.” Thus Iran, but not Israel, was given a say in Lebanon!

To say the least, this was a huge affront to Israel, not necessarily because Israeli leaders are worried they may be pushed to withdraw, given no such language exists in the MOU. Rather, because Iran is now promoted as regional actor, and Israel not included on an issue in its “backyard.” This was also unacceptable to Trump and the US government more broadly. Yes, they needed the MOU. They will not scrap it over Lebanon having just signed it with Lebanon. But that doesn’t stop the US pursuing another track.

According to Netanyahu, the new agreement means that “Israel, Lebanon and the United States are essentially telling Iran: ‘This is none of your business. You have no status here, no involvement and no role. Not you, not Hezbollah, not any terrorist organization’.”

Netanyahu is correct. While we will have to wait and see, at first sight this represents quite a coup for Israel, and for the US bargaining position with Iran. If Iran did plan to push full Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon as part of its final deal, it is far more difficult now that the Lebanese government has signed its own agreement with Israel on a process that supposedly leads to Israeli withdrawal on its own timetable. It is one thing for Iran to negotiate on behalf of Hezbollah. It is another to try to dictate policy to the Lebanese government.

That said, that may even be an ‘escape valve’ for Iran if needed.

What Lebanon wants, what Iran wants – Is the Iranian element blameless?

In fact, one of Lebanese president’s key arguments has been that Iran has no right to dictate what Lebanon can do, an argument which, at face value, has merit; even more, he accuses Iran of seeking to use Lebanese sovereignty as a “bargaining chip” in its negotiations with the US. Given the content and context of the agreement as described above, this may seem rich coming from a government which has arguably signed away Lebanese sovereignty. But what of the argument itself?

Much as Iran has been arguing for inclusion of Lebanon in any deal, is Aoun’s implication that Iran could trade this away for better terms on other issues possible? It may be unlikely, but not out of the question. The fact that Iran’s insistence on Lebanese ceasefire (but not Israeli withdrawal) in the first April ceasefire meant nothing in practice and that Israel continued its killing and expanded its occupation over the next two months is evidence that it is possible.

That is not necessarily even a criticism. A country that has suffered such a violent attack, such massive destruction, after years of maximum pressure sanctions, cannot be expected to hold the line for other peoples’ struggles. That is just a reality. If Iran is offered a very good package in other respects and drops Israeli withdrawal from its conditions this cannot be called “betrayal” (except that Hezbollah’s action on March 2 was in solidarity with Iran … but that is part of the problem …). [To digress, the charge by some activists that Iran has “betrayed” Palestine by not including Gaza in the MOU is even more misleading, simply highlighting their illusions that Palestine has anything to do with Iran in the first place].

But in that sense, Aoun’s claim that Iran’s heavy involvement in Lebanon via Hezbollah may just be a bargaining chip is not necessarily wrong in the abstract. It is quite possible to be highly critical of the Israel-Lebanon agreement – as a possible road to continued Israeli occupation, a south Lebanese ‘Oslo’ or even to civil war – without being uncritical of the Iranian regime’s own power projection in the region.

Like any medium-sized capitalist power, Iran aims to increase its power and influence in the region. There is a great deal to criticise, or vigorously condemn, about the way it has done so, especially in Syria and Iraq, but this is not the space to cover such ground. Two anecdotes suffice for now: in 2015, when Iran was at the zenith of its regional power, Iranian MP Ali Reza Zakani claimed that Iran now controls four Arab capitals, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus and Sanaa; while Ali Younisi, adviser to Iranian president Hassan Rouhani, stated that Iran now formed an empire, and that Baghdad was its “capital.”

Hezbollah was different, because it arose as a genuine expression of the resistance of south Lebanon’s Shiite population against the two-decade Israeli occupation. This gave Iran’s “resistance” ideology, otherwise hot air from a safe distance, some actual substance, given the Shiite religious connection and thus its reception to Khomeiniite ideology.

But once Israel was driven out in 2000, the right of Hezbollah to maintain arms due to “resistance” – while the militias of all other Lebanese communities dissolved at the end of the civil war in 1990 – came into question. Other than a short, but terrible, war in 2006, the Israel-Lebanon border was silent from 2000 to 2023. While an “axis of resistance” was talked about, none of the big Israeli wars on Gaza – 2008-9, 2012, 2014, 2019, 2021 – led to any reaction from across the Lebanese border, until the onset of the Gaza genocide (and even this reaction seems to have been a Hezbollah decision – driven by its south Lebanon context – rather than Iranian decision).

Why then did Iran want to maintain an armed Hezbollah in Lebanon? Surely it could have just as well maintained its influence, including significant economic penetration by Iranian capital, within the Lebanese Shiite community anyway. Israel, however, began campaigning from the early 1990s against an “Iranian bomb” that was often allegedly just “weeks away” from being built. As we have seen, this had an ideological function for the uncompromising, expansionist Zionist regime to justify everything. “Resistance” ideology played a similar role in the mobilizational needs of the Iranian regime.

But Iran also had reason to believe that Israel’s threats could someday become a reality. In past decades, Israel had bombed civilian nuclear facilities in both Iraq and Syria, and it had also killed Iranian scientists. Having an armed presence next door to Israel was a kind of forward security policy for Iran. As Palestinian writer Rashid Khalidi – author of ‘The 100 Years War on Palestine’ – put it, “I never believed there was such a thing as an axis of resistance. There was an axis for protection of Iran.”

Whether one agrees with this or not, Hezbollah’s fateful March 2 dispatch of rockets on northern Israel to avenge the death of an Iranian leader certainly supports Khalidi’s claim. Israel’s flagrant aggression against Iran means it is obviously no innocent here, to state the obvious, and its crocodile tears over northern Israeli communities sits uncomfortably with its vaporisation of countless Iranians at that very moment; and an act in solidarity with a foreign state under attack might sound admirable. But such a decision should be made by the Lebanese people as a whole, not by one organisation representing one part of one of its sectarian components, because the result – killing and destruction on an enormous scale and a new occupation – impacts all of Lebanon.

Hezbollah justified its action on the basis that Israel was still occupying five small regions near the border in violation of the November 2024 ceasefire, and this is true. But these were essentially five hilltop forts with a total area of some hectares, while now Israel is in occupation of up to a fifth of the country. Moreover, that had been the case all along; the March action was undeniably to avenge Khamenei.

That of course is not up to a non-Lebanese writer from far away, but up to the Lebanese people to sort out. But that is kind of the point.

Now – Lebanese Shiites have the right to resist occupation and dispossession

All that said, the situation has changed. All of Lebanon is impacted; but it is largely a million Shiites uprooted from the region under Israel’s occupation, the region being destroyed Gaza-style. And Hezbollah once again is their only organ to resist this occupation.

Israel’s gigantically “disproportionate” response – if it is even possible to use such terms – has given Hezbollah a new lease on life as a vehicle of resistance. Anyone would think this was Israel’s aim.

I am not so conspiratorial. But perhaps the point is that Israel’s aims have changed and that “disproportionate response” is now no longer a useful description, and not only because of the astronomical degree of the “disproportionality.”

When leader after leader states either that Israel plans to stay forever, or that Israel’s new borders should be the Litani (a view that is deeply held within Israeli society), or that a Greater Israel as allegedly depicted in biblical texts is a valid goal, we start to get the idea: West Bank, Gaza and Golan are not the limits of the expansionist state.

If the goal now actually is Greater Israel with new borders (for now?) on the Litani, then Hezbollah’s brief changes back to what it was in 1980s and 1990s, as opposed to the 2000-2023 period. And that puts real pressure on Iran not to trade it away; while not out of the question, an Iranian “betrayal” in the context of a long-term Israeli goal for new borders at the expense of the Shiites really would be a massive setback for the Iranian regime. As opposed to regimes or forces that Iran may have established transactional relations with at times, it is no accident that the only solid allies (whether considered “proxies” or otherwise) that Iran has in the region to use to project power and influence are among the Shiite populations in Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen. It may be able to give up Hezbollah’s armed forward defence role (especially now that Iran has broken the psychological barrier of directly hitting back at Israel), but it will not want to lose its influence among 40 percent of the Lebanese population.   But we will have to wait and see whether either the US-Iran agreement or the US-Israel-Lebanon agreement get Israel out of its new conquest. My long-time prognosis remains: a relative Iranian victory in the Gulf, and a relative Israeli victory in its own vicinity. If Israel still sees this as a defeat it is because it rejects sharing the region with any second hegemon.